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Nutile v. Secretary, Department of Corrections

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division

June 28, 2018

WILLIAM ROBERT NUTILE, Petitioner,
v.
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.

          ORDER

          Charlene Edwards Honeywell United States District Judge

         Petitioner initiated this action by filing a petition for the writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 (Dkt. 1) and a memorandum in support (Dkt. 2). The petition was dismissed without prejudice (Dkt. 15), and Petitioner filed an amended petition (Dkt. 17). The amended petition was likewise dismissed without prejudice (Dkt. 27), and Petitioner filed a second amended petition (Dkt. 28). Respondent filed a response in opposition to the second amended petition (Dkt. 34), to which Petitioner replied (Dkt. 40). Upon consideration, the second amended petition will be DENIED.

         I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

         Petitioner was found guilty of resisting an officer with violence, battery on a law enforcement officer, and obstructing or resisting an officer without violence (Respondent's Ex. 3). He was sentenced to 5 years in prison on both the resisting with violence and battery convictions, concurrent, and to time served on the resisting without violence conviction (Respondent's Ex. 4). During his appeal he argued that the trial court erred in failing to reassess his competency, the convictions for both resisting an officer with and without violence violated double jeopardy, and the trial court lacked jurisdiction, since the events took place on Petitioner's vessel in water under federal jurisdiction (Respondent's Ex. 5). The appellate court affirmed without a written opinion (Respondent's Ex. 7).

         II. GOVERNING LEGAL PRINCIPLES

         Because Petitioner filed his petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001); Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 889-90 (11th Cir. 2003). The AEDPA “establishes a more deferential standard of review of state habeas judgments, ” Fugate v. Head, 261 F.3d 1206, 1215 (11th Cir. 2001), in order to “prevent federal habeas ‘retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002); see also Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (recognizing that the federal habeas court's evaluation of state-court rulings is highly deferential and that state-court decisions must be given the benefit of the doubt).

         A. Standard of Review Under the AEDPA

         Pursuant to the AEDPA, habeas relief may not be granted with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The phrase “clearly established Federal law, ” encompasses only the holdings of the United States Supreme Court “as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams v.Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000).

         “[S]ection 2254(d)(1) provides two separate bases for reviewing state court decisions; the ‘contrary to' and ‘unreasonable application' clauses articulate independent considerations a federal court must consider.” Maharaj v. Secretary for Dep't. of Corr., 432 F.3d 1292, 1308 (11th Cir. 2005). The meaning of the clauses was discussed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 835 (11th Cir. 2001):

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the United States Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the United States Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the ‘unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the United States Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.

         If the federal court concludes that the state court applied federal law incorrectly, habeas relief is appropriate only if that application was “objectively unreasonable.” Id.

         Finally, under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court may grant the writ of habeas corpus if the state court's decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” A determination of a factual issue made by a state court, however, shall be presumed correct, and the habeas petitioner shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. See Parker, 244 F.3d at 835-36; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

         B. Standard for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

         The United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), established a two-part test for determining whether a convicted person is entitled to relief on the ground that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance: (1) whether counsel's performance was deficient and “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”; and (2) whether the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.[1] Id. at 687-88. A court must adhere to a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689-90. “Thus, a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct.” Id. at 690; Gates v. Zant, 863 F.2d 1492, 1497 (11th Cir. 1989).

         As observed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the test for ...


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