United States District Court, N.D. Florida, Tallahassee Division
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
CHARLES A. STAMPELOS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
submitted this case simultaneously with several other cases
in February 2018. An Order was entered advising Plaintiff
that it appeared that this case was redundant to his other
cases. ECF No. 4. Plaintiff was advised to consider whether
only one case was necessary to raise his claim, and he was
directed to show good cause for continuing this case in light
of the availability of relief in his other cases.
Id. In response, Plaintiff has filed an amended
civil rights complaint, ECF No. 5, under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. This version of Plaintiff's complaint has been
reviewed to determine if it is sufficient to state a claim.
In addition, it has been reviewed along with the amended
complaint Plaintiff filed in another case simultaneously with
this case. See, e.g., case # 4:18cv79-RH/CAS, ECF
No. 7. The amended complaints are virtually the same.
Accordingly, the recommendation made in this case is the same
as has been made in Plaintiff's other case.
vast majority of Plaintiff's allegations concern events
which occurred between 2007 - 2008. ECF No. 5 at 2-8.
Plaintiff also included two paragraphs concerning events
which transpired in November of 2013. Id. at 8.
federal § 1983 claim is governed by the forum
state's residual personal injury statute of limitations.
Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1188
(11th Cir. 1999) (citing Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S.
235, 249-50, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989) and
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276, 105 S.Ct. 1938,
85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985)). In Florida, a § 1983 action must
be commenced “within four years of the allegedly
unconstitutional or otherwise illegal act.”
Burton, 178 F.3d at 1188 (citing Baker v. Gulf
& Western Indus., Inc., 850 F.2d 1480, 1483 (11th
Cir. 1988)). All of Plaintiff's claims which occurred
from 2007 through 2013 are time barred and cannot proceed in
only claims which would not be time barred occurred in the
fall of 2017. ECF No. 5 at 9. Plaintiff alleged that he
acquired a substitute teacher's certificate and
“was initially hired by Gadsden County Schools . . . in
September 2017.” Id. Although contradictory,
Plaintiff also said that from “September 2017 to this
present day, Plaintiff has applied for several jobs at
Gadsden High School and never even received an interview
after several requests.” Id. Presumably,
Plaintiff meant that he was hired as a substitute teacher,
but has not been hired into a permanent teaching position,
because he alleged that he “substitute teach [sic] at
this school almost every day.” Id. That is not
clear, however, because Plaintiff alternately alleges that
his employment has been blocked and that he was
“offered a 4th teaching position at James A. Shanks
Middle School” in September 2017. Id. He
contends simultaneously that he has never had an interview,
and that he was interviewed and “told to start
once” he obtained his “Official Statement of
Status Eligibility.” Id.
the contradictory nature of his allegations, Plaintiff's
claim is that he is qualified, there is a shortage of
teachers, but Gadsden County Schools, the City of Quincy and
others are systematically blocking him “from being
hired in retaliation for exposing their inappropriate sexual
behavior of Gadsden County School Board and
Administration.” Id. at 9, 10. He asserts
claims under the Whistle Blower Act, the First Amendment, the
Fourteenth Amendment, “misuse of public position,
” and contends that he has “established a
Retaliation Claim.” Id. at 10-11.
VII and § 1983 prohibits “employers from
discriminating against an employee based on [his] opposition
to an unlawful employment practice.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-3(a); 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Williams v. Fla. Atl.
Univ., No. 17-12546, 2018 WL 1566526, at *3 (11th Cir.
Mar. 30, 2018). To state a prima facie claim for retaliation
under § 1983 by an employer, Plaintiff must show that
(1) he “engaged in statutorily protected
activity;” (2) he “suffered a materially adverse
action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the
protected activity and the adverse action.” Chapter
7 Trustee v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683 F.3d 1249, 1258
(11th Cir. 2012) (quoted in Williams, 2018 WL
1566526, at *3); see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe
Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2410-16,
165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006) (quoted in Goldsmith v. Bagby
Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1277 (11th Cir. 2008)).
Here, Plaintiff's amended complaint does not demonstrate
that Plaintiff engaged in any protected activities or
complained about an unlawful employment practice.
Plaintiff's amended complaint does not include any facts
which suggest, even if Plaintiff had engaged in
statutorily protected activities, that any decision maker was
aware of that conduct. Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege
any connection between his conduct and that of the employer.
Plaintiff's allegations are conclusory only, and
insufficient to support a claim for retaliation.
liberal reading of Plaintiff's amended complaint also
reveals that he has asserted a claim for religious
discrimination. ECF No. 7 at 11. However, there are no facts
presented which support such a claim. Plaintiff contends that
the Quincy State Bank (who is not a named Defendant in this
case) does not “know that they are being robbed
blind.” Id. at 9. Plaintiff contends that it
“just has to be more than just Plaintiff Preaching at
Holy Ghost Temple!” Id. That sentence does not
provide a basis for a First Amendment claim against the named
also has provided no facts which support any of his other
claims. The allegations are disjointed, conclusory, and
contradictory; they do not reveal unconstitutional or
unlawful conduct by the Defendants. It is unnecessary to
extend additional time for Plaintiff to submit another
amended complaint. This case should be summarily dismissed.
respectfully RECOMMENDED that
Plaintiff's amended complaint, ECF No. 5, be
DISMISSED for failure to state a ...