final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion
under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.
appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County. Angela C.
Reese, pro se, Appellant.
Moody, Attorney General, and Anne C. Conley, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Reese appeals the order summarily denying her motion for
postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.850. We affirm.
was convicted of multiple felony offenses arising out of a
home invasion robbery during which Reese shot one victim and
her co-defendant attacked another victim. Reese was sentenced
to life in prison as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) for
burglary and concurrent sentences ranging from time-served to
25 years for the other offenses. Reese's judgment and
sentence were per curiam affirmed on direct appeal. See
Reese v. State, Case No. 1D14-2229, 229 So.3d 323 (Fla.
1st DCA 2016) (table).
filed a timely rule 3.850 motion in which she raised six
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and one claim of
cumulative error. The trial court summarily denied the motion
on the merits. Reese filed a timely motion for rehearing,
which the trial court denied. This appeal followed.
prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the
defendant must establish that (1) defense counsel's
performance was deficient and (2) the deficient performance
prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To establish deficient performance,
the defendant must overcome the strong presumption that
counsel's conduct was reasonable and show that the
conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
based on prevailing professional standards. Id. at
688-89; see also id. at 687 ("[The deficient
performance prong] requires showing that counsel made errors
so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
'counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.").
To establish prejudice, the defendant must show a reasonable
probability-i.e., a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome-that the result of the proceeding
would have been different but for counsel's
unprofessional errors. Id. at 694; see also
id. at 687 ("[The prejudice prong] requires showing
that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is
fully agree with the trial court's analysis of claims 1,
3, 6, and 7, and we affirm the denial of those claims without
further comment. We affirm the denial of the other claims for
the reasons that follow.