United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Orlando Division
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JULIE
S. SNEED, UNTIED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff,
Michael Freeman, seeks judicial review of the denial of his
claim for supplemental security income (“SSI”).
As the Administrative Law Judge's (“ALJ”)
decision was not based on substantial evidence and did not
employ proper legal standards, the Court recommends that the
decision be reversed and remanded for further consideration.
BACKGROUND
A.
Procedural Background
Plaintiff
received SSI benefits beginning May 5, 2000, at age seven,
when the ALJ determined that he was disabled under the SSI
standards for a child under the age of eighteen. (Tr. 52, 60,
122.) After Plaintiff reached the age of eighteen, the
Commissioner reconsidered Plaintiff's eligibility for SSI
under the rules for determining disability in adults and
determined that Plaintiff was no longer disabled. (Tr. 64-66,
69-81.) Upon Plaintiff's request, the ALJ held a hearing
at which Plaintiff appeared and testified. (Tr. 489-506.)
Following the hearing, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision
finding Plaintiff not disabled since August 1, 2011, and
accordingly denied Plaintiff's claims for benefits. (Tr.
511.) Subsequently, Plaintiff requested review from the
Appeals Council, which the Appeals Council denied. (Tr. 1-6.)
Plaintiff appealed on October 22, 2015, and this Court
remanded the case for further administrative proceedings.
(Tr. 557-80.) While Plaintiff's appeal was pending, he
filed a new application for benefits, which the Appeals
Council consolidated with the remanded case. (Tr. 583-84.)
After holding a second hearing, the ALJ issued an unfavorable
decision on January 10, 2017. (Tr. 404-20.) Plaintiff then
timely filed a complaint with this Court. (Dkt. 1.) The case
is now ripe for review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 42
U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3).
B.
Factual Background and the ALJ's Decision
Plaintiff,
who was born in 1993, claimed disability beginning as a child
on May 17, 2000. (Tr. 122.) Plaintiff has a limited
education. (Tr. 125.) Plaintiff has no past relevant work
experience. (Id.) Plaintiff alleged disability due
to a learning disability. (Id.)
In
rendering the decision, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had
never performed substantial gainful activity. (Tr. 419.)
After conducting a hearing and reviewing the evidence of
record, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the following
severe impairments: diabetes mellitus, dependent and
schizotypal personality disorder, affective disorder, and
learning disorder. (Tr. 407.) Notwithstanding the noted
impairments, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have
an impairment or combination of impairments that met or
medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R.
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Id.) The ALJ then
concluded that Plaintiff retained a residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work
“except he can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffold
but can occasionally climb ramps and stairs.” (Tr.
412.) The ALJ further limited Plaintiff's RFC in finding
that Plaintiff can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel,
crouch, or crawl. (Id.) The ALJ found Plaintiff must
avoid concentrated exposure to extreme heat and workplace
hazards, but can perform simple, routine, and repetitive
tasks with occasional changes in a routine work setting and
“no production rate pace work.” (Id.)
The ALJ also concluded that Plaintiff can occasionally
interact with coworkers but is limited to minimal,
superficial interaction with the general public.
(Id.) In formulating Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ
considered Plaintiff's subjective complaints and
determined that, although the evidence established the
presence of underlying impairments that reasonably could be
expected to produce the symptoms alleged, Plaintiff's
statements as to the intensity, persistence, and limiting
effects of his symptoms were not fully credible. (Tr. 413.)
As
noted, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have any
past relevant work. (Tr. 419.) Given Plaintiff's
background and RFC, the vocational expert (“VE”)
testified that Plaintiff could perform jobs existing in
significant numbers in the national economy, such as a
garment sorter, laundry folder, and retail marker. (Tr. 420.)
Accordingly, based on Plaintiff's age, education, work
experience, RFC, and the testimony of the VE, the ALJ found
Plaintiff not disabled. (Id.)
APPLICABLE
STANDARDS
To be
entitled to benefits, a claimant must be disabled, meaning
that the claimant must be unable to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result
in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). A “physical
or mental impairment” is an impairment that results
from anatomical, physiological, or psychological
abnormalities that are demonstrable by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 423(d)(3), 1382c(a)(3)(D).
The
Social Security Administration, in order to regularize the
adjudicative process, promulgated the detailed regulations
currently in effect. These regulations establish a
“sequential evaluation process” to determine
whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. If
an individual is found disabled at any point in the
sequential review, further inquiry is unnecessary. 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920(a). Under this process, the ALJ must
determine, in sequence, the following: (1) whether the
claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful
activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment,
i.e., one that significantly limits the ability to perform
work-related functions; (3) whether the severe impairment
meets or equals the medical criteria of 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1; and, (4) whether the claimant can
perform his or her past relevant work. If the claimant cannot
perform the tasks required of his or her prior work, step
five of the evaluation requires the ALJ to decide if the
claimant can do other work in the national economy in view of
the claimant's age, education, and work experience. 20
C.F.R. § 416.920(a). A claimant is entitled to benefits
only if unable to perform other work. Bowen v.
Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987); 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(g).
A
determination by the Commissioner that a claimant is not
disabled must be upheld if it is supported by substantial
evidence and comports with applicable legal standards.
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)
(quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197,
229 (1938)); Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400
(11th Cir. 1996). While the court reviews the
Commissioner's decision with deference to the factual
findings, no such deference is given to the legal
conclusions. Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994).
In
reviewing the Commissioner's decision, the court may not
decide the facts anew, re-weigh the evidence, or substitute
its own judgment for that of the ALJ, even if it finds that
the evidence preponderates against the ALJ's decision.
Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th
Cir. 1983). The Commissioner's failure to apply the
correct law, or to give the reviewing court sufficient
reasoning for determining that he or she has conducted the
proper legal analysis, mandates reversal. Keeton, 21
F.3d at 1066. The scope of review is thus limited to
determining whether the findings of the Commissioner are
...