United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Orlando Division
GREGORY A. PRESENELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Matter comes before the Court without a hearing on the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8) and the
Plaintiff's Response in Opposition (Doc. 17).
Factual and Procedural Background
Complaint states that the Plaintiff, who is visually
impaired, “is interested in playing golf (such as
offered at Celebration Golf Club through reserving a tee
time) and purchasing food and merchandise while at
Celebration Golf Club.” Doc. 1 ¶ 28. The Plaintiff
called Celebration Golf in order to find out about times,
costs, and amenities-information that is otherwise available
on the website-but he claims that the “Defendant's
representative failed to fully assist Plaintiff and referred
him to its Website.” Doc. 1 ¶ 29. The Plaintiff
allegedly attempted to visit the website, utilizing his
screen reader software, but “he encountered a Website
that was not designed with accessibility (for the disabled)
in mind.” Doc. 1 ¶ 31-32. This, the Plaintiff
claims, “destroyed” his “expectation of
golfing at Defendant's golf course.” Doc. 1 ¶
March 21, 2018, the Plaintiff filed his Complaint, seeking
injunctive relief, attorney's fees, and costs under Title
III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Doc. 1. The
Defendant filed the Motion to Dismiss on April 20, 2018. Doc.
8. On May 21, 2018, the Plaintiff filed a Response in
Opposition. Doc. 17. Additionally, the Defendant filed a
Notice of Supplemental Authority on May 30, 2018. Doc. 18.
Motion to Dismiss
ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff,
see, e.g., Jackson v. Okaloosa County, Fla., 21 F.3d
1531, 1534 (11th Cir. 1994), and must limit its consideration
to the pleadings and any exhibits attached thereto.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c); see also GSW, Inc. v.
Long County, Ga., 999 F.2d 1508, 1510 (11th Cir. 1993).
The Court will liberally construe the complaint's
allegations in the Plaintiff's favor. See Jenkins v.
McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). However,
“conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual deductions
or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent
dismissal.” Davila v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
326 F.3d 1183, 1185 (11th Cir. 2003).
reviewing a complaint on a motion to dismiss under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “courts must be
mindful that the Federal Rules require only that the
complaint contain ‘a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'
” U.S. v. Baxter Intern., Inc., 345 F.3d 866,
880 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)). This is a
liberal pleading requirement, one that does not require a
plaintiff to plead with particularity every element of a
cause of action. Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice,
Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001).
Americans with Disabilities Act
III of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12181-12189 (“Title III”), which
addresses “Public Accommodations and Services Operated
by Private Entities, ” provides that “[n]o
individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of
disability in any place of public accommodation.” 42
U.S.C. § 12182(a). Any person subjected to
discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of
Title III may bring a private action. 42 U.S.C. §
12188(a). To prevail on a Title III ADA claim, a plaintiff
generally has the burden of proving (1) that he or she is an
individual with a disability; (2) that the defendant owns,
leases, or operates a place of public accommodation; and (3)
that the defendant denied him or her full and equal enjoyment
of goods, services, facilities or privileges offered by the
defendant (4) on the basis of his or her disability.
Schiavo ex rel Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F.Supp.2d
1161, 1165 (M.D. Fla. 2005). The only relief available to
plaintiffs suing under Title III of the ADA is injunctive
relief. Houston v. Marod Supermarkets,
Inc., 733 F.3d 1323, 1329 (11th Cir. 2013).
standing under Article III of the Constitution, a plaintiff
must satisfy three elements: First, the plaintiff must have
suffered an “injury in fact”-an invasion of a
legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and
particularized and (b) actual or imminent, rather than
conjectural or hypothetical. Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Allegations of
future injury can establish standing if the threat of injury
is “certainly impending” or if there exists a
“‘substantial risk' that harm will
occur.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134
S.Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty
Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n.5 (2013)). Second,
there must be a causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of; that is, the injury must be fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant rather
than the result of independent action of a third party.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. And it must be likely,
rather than merely speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision. Id. at 561. The
party invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts has the
burden of establishing each element. Id.