United States District Court, N.D. Florida, Tallahassee Division
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MICHAEL J. FRANK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
cause is before this court on Plaintiff's “Motion
to Renew the Temporary Restraining Order” (Doc. 76),
and Defendant's response in opposition. (Doc.
9, 2017, Plaintiff, who is an inmate of the Florida
Department of Corrections, filed this action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. On August 7, 2018, Plaintiff file a
motion for a “temporary restraining order” in
which he requested access to the prison law library for
fifteen hours per week. (Doc. 30). Defendant did not file a
response to that motion. (Doc. 40 at 9). Therefore, on
September 25, 2018, Magistrate Judge Charles A. Stampelos
granted Plaintiff's unopposed motion. (Doc. 40 at 9-10).
The order required Defendant to allow Plaintiff to spend
fifteen hours per week in the prison law library to prepare a
motion. (Id. at 9).
April 4, 2019, Plaintiff moved to renew the temporary
restraining order. (Doc. 76). He now seeks twenty-five hours
per week in the prison law library. (Id.). Defendant
filed a response in opposition to the motion. (Doc. 79).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's motion should be denied
because: (1) an order requiring the Defendant to provide
access would “run afoul of the Florida Department of
Corrections' sovereignty as a State Executive Branch
agency and its ability to manage its institutions;” (2)
Plaintiff already has adequate access to the law library; and
(3) prior to filing his motion, Plaintiff had not complained
to prison officials that he did not have adequate access to
the law library, and thus did not afford the prison an
opportunity to address the matter without court intervention.
determining whether a moving party is entitled to a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction, the court must
evaluate the following four criteria:
(1) a substantial likelihood that the movant will eventually
prevail on the merits;
(2) the movant will suffer irreparable injury unless the
temporary restraining order is issued;
(3) the injury to the movant outweighs whatever danger the
proposed temporary restraining order may cause the party or
parties opposing the temporary restraining order; and
(4) a temporary restraining order would not be adverse to the
Wreal, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 840 F.3d 1244, 1247
(11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d
1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000)); Four Seasons Hotels &
Resorts, B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 320 F.3d 1205,
1210 (11th Cir. 2003); Parker v. State Bd. of Pardons
& Paroles, 275 F.3d 1032, 1035 (11th Cir. 2001). A
temporary restraining order, like a preliminary injunction,
is an extraordinary remedy that should not to be granted
unless the movant clearly establishes the burden of
persuasion as to the four requisites. Schiavo ex rel.
Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225 (11th Cir.
2005); Ingram v. Ault, 50 F.3d 898, 900 (11th Cir.
1995); All Care Nursing Serv. v. Bethesda Mem'l
Hosp., 887 F.2d 1535, 1537 (11th Cir. 1989); see
Wreal, 840 F.3d at 1247; Four Seasons, 320 F.3d
at 1210 (quoting McDonald's Corp. v. Robertson,
147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998)).
the purpose of preliminary injunctive relief or a temporary
restraining order is to preserve the status quo between the
parties and to prevent irreparable injury until the merits of
the lawsuit itself can be reviewed. Devose v.
Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994); All
Care Nursing Serv., 887 F.2d at 1537; United States
v. State of Ala., 791 F.2d 1450, 1457 n.9 (11th Cir.
1986). This necessitates that the relief sought in the motion
be closely related to the conduct complained of in the actual
complaint. Devose, 42 F.3d at 471; Penn v. San
Juan Hosp., 528 F.2d 1181, 1185 (10th Cir. 1975).
has not argued or established that he will suffer irreparable
injury. Rather, he contends simply that he will be unable to
respond to the Defendant's summary judgment motion absent
additional time in the prison law library. Plaintiff has
failed to address the possibility of asking this court for
additional time to file his response. Plaintiff previously
has demonstrated that he knows how to file a motion to extend
a deadline. If Plaintiff needs additional time in the law
library before filing his response, he can simply seek
additional time to file his response. Furthermore, the
undersigned sua sponte extended the deadline for
Plaintiff to respond to Defendant's motion for summary
judgment until July 23, 2019. (Doc. 82). This should afford
Plaintiff with sufficient time in the prison law library to
respond to the Defendant's motion. If, however, Plaintiff
needs additional time, he can file a motion with this court.
Of course, any such motion must state the relevant facts and
must show good cause for the relief requested. Additionally,
the undersigned ordered Defendant to “afford Plaintiff