United States District Court, N.D. Florida, Tallahassee Division
STEVEN D. YOUNG, Plaintiff,
CORIZON LLC, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MICHAEL J. FRANK, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
an inmate of the Florida Department of Corrections proceeding
in forma pauperis and pro se, initiated
this civil rights action by filing a complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). Upon review of Plaintiff's
complaint, it is apparent that venue is not proper in the
Northern District of Florida. Therefore, this case should be
transferred to the Middle District of Florida.
is an inmate of the Florida penal system confined at Union
Correctional Institution. Union Correctional Institution is
located in the Middle District of Florida. In his § 1983
complaint, Plaintiff identified several Defendants,
including: Corizon, LLC, Woodrow A. Myers, Rhonda Almanza,
Helen Sneed, Teresa Woodal, Erron Campbell, Centurion of
Florida, LLC, John Doe #1-3, E. Perez-Lugo, Thomas Reimers,
Daniel Cherry, Michelle Schouest, and Julie
claims that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a
serious medical need while he was incarcerated in the Middle
District of Florida. Plaintiff alleges that from June 2014 to
August 24, 2016, Plaintiff was denied care for his hepatitis
C. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages and
injunctive and declaratory relief such that the FDC be
required to provide treatment and ameliorative care,
including pain medication. (Doc. 1).
April 11, 2019, the undersigned ordered Plaintiff to show
cause why this case should not be transferred to the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, the
district where Plaintiff and Union C.I. is located. (Doc.
13). Without citation to any federal authority, Plaintiff
responded that venue is proper in the Northern District
pursuant to the “sword wielder” doctrine and the
“home venue privilege.” (Doc. 14).
for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is governed by 28
U.S.C. § 1391(b), which provides in relevant part:
Venue in general.-A civil action may be brought in-
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if
all defendants are residents of the State in which the
district is located; [or]
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, . . .
case, Plaintiff cannot bring this action in “a judicial
district in which any defendant resides” because it
appears that not all of the defendants are residents of
Florida. According to Plaintiff's complaint, several
Defendants reside in states other than Florida. (Doc. 1 at
2-3). Specifically, at least one Defendant resides in each of
the following locations: (1) St. Louis, Missouri; (2) Tempe,
Arizona; and (3) Brentwood, Tennessee.
other hand, the denial of Plaintiff's medical care
occurred at Union C.I., which is located in Union County.
Thus, a substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to the Plaintiff's claim occurred in the Middle
District of Florida, not the Northern District of Florida.
See Jenkins Brick Co. v. Bremer, 321 F.3d 1366, 1372
(11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Sect. Fla. Dept. of
Corr., No. 12-22958-CIV, 2012 WL 6626818, at *2 (S.D.
Fla. Dec. 19, 2012) (“[T]he policy decision alone does
not give rise to the claim; a claim only exists if someone
has been harmed by the policy decision.”); Mobile
Diagnostic Imagining, Inc. v. Gormezano, No.
12-60888-CIV, 2012 WL 3244664, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 9, 2012)
(noting that courts have held “that substantial events
occurred within a venue when harm or injury was suffered in
that venue”); Sanchez v. Pingree, 494 F.Supp.
68, 70 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (holding that although state statute
was administered in the Northern District of Florida, venue
was proper in the Southern District of Florida because
plaintiffs suffered their injuries from the administration of
the statute in the Southern District). Thus, based on the
information provided by the Plaintiff in his complaint, venue
is proper in the Middle District of Florida.
venue is improper, the district court “shall dismiss,
or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to
any district or division in which it could have been
brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a); see Wright v.
Miranda, 740 Fed.Appx. 692, 693 (11th Cir. 2018).
Furthermore, 28 U.S.C. § 1404 provides: “[f]or the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to
any other district or division where it might have been
brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). “Section
1404(a) is merely a codification of the doctrine of forum
non conveniens for the subset of cases in which the
transferee forum is within the federal court system; in such
cases, Congress has replaced the traditional remedy of
outright dismissal with transfer.” Atl. Marine
Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the W. Dist. of
Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 60, 134 S.Ct. 568, 580 (2013);
Sinochem Int'l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int'l
Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430, 127 S.Ct. 1184,
1190-91 (2007) (noting that § 1404(a) provides for
transfer of a case “when a sister federal court is the
more convenient place for trial of the action”).
“Section 1404(a) reflects an increased desire to have
federal civil suits tried in the federal system at the place
called for in the particular case by considerations of
convenience and justice.” Van Dusen v.
Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616, 84 S.Ct. 805, 809 (1964).
“is a ‘long-approved practice of permitting a
court to transfer a case sua sponte under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, as codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) . . . .'” Tazoe v. Airbus,
S.A.S., 631 F.3d 1321, 1336 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Costlow v. Weeks, 790 F.2d 1486, 1488 (9th Cir.
1986)). In analyzing the issue of proper venue in the context
of the federal doctrine of forum non conveniens,
courts have looked to various factors relating to the private
interest of the litigants and the public interest in the fair
and efficient administration of justice. See Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09, 67 S.Ct. 839,
843 (1988), superseded by statute on other grounds as