United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Orlando Division
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
B. SMITH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
before the Court is Plaintiff's Memorandum to Waive All
United States District Court Document Fees, construed as a
motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc
2). Upon due consideration I respectfully recommend that the
motion be denied and that this case be
dismissed without leave to amend.
Hiamoui Hesutu Tupi Bey has filed a paper titled
“Emergency Diplomatic Relations” which is
construed as a complaint (Doc. 1). Attached to the complaint
are a paper titled “The Moorish Divine and National
Movement of the World Affidavit LAWFUL NOTICE! Name
Declaration, Correction Proclamation and Publication (Doc.
1-1), and a paper titled “The Moorish Divine and
National Movement of the World Affidavit Judicial Notice and
Proclamation (Doc. 1-2).
appears that Plaintiff's given name is Kenneth Gregory
Jackson (Doc. 1-1 at 1). But, he now goes by Hiamoui Hesutu
Tupi Bey, Minister/Ambassador Bey, Federal Employer 06143
(Doc. 1 at 1). Plaintiff states that he is “a Noble of
the Al Moroccan Empire (North America) In Propria Persons (my
own proper self); being Moorish American - a Descendant of
the Ancient Moabites / Moors, by Birthright, Freehold,
Primogeniture and Inheritance; being Aboriginal and
Indigenous to the Land /s (Amexem / Americas) Territorium of
my Ancient Moabite / Moorish Fore-Mothers and
Fore-Fathers….” (Doc. 1-2 at 1.
the papers Plaintiff has filed are gibberish. Because they
are incomprehensible, Plaintiff's papers fail to show the
basis of the Court' subject matter jurisdiction, how
Plaintiff has been damaged, or the relief he seeks.
courts may allow an individual to proceed in forma
pauperis if that person declares in an affidavit that he
“is unable to pay [filing] fees or give security
therefor.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Before a
plaintiff is permitted to proceed in forma pauperis,
the court must review the complaint to determine whether it
is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an
immune defendant. Id. § 1915(e)(2).
(ii) of § 1915(e)(2)(B) authorizes dismissal of an
indigent's case on the same terms as Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of cases in
general-when the complaint “fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted.” Dismissal pursuant to
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same familiar
standards that govern dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
Thorpe v. Little, 804 F.Supp.2d 174, 180 (D. Del.
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and Rule 12(b)(6) test the sufficiency of
the plaintiff's complaint. Because Rule 8(a)(2) requires
a plaintiff to “show” that he is entitled to
relief, a mere “blanket assertion of entitlement to
relief” will not do. Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 556 n. 3 (2007). To survive
dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and Rule 12(b)(6), a
plaintiff must plead facts which, “accepted as true,
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A
claim is “plausible on its face” when its factual
content permits a “reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In evaluating a
plaintiff's complaint under this standard, the court must
accept all well pleaded factual allegations as true and
construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Id.; Ironworkers Local Union 68 v. AstraZeneca
Pharmaceuticals, LP, 634 F.3d 1352, 1359 (11th Cir.
2011). Legal conclusions devoid of factual support are not
entitled to an assumption of truth. Mamani v.
Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than
pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be
liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United
States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (per
curiam). See also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, pro se litigants must
still conform their pleadings to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829
(11th Cir. 2007), and the court will not “serve as de
facto counsel for a party or ... rewrite an otherwise
deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.”
GJR Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla.,
132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted),
overruled on other grounds as recognized in
Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 706 (11th Cir.
courts have “an independent obligation” in every
case “to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction
exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any
party.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S.
500, 501 (2006) (citing Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon
Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999)). Parties seeking
to invoke the limited jurisdiction of the federal court over
a cause of action must show that the underlying claim is
based upon either diversity jurisdiction (controversies
exceeding $75, 000 between citizens of different states) or
the existence of a federal question (“a civil action
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States”), in which a private right of action has
been created or is implied by Congressional intent.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1332;
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 n.8 (2001).
has failed to state a cognizable claim for relief that is
within the limited jurisdiction of this Court. No. federal
cause of action is pled and none is apparent. While Plaintiff
has named “Mike Pompeo, D.B.A. United States Department
State Secretary and Kirstjen M. Nielsen, D.B.A. Department of
Homeland Security' as the Defendants, he has not pled
facts to support a claim against them.
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim “without granting leave to amend at least once
when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication
that a valid claim might be stated.” Gomez v. USAA
Federal Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2nd Cir. 1999)
(per curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Troville v. Venz, 303 F.3d 1256,
1260 & n.5 ...