United States District Court, S.D. Florida
OLUWAMUYIWA AWODIYA, PRO SE
ALTMAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
CAUSE came before the Court upon a sua
sponte review of the record. On April 11, 2019, the
Defendant, Ross University School of Medicine
(“Defendant” or “RUSM”), filed a
Motion for Leave to File a Partial Motion for Summary
Judgment [ECF No. 175]. On April 17, 2019, the Plaintiff,
Oluwamuyiwa Awodiya, filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
Alteration [ECF No. 178] of the Court's March 2, 2019
Omnibus Order [ECF No. 154]. The Court has carefully reviewed
the parties' written submissions, their responses and
replies, and the applicable law.
The Defendant's Motion for Leave to File a Partial Motion
for Summary Judgment
to the original Scheduling Order [ECF No. 37] in this case,
“[a]ny and all pretrial motions, including motions for
summary judgment . . . must be filed no later than eighty
(80) days prior to the trial date.” Id. Trial
in this matter was initially set for March of 2019.
Id. The Defendant filed its Motion for Summary
Judgment [ECF No. 120] on January 4, 2019. The Defendant now
seeks to file what amounts to a second motion for summary
judgment long after the deadline imposed in the Court's
original Scheduling Order has passed. While Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not prohibit the filing
of multiple motions for summary judgment,  the Defendant
must show good cause under Rule 16(b)(4) for deviating from
the Court's initial scheduling deadlines.
Motion for Leave, the Defendant contends that the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the
Rehabilitation Act (“RA”) do not apply in
Dominica, which is where the relevant acts in this case
occurred. While that may be true, this argument was available
to the Defendant when it filed its initial Motion for Summary
Judgment in January of 2019. The record reveals that no new
discovery has taken place since then, nor has the Defendant
introduced any new evidence that might warrant construing the
Motion for Leave as one for reconsideration. In any event,
because the Defendant has failed to show good cause, its
Motion For Leave [ECF No. 175] is DENIED.
The Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and
Alteration of the Omnibus Order
succeed on a failure to accommodate claim, including both an
ADA and an RA claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he: 1)
has a disability; 2) is an otherwise qualified individual;
and 3) was discriminated against because of his disability.
See Holly v. Clairson Indus., LLC, 492 F.3d 1247,
1256 (11th Cir. 2007).
Motion for Reconsideration, the Plaintiff argues that the
Court misapplied the standard that applies at summary
judgment for determining whether he “has a
disability.” Pl. Mot. Reconsideration 6. Generally
speaking, there are three grounds that justify
reconsideration of a Court's order on summary judgment:
1) an intervening change in controlling law; 2) the
availability of new evidence or an expanded factual record;
and 3) the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest
injustice. See Woide v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg.
Ass'n, 705 Fed.Appx. 832, 836 (11th Cir. 2017)
(quoting Del. Valley Floral Grp., Inc. v. Shaw Rose Nets,
LLC, 597 F.3d 1374, 1383) (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
Plaintiff contends that his medical
diagnoses-attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder and
obsessive compulsive disorder-require a per se
finding that the Plaintiff “has a disability” for
purposes of both the ADA and the RA. While the amendments to
the ADA the Plaintiff cites (Pl. Mot. Reconsideration 8-10)
certainly lowered the threshold that plaintiffs must meet in
order to establish disability, those amendments did not, as
the Plaintiff claims, eliminate the requirement that
plaintiffs must make an individualized showing that their
alleged disability substantially limits a major life
activity. Solodar v. Old Port Cove Lake Point Tower
Condo. Ass'n, Inc., No. 12-80040-CIV, 2013 WL
3892986, at *9 (S.D. Fla. July 26, 2013) (noting that the
question of whether the plaintiff is substantially limited,
even after the 2008 amendments, created a question of fact
that could not be resolved at summary judgment stage). In
other words, medical diagnoses, without more, do not satisfy
the first prong of a failure to accommodate claim.
even if the Plaintiff could show that his medical diagnoses,
standing alone, satisfied this first prong, he does not
explain how he is entitled to summary judgment on the
remaining elements of his failure to accommodate claims. In
its Omnibus Order, for instance, the Court found that a
disputed issue of material fact exists as to whether the
Plaintiff ever made a request for an accommodation [ECF No.
154 at 10]. The Plaintiff does not even address this finding
in his Motion. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Motion [ECF
No. 178] is DENIED.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f)(3)
district courts have discretion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b)(4)
to grant parties leave to file a second summary judgment
motion, the Court finds that the more prudent course in this
case is to ...