WOODFIELD COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, INC., and ROBERT DRAY, Appellants,
ALEXANDRA ORTIZ, a minor, by and through ROBERT ORTIZ and ELIZABETH ORTIZ, as Parents and Natural Guardian of ALEXANDRA ORTIZ and Individually, Appellees.
FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF
pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for
Pinellas County; Jack R. St. Arnold, Judge.
Anthony J. Petrillo, Michael H. Kestenbaum and Lauren E.
Wages of Luks, Santaniello, Petrillo & Jones, Tampa, for
Todd Marks, Kelly M. Albanese and Kylie M. Caporuscio of
Westchase Law, P.A., Tampa, for Appellees.
Ortiz family lives in a home in Woodfield, a deed restricted
community in Tarpon Springs. The Ortizes often parked
vehicles in the street near their house, but the Woodfield
Community Association contended that violated the parking
restrictions contained in Woodfield's recorded community
declaration. Eventually, the association issued the Ortizes a
fine. The Ortizes then filed a lawsuit against the
first count of their complaint, the Ortizes sought a
declaratory judgment to have the recorded declaration's
parking restrictions deemed void and unenforceable. The
Ortizes filed a motion for summary judgment on that count,
which, following a hearing, the trial court granted. In its
order, the court declared the fine void and enjoined the
association from imposing any further fines against the
Ortizes under the recorded declaration. The association now
seeks review of the trial court's order.
orders that merely grant partial summary judgment, such as
the one before us, are considered nonfinal, nonappealable
orders. See, e.g., Gator Boring & Trenching,
Inc. v. Westra Constr. Corp., 210 So.3d 175, 180 (Fla.
2d DCA 2016) ("The trial court's orders are nonfinal
and nonappealable to the extent that they grant a partial
summary judgment in favor of Westra. . . ."); Wahl
v. Taylor, 926 So.2d 488, 489 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)
(observing that "an order merely granting a motion for
summary judgment is not a final order because it does not
enter judgment for or against a party"). However,
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.130(a)(3)(B) provides us jurisdiction to review the
portion of the order enjoining the association from enforcing
the recorded declaration. See, e.g., Hasley v.
Harrell, 971 So.2d 149, 151-52 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)
(declining to exercise jurisdiction over partial final
judgment entered in a noncompete agreement dispute, except
"insofar as it granted an injunction"). That is as
far as our jurisdiction extends in the appeal before us.
See Aaoep USA, Inc. v. Pex German OE Parts, LLC, 202
So.3d 470, 471-42 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) ("[O]ur
jurisdiction to review non-final orders granting injunctive
relief under rule 9.130(a)(3)(B) does not extend to afford
review of certain other matters the non-final order
addresses."). Accordingly, the association's appeal,
which challenges several aspects of the summary judgment
ruling that do not pertain to injunctive relief, must be
dismissed without prejudice to any litigant's right to
challenge future appealable orders entered in this case.
regard to the injunction the trial court fashioned in its
order, we agree with the association's argument that the
injunction did not comply with Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.610(c). Rule 1.610(c) provides, in relevant part,
that "[e]very injunction shall specify the reasons for
entry, shall describe in reasonable detail the act or acts
restrained without reference to a pleading or another
document, and shall be binding on the parties in the
action." The order before us does not include specific
reasons for its entry. See Kirkland v. PeoplesSouth
Bank, 70 So.3d 662, 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) ("Where
a trial court fails to include specific reasons for issuing
an injunction, the reviewing court must reverse."
(citing Premier Lab Supply, Inc. v. Chemplex Indus.,
Inc., 10 So.3d 202, 206-07 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009);
Hasley, 971 So.2d at 152-53). Accordingly, we must
reverse and remand for the trial court to enter an order that
comports with the requirements of rule 1.610(c).
in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
VILLANTI, and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.
"Appeals to the district courts of
appeal of non-final orders are limited to those that . . .
(B) grant, continue, modify, deny, or dissolve injunctions,
or refuse to modify ...