final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion
under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.
appeal from the Circuit Court for Madison County. E. Bailey
Browning, III, Judge.
Smith, pro se, Appellant.
Zachary Daniel, pro se, Appellee.
the mother, appeals that portion of the "Final Judgment
of Dissolution of Marriage with Dependent or Minor
Child" ordering shared parental responsibility and
granting supervised parenting time between the parties'
minor child and Appellee, the father. Because those
provisions of the final judgment ignore an unexpired Kentucky
Domestic Violence Order of Protection entered against the
father, and for additional reasons discussed below, we
court has "broad discretion" in determining
time-sharing matters and parenting plans, and its decision
will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of
discretion. J.N.S. v. A.M.A., 194 So.3d 559, 560
(Fla. 5th DCA 2016); Miller v. Miller, 842 So.2d
168, 169 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). In the present case, however,
we hold the trial court did abuse its discretion by failing
to accord full faith and credit due the Kentucky Domestic
Violence Order of Protection under 18 U.S.C. §
2265(a) and section 741.315(2), Florida Statutes
(2016). See also § 61.526(1), Fla.
Stat. (2016). Significantly, the Order of Protection
prohibits the father from coming within 500 feet of the minor
child. By granting the father "parenting time, "
even though supervised, the final order directly contravenes
the explicit terms of the Order of Protection.
the Order of Protection was direct and unrefuted evidence of
domestic violence against the mother and the minor child by
the father. Although the trial court did find that domestic
violence occurred during the marriage because the father did
not refute the mother's allegations of the violence,
there is nothing in the final order suggesting that the trial
court seriously considered this finding in carrying out its
duty to determine the best interests of the child according
to the provisions of sections 61.13(2)(c)2. and 61.13(3)(m),
Florida Statutes (2016). Nor can the court's
pronouncement that the father should enjoy shared parental
responsibility and visitation with the minor child be
reconciled to its crediting of the mother's testimony
that the domestic violence "did substantial emotional
damage to the Child" and "that the Child's
conditions and [medical] status require special consideration
and attention by the Court."
addition, apart from giving a passing mention to domestic
violence, which, as previously noted, is a factor to be
considered under section 61.13(3)(m), the final order is
otherwise devoid of any suggestion that the trial court
considered the remaining factors in section 61.13(3)(a)-(t),
Florida Statutes (2016), in order to determine the best
interests of the child. See Bainbridge v. Pratt, 68
So.3d 310, 313 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (concluding that while
"there is no statutory requirement that a trial court
engage in a discussion as to each of the factors [in section
61.13(3)], a discussion of the relevant factors can be
helpful in determining whether the trial court's judgment
is supported by competent, substantial evidence"). For
this reason, we conclude that the trial court's award of
shared parental responsibility and parenting time is not
based on competent, substantial evidence.
we reverse that portion of the "Final Judgment of
Dissolution of Marriage with Dependent or Minor Child"
relating to shared parental responsibility and parenting
time. We remand the case to the trial court with instructions
for it to reconsider, and if necessary, to take additional
evidence on and make findings concerning, the Kentucky
Domestic Violence Protection Order and the best interests of
the child, as those factors directly affect the issues of
shared parental responsibility and parenting time.
in part, Reversed, in part, and Remanded for further
Roberts, and Jay, JJ, concur