final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
Appeal from non-final orders from the Circuit Court for
Miami-Dade County, Thomas J. Rebull, Judge. Lower Tribunal
Alfonso E. Oviedo-Reyes, for appellants.
Bradley Arant Boult Cummings, LLP, and Tabitha S. Etlinger
(Tampa), for appellee.
EMAS, C.J., and SCALES and HENDON, JJ.
Taufer ("Taufer"), Hilda E. Lacayo and Mauricio
Lacayo, ("Tenants"), appeal from the trial
court's denial of their motions to vacate, reconsider, or
stay the order granting writ of possession to Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A.("Bank"). For the following
reasons, we dismiss the appeal.
2014, the final judgment of foreclosure was rendered in favor
of the Bank. The Bank and Taufer subsequently entered into a
2015 stipulation, ratified by the trial court, in which
Taufer withdrew all of her post-judgment motions and
stipulated to the immediate issuance of a certificate of
title. Title was issued to the Bank.
between the final judgment of foreclosure and the stipulation
and title transfer, Taufer leased the premises to the
Tenants. When the Bank filed its 2015 motion for writ of
possession, and timely filed notice to vacate, Taufer and the
Tenants objected, and filed the following four motions: 1)
motion to reconsider or vacate the order granting writ of
possession to the Bank, pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.530; 2) motion to reconsider or vacate the order
pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540; 3) motion
to stay the order granting writ of possession pending appeal;
4) motion to stay the order granting writ of possession for
45 days to allow the tenants to find new living arrangements.
All were properly denied by the trial court.
initial matter, the appellants herein lack standing to attack
the validity of the final judgment of foreclosure. The
Tenants took their interest in the property subject to a
recorded lis pendens and final judgment of foreclosure. The
Tenants are bound by that judgment. Furthermore, Taufer
waived her right to challenge the final judgment when she
stipulated to the title transfer. See e.g.,
Carlisle v. U.S. Bank, Nat'l Ass'n for Harborview
2005-10 Tr. Fund, 225 So.3d 893, 895 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)
(holding that as a purchaser post-lis pendens, Carlisle had
no rights in the property at the time the litigation
commenced, and he purchased the property subject to and bound
by any judgment rendered in the foreclosure action).
review of a final order, in order to invoke this Court's
jurisdiction to review a non-final order, an appellant must
file a notice within thirty days of rendition of the order to
be reviewed. Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(b). Here, the writ of
possession was rendered on August 16, 2018, and the notice of
appeal was filed on October 4, 2018. Appellants' failure
to file a notice of appeal within thirty days of rendition
precludes this Court from exercising jurisdiction over the
appeal. See Bryant v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 182
So.3d 927 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). As well, Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.540 cannot be directed toward non-final orders
such as the order granting the writ of possession. See
Hollifield v. Renew & Co., 18 So.3d 616, 617 (Fla.
1st DCA 2009) ("Rule 1.540 authorizes a trial court to
grant relief 'from a final judgment, decree, order, or
proceeding'-not from a non- final order . . . .").
Motions for reconsideration apply to "nonfinal,
interlocutory orders, and are based on a trial court's
'inherent authority to reconsider and, if deemed
appropriate, alter or retract any of its nonfinal rulings
prior to entry of the final judgment or order
terminating an action . . . .'" Seigler v.
Bell, 148 So.3d 473, 478-79 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (quoting
Silvestrone v. Edell, 721 So.2d 1173, 1175 (Fla.
1998) (citations omitted, emphasis added)); see also
Bettez v. City of Miami, 510 So.2d 1242, 1243 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1987) ("It is well settled in this state that a
trial court has inherent authority to reconsider . . . any of
its interlocutory rulings prior to entry of a final
judgment or final order in the cause.") (emphasis
added); see also Bryant, 182 So.3d at 930
("Moreover, even if the motion to vacate had been the
proper procedural vehicle below, we are without jurisdiction
to review the trial court's denial of that motion because
it does not fall within the range of appealable, non-final
orders provided by Rule 9.130(a)(3).").
issue raised by the appellants for the first time on appeal
is the federal Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of
2009. The appellants did not raise this issue
below and cannot raise it for the first time on appeal.
Gables Ins. Recovery, Inc. v. Citizens Prop. Ins.
Corp., 261 So.3d 613, 620 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (holding,
in order to raise an issue on appeal, it must be presented to
the trial court, and the specific legal argument or ground to
be argued on appeal must be part of that presentation).
Finally, the arguments in support of the motions to stay are,
essentially, unauthorized and untimely challenges to the
final judgment of foreclosure, rendered in 2014. The
remaining arguments on appeal are without merit. We therefore
dismiss the appeal.