United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Fort Myers Division
OPINION AND ORDER 
SHERIPOLSTERCHAPPELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This matter comes before the Court on Agane Mohamed
Warsame's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1)
filed on December 18, 2017. At the time Petitioner filed his
Petition, he was in Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) custody since August 1, 2017.
Id. Petitioner asserted that he was being unlawfully
detained under Zadvydas v. Davis,  and requested the
Court, inter alia, to direct Respondents to
“immediately release” him from custody.
Id. at 9.
Court ordered Respondents to show cause why the petition
should not be granted (Doc. 5). Respondents filed a Response
(Doc. 7) moving the Court to dismiss the Petition on March
12, 2018. The Court afforded Petitioner an opportunity to
file a reply (Doc. 8). Respondents sought leave to supplement
the Response (Doc. 9), which the Court granted (Doc. 11).
Respondents filed a Supplemental Return to Petition (Doc. 12)
with exhibits (Doc. 12-1 to Doc. 12-12) on June 15, 2018. The
Court afforded Petitioner an opportunity to file a reply to
the Supplemental Return on or before June 29, 2018 (Doc. 11).
As of the date of this Order, Petitioner has not filed a
reply. For the reasons set forth in this Order, the Court
finds the Petition must be dismissed as moot.
is a native and citizen of Somalia who was admitted into the
United States at St. Paul, Minnesota on December 8, 1995.
Doc. 1, ¶ 6; Doc. 12-1. Petitioner's status was
adjusted to lawful permanent resident on March 5, 1997. Doc.
12-1. On April 16, 2007, Petitioner was convicted of a
violation of a law relating to a controlled substance and was
serving a 27-month sentence in a Minnesota state prison. Doc.
12-2, ¶ 3; Doc. 12-4. On March 24, 2008, ICE detained
Petitioner and served him with a Notice to Appear, charging
him with removability pursuant to (1) Section 237(a)(2)(B)(i)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(B)(i), (controlled substance conviction), and (2)
Section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (aggravated felony
conviction). Id., ¶ 4; Doc. 12-3. On April 3,
2008, an immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed from
the United States to Somalia. Doc. 12-5. Petitioner waived
his right to appeal and the removal decision is
administratively final. Doc. 12-2, ¶ 5. On July 9, 2008,
Petitioner was released pursuant to an order of supervision
pending removal. Id., ¶ 7; Doc. 12-8. On August
1, 2017, Petitioner's order of supervision was revoked,
and Petitioner was returned to ICE custody. Doc. 12-2, ¶
13; Doc. 12-9; Doc. 12-10. On December 18, 2017, Petitioner
filed his Petition claiming that his continued detention by
ICE violates 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(6) as recognized by the
Supreme Court's decision in Zadvydas. Doc. 1 at
7. Petitioner also asserted substantive and procedural due
process violations under the Fifth Amendment stemming from
his continued detention. Doc. 1 at 7-8. On April 20, 2018,
Petitioner was charged by Information for violation of Fla.
Stat. § 843.01; 777.011, resisting an officer with
violence, a third-degree felony. Doc. 12-11. Petitioner was
arrested and transferred out of ICE custody and into the
custody of the Glades County Sheriff. Doc. 12-12, ¶ 4).
As of the date on this Order, Petitioner remains in Glades
County jail pending his criminal prosecution in the Twentieth
Judicial Circuit Court (No. 18-000053-CF). www.
reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that this action
must be dismissed as moot. “[A] case is moot when the
issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a
legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Al
Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330, 1335-36 (11th Cir.
2001) (internal punctuation omitted). “If events that
occur subsequent to the filing of a lawsuit or an appeal
deprive the court of the ability to give the plaintiff or
appellant meaningful relief, then the case is moot and must
be dismissed.” Id. at 1336.
dismissal after release from the custody is not automatic; a
habeas petition continues to present a live controversy after
the petitioner's release or deportation when there is
some remaining “collateral consequence” that may
be redressed by success on the petition. See Spencer v.
Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1998) (“Once the
convict's sentence has expired, however, some concrete
and continuing injury other than the now-ended incarceration
or parole-some ‘collateral consequence' of the
conviction-must exist if the suit is to be
maintained.”); Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47,
52 n.2 (2006) (case not mooted by petitioner's
deportation because the petitioner could still benefit by
pursuing his application for cancellation of removal). This
exception to the mootness doctrine applies when: (1) the
challenged action is too short to be fully litigated prior to
its cessation or expiration; and (2) there is a reasonable
expectation that the same complaining party would be
subjected to the same action again. Weinstein v.
Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975); Carafas v.
LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237 (1968); Murphy v.
Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982).
instant case, Petitioner challenges his extended detention
pending deportation and seeks immediate release from ICE
custody and any further illegal detention by ICE. Doc. 1 at
10. Petitioner does not challenge the underlying order of
removal. Therefore, Petitioner's claim was resolved when
he was transferred out of the custody of ICE and placed into
the custody of the Glades County Sheriff. The chances of his
extended detention happening again are too speculative to
create a controversy sufficient to support a claim for
relief, and the narrow exception to the mootness doctrine
does not apply. Even should review of this matter somehow
become necessary in the future, there is no reason to expect
either inadequate time or an inadequate forum in which to
litigate the issue. The narrow exception to the mootness
doctrine does not apply, and Petitioner's claim that he
is being unconstitutionally held is dismissed as moot.
the Court can no longer give Petitioner any meaningful
relief, his § 2241 petition is moot and “dismissal
is required because mootness is jurisdictional.” Al
Najjar, 273 F.3d at 1336, 1253; Riley v.
I.N.S., 310 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 2002) (release from
detention under an order of supervision moots a
petitioner's challenge to the legality of his extended
detention); Nunes v. Decker, 480 Fed.Appx. 173, 175
(3d Cir. 2012) (release of alien under order of supervision
who challenged only his extended detention mooted § 2241
habeas petition because the alien “achieved the result
he sought in his habeas petition”); see also Phang
v. Whiddon, No. 2:13-cv-149-FtM-29DNF, 2014 WL 6685345,
* 3 (M.D. Fla. 2014).
it is now
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is
DISMISSED without prejudice as mootDONE and ORDERED in Fort