MICHAEL P. MONROE, JR., Appellant,
STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.
FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF
pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit
Court for Polk County; Neil A. Roddenbery, Judge.
Michael P. Monroe, Jr., pro se.
Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Donna S. Koch,
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa for Appellee.
postconviction court summarily denied Michael P. Monroe,
Jr.'s, amended motion for prison and jail
credit. We affirm as to the denial of prison
credit but reverse for the postconviction court to further
review Monroe's request for jail credit and to grant him
additional credit, attach copies of the portions of the court
records or files that support the denial of his request, or
conduct an evidentiary hearing.
was arrested for a criminal offense in Hillsborough County in
April 2016 and detained in jail. At the time, he was subject
to two orders of probation for earlier offenses committed in
Hillsborough and Polk Counties. In his amended motion for
prison and jail credit, Monroe asserted that while in the
Hillsborough County jail, he had been served with a
"warrantless arrest affidavit" or
"detainer" from Polk County. He further asserted
that in September 2016, he had been sentenced to fifteen
months in state prison on the Hillsborough County cases. He
asserted that while he was in prison, the Polk County
authorities had issued another "warrantless arrest
his release from prison, Monroe was sent to the Polk County
jail, and, in June 2017, he admitted the Polk County
violation of probation (VOP) in exchange for a three-year
prison sentence. The snap-out "memo of sentence"
reflected that he was to be given "credit for t[ime]
s[erved] in Hillsborough County for arrest in this VOP (if
any)," but the memo did not specify the number of days
of credit. On October 17, 2017, however, the Department of
Corrections (DOC), in response to an inquiry by Monroe,
indicated that DOC had credited him with 340 days of jail
credit. Although the DOC's response did not indicate the
range or ranges of dates encompassed within that 340-day
figure, Monroe's amended motion identified three separate
periods during which he assertedly had been in jail, and
those periods add up to 340 days.
periods do not include time that Monroe spent in prison on
the Hillsborough County cases or time that he spent in the
Polk County jail between his release from prison on the
Hillsborough County cases and his sentence to prison on the
Polk County VOP. In his amended motion, Monroe requested an
additional 254 days of prison and jail credit for that entire
period, which ran from September 27, 2016, to June 7,
2017. The postconviction court denied the
motion, ruling that the case law on which Monroe relied had
been superseded and that he was not entitled to additional
postconviction court correctly concluded that Monroe was not
entitled to credit against his Polk County sentence for the
time that he had spent in prison on the Hillsborough County
cases because, according to Monroe's own assertion, Polk
County had issued only a detainer, not an arrest warrant.
See Norman v. State, 900 So.2d 702, 703 (Fla. 2d DCA
2005) ("When a detainer has been issued against a
prisoner, generally the prisoner will not be entitled to
prison credit in the case with the detainer when he is
sentenced in that case following the completion of the
sentence he is currently serving. See Gethers v.
State, 838 So.2d 504, 508 (Fla. 2003). On the other
hand, if an arrest warrant is transmitted and a prisoner is
arrested under the authority of that warrant, the prisoner
may be entitled to credit because he is being held on both
charges. [Id.] at 507."). We therefore affirm
the postconviction court's denial of Monroe's request
for prison credit.
not appear, however, that the postconviction court accounted
for the portion of the requested 254 days that Monroe had
spent in the Polk County jail after his release from prison
on the Hillsborough County cases but before he was sentenced
to prison on the Polk County VOP. Monroe is entitled to
credit for that period, assuming that it is not already
incorporated into the 340 days of credit that he has been
granted. See § 921.161(1), Fla. Stat. (2016)
("[T]he court imposing a sentence shall allow a
defendant credit for all of the time she or he spent in the
county jail before sentence."). Because the
postconviction court failed to attach copies of portions of
court records or files to refute this component of
Monroe's claim, we cannot determine what, if any, jail
credit he may be entitled to. We therefore reverse the
postconviction court's denial of Monroe's claim as it
pertains to jail credit. On remand, the court may grant the
additional credit, attach portions of the record that
conclusively refute his clam, or conduct an evidentiary
hearing to resolve the issue. The trial court may also
consider requiring the State to respond to the motion.
See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.801(e) (incorporating rule
in part; reversed in part; remanded.
LaROSE, C.J., and ...