United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division
CHARLES C. VAUGHAN, Plaintiff,
EMERALD COAST RV CENTER, LLC, KEYSTONE RV COMPANY and LDRV HOLDING GROUP, Defendants.
D. Whittemore United States District Judge
THE COURT is Plaintiffs Motion to Stay Case Pending
the Court's Decision on the Motion to Remand to State
Court (Dkt. 13), which Defendant opposes (Dkts. 14, 15). Upon
consideration, the motion is DENIED.
power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent
in every court to control the disposition of the causes on
its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for
counsel, and for litigants. How this can best be done calls
for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing
interests and maintain an even balance." Landis v.
N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936). "The party
moving for a stay bears the burden of demonstrating that it
is appropriate [, and if] a stay would create hardship for a
party, then the movant must demonstrate that it would suffer
hardship or inequity from going forward." Harris
Corp. v. Rembrandt Technologies, LP, No.
6:07-cv-796-Orl-31 DAB, 2007 WL 2757372, at * 1 (M.D. Fla.
Sept. 20, 2007) (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at
254-256.) Among the factors courts examine in determining
whether to stay an action include "(1) whether a stay
will unduly prejudice or tactically disadvantage the
non-moving party; (2) whether a stay will simplify the issues
and streamline the trial; and (3) whether a stay will reduce
the burden of litigation on the parties and on the
court." Alps S., LLC v. The Ohio Willow Wood
Co., No. 8:09- cv-00386-T-EAK-MAP, 2010 WL 2465176, at
*1 (M.D. Fla. June 16, 2010).
has failed to carry his burden to demonstrate a stay is
appropriate at this time. Despite stating so in its Motion to
Stay, it is apparent from a review of the docket that
Plaintiff has not filed a Motion for Remand in accordance
with the Local Rules. Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion is
 Plaintiffs Motion to Remand
(Dkt. 13-1) is attached as an exhibit to Plaintiffs Motion to
Stay (Dkt. 13). Notwithstanding this filing error, Plaintiffs
contentions seeking remand are without merit. An action
initially commenced in state court may be removed if the
federal court has original jurisdiction. See 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal courts are vested with
jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
28 U.S.C. § 1331. For an action to 'arise under'
federal law, a federal question must appear on the face of
the well-pleaded complaint. See Christiansen v. Colt
Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808-09
It is apparent from the face of the Complaint (Dkt.
1-1) that Plaintiff purports to plead a violation of the
Federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. And although the Act is a
federal statute, an amount in controversy requirement exists.
See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3)(B) ("No claim
shall be cognizable in a suit brought [in an appropriate
district court of the United States] ... if the amount in
controversy is less than the sum or value of $50, 000
(exclusive of interests and costs) computed on the basis of
all claims to be determined in [the] suit."). Plaintiff
does not dispute this requirement. However, to determine
whether the jurisdictional requirements of removal are met,
"the court may consider facts alleged in the notice of
removal, judicial admissions made by the plaintiffs,
non-sworn letters submitted to the court, or other summary
judgment type evidence that may reveal that the amount in
controversy requirement is satisfied." Pretka v.
Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 754 (11th Cir.
2010) (citation omitted).
Defendants' factual summary in their Notice of
Removal (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 10, 12-17)) sufficiently
identifies the jurisdictional requirements for removal.
Moreover, Plaintiffs Complaint (Dkt. 1-1) states that [a]ll
claims alleged in this action related back to the claims and
allegations of Plaintiff s initial lawsuit." (Citing
Vaughn v. Emerald Coast RV Center LLC, et. al., No.
8:17-cv-639-MSS-AEP, Middle District of Florida). And as part
of those allegations, Plaintiff alleged "This Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to . . . the Federal Magnuson Moss
Warranty Act." See No. 8:17-cv-639, Dkt. 75
(Fourth Amended Complaint).
Further, there is supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a) ("[I]n any civil action of which
the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district
courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other
claims that are so related to the claims in the action within
such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same
case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution."). The state law claims arise under the
same operative facts as the federal claim, and are properly
before this ...