final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion
under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.
appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. Russell
Thomas, Public Defender, and Jasmine Russell, Assistant
Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross,
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Crenshaw was charged with grand theft after surveillance
video showed her leaving her Burger King shift carrying cash
in a to-go bag. According to the restaurant's owner, the
money in the bag (some $1, 600) was supposed to be deposited
in the bank, but it never made it. He said other deposits had
gone missing in the months before Crenshaw's arrest, too.
Almost all of those deposits disappeared on days Crenshaw was
scheduled to work.
trial, Crenshaw moved for a judgment of acquittal. She argued
that while she may have left work with money in a to-go
bag-as seen in the video-that did not prove she stole
anything. Instead, according to Crenshaw and other witnesses,
Burger King managers were encouraged to carry deposits in
to-go bags-the same bags customers get their food in-because
the bags were inexpensive and inconspicuous.
court denied Crenshaw's motion, and the jury later
convicted her of grand theft. The court sentenced her to six
months' imprisonment, followed by four years'
probation. Now, Crenshaw appeals the court's decision,
raising the same judgment-of-acquittal argument and
challenging an aspect of her sentence.
review de novo the order denying the acquittal motion, and we
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State.
Pagan v. State, 830 So.2d 792, 803 (Fla. 2002). To
survive the motion, the State needed to present evidence that
Crenshaw intended to deprive Burger King, permanently or
temporarily, of at least $300 worth of property. §§
812.014(1), (2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2016).
the issue of Crenshaw's intent, we note that there was
evidence that employees routinely took deposits to the bank
in togo bags rather than bank-provided bags; the restaurant
owner confirmed as much on cross-examination. But there was
also evidence that the bank never received several deposits
Crenshaw was scheduled to deliver (in addition to the one
seen in the video), despite having a dual-controlled and
video-monitored system of accepting and processing deposits.
Furthermore, the jury saw Crenshaw tightly wrap money in one
to-go bag, put that money at the bottom of another to-go bag,
place other objects in the bag (concealing its contents), and
then store the bag among her personal effects. Considering
all of this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that
Crenshaw intended to deprive the restaurant of the money she
left the store with. See Manuel v. State, 16 So.3d
833, 835 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) ("[T]aking the evidence in
a light most favorable to the State, intent can be inferred
from the circumstances of the incident.").
the value of the funds, there was evidence to support a
finding that the $300 threshold was satisfied. Although there
was evidence of multiple missing deposits, only one day's
events were captured on video. But there was evidence that
one day's deposit alone was worth at least $1, 600. The
trial court did not err in denying the motion for judgment of
separately argues that the court should have granted her
motion to correct a sentencing error. When orally pronouncing
sentence, the trial court gave Crenshaw jail credit. But the
subsequent written order gave Crenshaw less jail credit.
Crenshaw moved to correct the written order to align with the
oral pronouncement, but the court denied the motion. The
court said its oral pronouncement gave too much credit, that
the written order was correct, and that its erroneous oral
pronouncement constituted a "scrivener's
error." Although the oral pronouncement generally
controls-even when it provides too much jail credit, see
Nelson v. State, 148 So.3d 173, 174 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)
(holding that the oral pronouncement granting jail credit
controls over the written sentence "[r]egardless of
whether the appellant is entitled to the credit");
see also Douglas v. State, 140 So.3d 691, 691 (Fla.
1st DCA 2014) ("It is a longstanding principle that a
court's oral pronouncement controls over any written
sentencing document."), the issue is now moot because
Crenshaw has already completed her jail term. See Toomer
v. State, 895 So.2d 1256 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (issues of
jail credit are rendered moot once the sentence has been
completed). We therefore dismiss as moot the portion of this
appeal challenging the jail credit.
in part; Dismissed in part.
Kelsey, and ...