United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division
CLYDE J. HOLLIDAY, III, Plaintiff,
SYNDICATE 3000 at LLOYD'S, UNDERWRITERS AT, LONDON, and their appointees, assigns, and affiliates, Defendant.
VIRGNIA M. HERNANDEZ COVINGTON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter comes before the Court pursuant to Pro se Plaintiff
Clyde J. Holliday, III's Motion for Reconsideration (Doc.
# 49), filed on May 24, 2018. For the reasons that follow,
the Motion is denied.
as here, a motion for reconsideration is filed within 28 days
of an order, Rule 59 applies. Beach Terrace Condo.
Ass'n, Inc. v. Goldring Inves., No.
8:15-cv-1117-T-33TBM, 2015 WL 4548721, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July
28, 2015). “The only grounds for granting a Rule 59
motion are newly discovered evidence or manifest errors of
law or fact.” Anderson v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl.
Prot., 567 Fed.Appx. 679, 680 (11th Cir. 2014)(quoting
Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir.
relief under Rule 59(e) is “an extraordinary remedy to
be employed sparingly in the interests of finality and
conservation of scarce judicial resources.” United
States v. DeRochemont, No. 8:10-cr-287-T-24MAP, 2012 WL
13510, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 4, 2012)(citation omitted).
Furthermore, “a Rule 59(e) motion [cannot be used] to
relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence
that could have been raised prior to the entry of
judgment.” Michael Linet, Inc. v. Vill. of
Wellington, 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005).
review of the facts of this case is unnecessary. The Court
granted Markel Syndicate 3000's Motion to Dismiss the
Third Amended Complaint and dismissed this case without
prejudice on May 15, 2018. (Doc. # 48). The Court dismissed
the case for insufficient service of process because Holliday
failed to properly serve Markel Syndicate 3000 with a summons
along with a copy of the Third Amended Complaint by the
service deadline of April 23, 2018. (Id. at 10).
Order, the Court noted that it had previously “reminded
Holliday of his responsibility to properly serve Syndicate
3000 in the manner prescribed by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4.” (Doc. # 48 at 4). Indeed, in a previous
Order from April 2, 2018, the Court had extended the service
deadline to April 23 and advised “Holliday to
familiarize himself with the service requirements of Rule
4.” (Doc. # 39). The Court had also warned Holliday:
“Further extensions will not be granted and failure to
properly serve Defendant and file proof of service by April
23 will result in dismissal of this action.”
Holliday argues that the Court should reconsider its Order
dismissing the case without prejudice. (Doc. # 49). He makes
numerous arguments about various errors he believes the Court
has made and misrepresentations he believes Markel Syndicate
3000 has made. Because the Court dismissed the case for
insufficient service of process, the Court need only address
Holliday's argument that service was properly affected.
service, Holliday states:
Plaintiff did in fact, as a result of its Pro Se status
believe that when Service of Process was performed upon the
Defendant, both in New York, City and London, UK that (a) the
State as Agent for the Defendant under Statute was in fact a
Summons issued by the State of Florida in accordance with
State of Florida statutes governing “Service of
Process” and (b) that as the name of the Defendant
continued as Underwriters at Lloyds, London, again being
named as the Defendant pursuant to the specific orders of the
Florida Department of Financial Services, there was factually
NO name change and that an additional Service of Process 6,
2018, 17 days in advance of the Court's stipulated date
of April 23, 2018 indicating there is NO violation of the
part of the Pro Se Plaintiff, and that further any minimal
delay in posting the Summons as issued by the Clerk of the
Court, would have posed “No Harm To The
Defendant” and would fall under the provision of Fed
Rule 61 as Harmless Error for which Plaintiff believes he is
entitled to relief.
(Doc. # 49 at 2). He neither argues nor presents evidence
that Markel Syndicate was actually served with a true summons
on April 6, 2018, when it was first served with the Third
Amended Complaint. Instead, he insists his error in believing
service performed by Florida's Department of Financial
Services trumped the need for a summons issued by the Clerk
of this Court was harmless and should be ignored.
argument does not warrant reconsideration of the Court's
prior Order. Holliday had previously obtained a summons from
the Clerk in August of 2017, when he filed his original
Complaint. (Doc. # 2). So, he knew that summonses are
obtained from the Clerk of the Middle District of Florida -
not from Florida's Department of Financial Services. The
Court had advised Holliday on the requirements of service of
process and emphasized that Holliday would be required to
follow all the dictates of Rule 4. (Doc. ## 5, 8, 10, 37,
39). That includes Rule 4's requirement that a summons -
signed by the Clerk and bearing the Court's seal - be
served with a complaint. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(a)-(c)(1). Rule 4(m)
specifies that, if a defendant is not properly served within
the time limit for service, “the court - on motion or
on its own after notice to the plaintiff - must dismiss the
action without prejudice against that defendant or order that
service be made within a specified time.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
4(m). The Court had warned Holliday that failure to properly
serve by the April 23 deadline would result in dismissal and
the Court was not required to grant Holliday yet another
extension of time to properly serve Markel Syndicate 3000.
(Doc. # 39).
also emphasizes the second affidavit of Barbara Demosthenes,
the attorney who accepted service on behalf of Markel
Syndicate 3000 on both April 6, 2018, and May 3, 2018. (Doc.
# 49 at 2). In that second affidavit filed on May 9, 2018,
Demosthenes avers that she received a summons and copy of the
Third Amended Complaint on May 3, 2018. (Doc. # ...