Anthony M. Gartman, Appellant,
State of Florida, Appellee.
final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion
under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.
appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. Waddell A.
Thomas, Public Defender, and David Alan Henson, Assistant
Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Daniel Krumbholz, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
earlier appeal, we reversed Anthony Gartman's sentences
and remanded for resentencing. Gartman now appeals his new
sentences, alleging a double jeopardy violation. We affirm.
was convicted of armed robbery and possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon. See Gartman v. State, 197 So.3d
1181 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). The trial court originally imposed
a twelve-year sentence with a ten-year mandatory minimum on
Count I (armed robbery) and a six-year sentence with a
three-year mandatory minimum on Count II (felon in
possession). The court- relying on the then-controlling
decision in Walton v. State, 106 So.3d 522 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2013), rev'd, 208 So.3d 60 (Fla. 2016)-
concluded it had to impose the sentences consecutively and
"stack" the mandatory-minimum terms. Accordingly,
the court imposed a cumulative sentence of 18 years with a
13-year mandatory minimum.
Gartman's first appeal was pending, the Florida Supreme
Court decided Williams v. State, 186 So.3d 989 (Fla.
2016), which precluded Gartman's consecutive sentences.
We therefore reversed Gartman's sentences and remanded
for resentencing in light of Williams.
Gartman, 197 So.3d at 1182. We did not disturb the
remand, the trial court-attempting to achieve a "fair
outcome" and effectuate its original sentencing
intent-sentenced Gartman to 18 years' prison with a
ten-year mandatory-minimum for Count I. The court reimposed
the original Count II sentence (six years with a three-year
mandatory-minimum) and ordered the Count I and Count II
sentences to run concurrently. The practical effect of this
decision was that Gartman's cumulative sentence remained
essentially unchanged, the only difference being a marginally
shorter mandatory-minimum term. Gartman objected, arguing
that because he had only challenged the legality of his Count
II sentence-not his Count I sentence-the court's
authority on remand was limited to the ministerial task of
adjusting the previously imposed sentences to run
concurrently. Gartman essentially argued that, pursuant to
this court's mandate, he was to receive a sentence of
twelve years' prison with a ten-year mandatory-minimum
and the court had no discretion to impose any other sentence.
subsequent rule 3.800(b)(2) motion, Gartman renewed his claim
that the court had exceeded its authority under the appellate
mandate, and he argued the sentencing order violated the
Florida and Federal constitutions' prohibitions against
double jeopardy by increasing his Count I sentence, which he
contended was not at issue in his first appeal. The court
denied the motion, and Gartman appealed.
law has long recognized that when a defendant successfully
challenges his sentence on one count, a resentencing trial
court cannot change sentences relating to other counts, if
the appellate court's mandate did not affect those other
counts. See, e.g., Fasenmyer v. State, 457 So.2d
1361, 1362 (Fla. 1984). But in this case, our earlier
decision reversed Gartman's sentences on both
counts-not just on Count II. Therefore, "the requirement
for concurrent sentences [did] not preclude the trial court
on remand from structuring [Gartman]'s sentences in a
manner that achieves the original sentencing goal."
Simmons v. State, 215 So.3d 162, 163 (Fla. 1st DCA
2017); see also James v. State, 845 So.2d 238, 240
(Fla. 1st DCA 2003) ("[A] trial court is not barred from
accomplishing its original sentencing goals where a defendant
successfully seeks to have a sentence overturned.")
argues that he intended to challenge only his Count II
sentence in the first appeal. But his arguments in that
appeal do not control; what matters is what our decision
said. And our decision said that we "vacate the
sentences [plural] and remand for resentencing."
Gartman, 197 So.3d at 1182. Because the sentences
(plural) were vacated, the trial court was left to impose new
sentences. Had Gartman viewed our earlier opinion's
direction as erroneous, he could have challenged that
direction through a motion for rehearing. But it was not up
to the trial court to suppose we meant something other than
what we said.
we conclude that the trial court did not err in resentencing
Gartman in a manner consistent with ...