United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Jacksonville Division
TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
initiated this case by filing a pro se Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) (Petition). He challenges his
“administrative segregation or other incarcerative
results of administrative disciplinary action, ” by
raising the following four claims: (1) “prison
officials have failed to provide sufficient evidence to
support their decision to retain [Petitioner] in close
management confinement”; (2) the Florida Department of
Corrections (DOC) “has failed to conduct [close
management] reviews in a manner consistent with their rules
and . . . such failure is intentional and meant to serve as
punishment for Petitioner's grievances”; (3) the
“DOC has deprived [Petitioner] of his state-created
liberty interest in retaining his 90 day review”; and
(4) “DOC's disparate treatment of inmates in the
Transitional Care Unit, out-patient, close management unit
from those in the Residential Treatment Program deprives
Petitioner of equal protection of the law.” Petition at
5-16. As relief, he requests “an evidentiary hearing
and immediate relief from close management status.”
Id. at 21.
filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 10), requesting this case be
dismissed for Petitioner's failure to exhaust his
available administrative remedies. Petitioner replied. See
“Traverse and Supporting Document” (Doc. 12).
the filing of the Petition, Petitioner has been released from
custody. He is currently on conditional release supervision,
with a scheduled termination date of June 21,
2021. Petitioner's only request for relief
in this case is “an evidentiary hearing and immediate
relief from close management status.” Petition at 21.
Now that Petitioner is no longer in custody, this Court
cannot provide him with the relief he requests. Because
Petitioner challenges the status of his confinement, rather
than his underlying conviction, there are no collateral
consequences to consider. Thus, this case is moot. See
Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049, 1053 (11th Cir. 2003)
(“Where . . . a prisoner has completed an imposed term
of administrative segregation before he files his petition, .
. . the petition[ is] moot when filed and cannot be revived
by collateral consequences.” (quotations and citation
omitted)); Hernandez v. Wainwright, 796 F.2d 389,
390 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Bailey v.
Southerland, 821 F.2d 277, 278-79 (5th Cir. 1987).
7, 2018, Petitioner filed a response (Doc. 19), arguing that
his conditional release subjects him to reincarceration at
any time with the potential of being subjected to the
“harsh conditions” presented in this
case. The fact that Petitioner could
face reincarceration (and then be placed on close management)
if he violates his conditional release is speculative. There
is not “‘a reasonable expectation'”
that Petitioner will “‘be subjected to the same
action again.'” Medberry v. Crosby, 135
Fed.Appx. 333, 335 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Murphy v.
Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982)); see Kirkland v.
Jones, No. 3:14CV11/MCR/EMT, 2015 WL 2372778, at *3
(N.D. Fla. May 18, 2015) (unpublished) (“Because
Petitioner challenges only his 60-day placement in
disciplinary confinement and his continuation on CM status,
and he is no longer incarcerated, his application for habeas
relief is moot.”); Medina v. Warden, FCC
Coleman-USP I, No. 5:10-cv-530-Oc-38, 2014 WL 345703, at
*2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2014) (unpublished) (finding that a
habeas “[p]etition seeking release from administrative
confinement, or lesser restrictions while housed in
confinement, [wa]s moot due to [the p]etitioner's
transfer from the BOP to the Mississippi Department of
Corrections”); Martens v. McNeil, No.
2:08-cv-201-FTM-36, 2011 WL 485886, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 7,
2011) (unpublished) (finding that the
“[p]etitioner's challenges to his previous
placement on Close Management cannot be revived by collateral
consequences, ” and the
“capable-of-repetition-but-evading-review exception is
inapplicable” as the “[p]etitioner holds the keys
to remaining off Close Management status, to the extent that
if he adheres to the Department's rules and regulations
he will not be subjected to disciplinary action”);
Hiteshaw v. Dep't of Children & Families,
No. 2:06-cv-586-FtM-99, 2011 WL 308174, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan.
27, 2011) (unpublished) (“Any claim that [the
p]etitioner's release will be revoked in the future would
be purely speculative.”); Adamson v. McNeil,
No. 3:08CV132 MCR EMT, 2010 WL 4483399, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Oct.
13, 2010) (unpublished), report and recommendation
adopted, 2010 WL 4457049 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2010)
(unpublished) (“Petitioner's challenges to his
placement on CM for eight (8) years . . . were rendered moot
by Petitioner's release from CM during the pendency of
this habeas action.”).Accordingly, it is
1. This case is DISMISSED as moot.
2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case as
moot and close the file.
3. If Petitioner appeals, the Court denies a certificate of
appealability. The Clerk shall terminate any motion to
proceed on appeal as a pauper that may be filed in this case.
Such termination shall serve as a denial of the motion.
 See Supervised Population
Information Search, Florida Department of Corrections,
(last visited May 14, 2018).
 Attached to the response is a
grievance written by Petitioner on April 11, 2018. He notes
that he “was transferred to Columbia C.I. on or about
Jan. 9, 2018, ” and he was “[r]eleased to the
inmate general population on Jan. 10, 2018.” Doc. 19-2
at 2. Thus, even before his ...