final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit,
Indian River County; Cynthia L. Cox, Judge; L.T. Case Nos.
312012CF000882A, 312012CF000882C, 312012CF000882E.
Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kimberly T.
Acuña, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach,
Murrell, West Palm Beach, for appellee Lewis Stouffer.
R. Aaronson of Benjamin, Aaronson & Patanzo, PA, Fort
Lauderdale, for appellee Clark Jeffrey Thompson.
S. Weinstein of Hinshaw & Culbertson, LLP, Coral Gables,
for appellee Craig L. Turturo.
Indian River County Sheriff's Office ("IRCSO")
detective, as part of an investigation originating in his
home county, was the sole affiant on applications and
affidavits for search warrants in both Broward and Palm Beach
Counties. The trial court granted the motion to suppress
evidence that was obtained as a result of both search
warrants, stating that the detective acted outside his
jurisdiction "under color of office" to obtain both
asked to determine if the detective had the authority to be
the affiant on search warrants and their accompanying
affidavits in counties outside his jurisdiction where the
detective was investigating a case that originated within his
own jurisdiction. We find that the trial court erred in
suppressing the evidence and find that the detective could be
an affiant for applications and affidavits that would serve
as the basis for search warrants outside of his jurisdiction.
Therefore, we reverse and remand.
to the suppression hearing conducted by the trial court, the
parties stipulated that an investigation of pain clinics
began in Indian River County in 2011. IRCSO, the Drug
Enforcement Agency, and various other local law enforcement
agencies were involved in this joint investigation, which
included multiple defendants and various locations in several
counties in Florida. As part of the investigation, a
detective from IRCSO went to Broward County and Palm Beach
County to be the affiant on search warrant applications for
the residences of appellees in both counties. The IRCSO
detective was the sole affiant on the search warrants. The
detective included in the affidavit in support of the search
warrants that he is a sworn law enforcement officer from the
IRCSO. He also utilized sealed wiretap information that was
part of the ongoing investigation in Indian River County.
search warrants were executed by law enforcement officers
with either statewide or local jurisdiction. Subsequently,
appellees filed motions to suppress alleging that the IRCSO
detective was outside of his jurisdiction when he sought the
search warrants in Broward and Palm Beach. The trial court
agreed by granting the motion to suppress and finding that
the detective acted "under color of office" when
being an affiant of the search warrants from Broward County
and Palm Beach County. This appeal follows.
trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress comes to the
appellate court clothed with a presumption of correctness and
the court must interpret the evidence and reasonable
inferences and deductions derived therefrom in a manner most
favorable to sustaining the trial court's ruling."
Luna v. State, 154 So.3d 1181, 1183 (Fla. 4th DCA
2015) (citation omitted). "The appellate court defers to
the trial court's findings regarding the facts and uses
the de novo standard of review for legal conclusions."
Id. (citation omitted). To the extent this case
involves an issue of statutory interpretation, a de novo
standard of review applies. Therlonge v. State, 184
So.3d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).
begin our analysis by reviewing the plain language of the
applicable statutes. Section 933.06, Florida Statutes (2011),
The judge must, before issuing the warrant, have the
application of some person for said warrant duly sworn to and
subscribed, and may receive further testimony from witnesses
or supporting affidavits, or depositions in writing, to
support the application. The affidavit and further proof, if
same be had or required, must set forth the facts tending to