United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Fort Myers Division
OPINION AND ORDER 
POLSTER CHAPPELL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter comes before the Court on Defendant James
Dryzmala's Motion to Establish Briefing Schedule (Doc.
23) filed on May 24, 2018. Plaintiff Adam Lacroix responded
on May 24, 2018. (Docs. 24; 25). Defendant Lee County,
Florida responded on May 30, 2018. (Doc. 27). The matter is
ripe for review.
a civil-rights case. Lacroix filed his Complaint and a
request for a preliminary injunction in March 2018. (Doc. 1;
7). The instant dispute concerns the propriety of issuing a
briefing schedule for Lacroix's pending preliminary
injunction request (Doc. 7). Dryzmala argues that a briefing
schedule would allow the Defendants to fully address the
complex issues in this case, and would thereby benefit both
the Court and the interests of justice. Lacroix does not
respond to Dryzmala's argument, except to contend that
any briefing schedule should not include Lee County because
it is subject to an enforceable scheduling stipulation. Lee
County opposes Lacroix's position. The Court will address
the arguments in turn.
the Court addresses the propriety of a briefing schedule.
District courts have a considerable amount of discretion in
scheduling preliminary injunction matters. See Young v.
City of Palm Bay, Fla., 358 F.3d 859, 864 (11th Cir.
2004) (“A district court must be able to exercise its
managerial power to maintain control over its
docket.”). The only hard and fast rule is that the
parties opposing the preliminary injunction application
“must file with the Clerk's Office, and deliver to
the moving party, all counter or opposing affidavits, and a
responsive brief, not later than at least seven days before
the hearing.” M.D. Fla. R. 4.06(b). Dryzmala argues
that imposing a briefing schedule would clear up any
uncertainty between the parties, and facilitate judicial
economy. The Court agrees. As such, it will set out a
deadline for briefing and a hearing date.
the Court addresses the propriety of Lee County's
inclusion in the briefing schedule. This analysis begins with
whether Lacroix's alleged stipulation is the ultimate
arbiter of Lee County's briefing obligations. The Court
finds it is not. As a threshold matter, Lacroix's
argument fails because the Court's inherent managerial
power over its docket trumps any alleged stipulation.
See Young, 358 F.3d at 864. But even if
that were not that case, Lacroix's argument would still
fail because the alleged stipulation is unenforceable.
Lacroix contends emails between his counsel and Lee County on
April 25, 2018 (Doc. 24-1), constituted a stipulation that
Lee County would respond to the Complaint and Motion for
Preliminary Injunction by a specific date. But Lee County did
not receive the Complaint or the Motion for the Preliminary
Injunction until May 10, 2018. (Doc. 22-1). Thus, at the time
the emails were sent, Lee County had no ability to assess the
merits of the case or the time it would take to formulate a
response. Absent such information, Lee County did not have
the ability to enter into a meaningful agreement.
See LSQ Funding Grp., L.C. v. EDS Field
Servs., 879 F.Supp.2d 1320, 1327 (M.D. Fla. 2012)
(“mutual assent is necessary as to essential
terms” for an agreement to be enforceable).
leaves the Court to decide whether both Dryzmala and Lee
County should be included on the briefing schedule. The Court
finds that doing so would prevent a staggered and uncertain
briefing process, and therefore serve both the interests of
the parties and judicial economy. Dryzmala's Motion will
be granted in full.
it is now
1. Defendant James Dryzmala's Motion to Establish
Briefing Schedule for Preliminary Injunction Request (Doc.
23) is GRANTED.
2. Dryzmala and Lee County will have up to and until
June 20, 2018 to respond to Lacroix's
Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
3. The Court will hear oral arguments ONLY on Lacroix's
Motion for Preliminary Injunction on July 11, 2018 at