United States District Court, N.D. Florida, Tallahassee Division
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MICHAEL J. FRANK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Maurice Woodard has filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1), with supporting
memorandum (Doc. 2). Respondent (“the State”)
answered, providing relevant portions of the state court
record. (Doc. 17). Woodard replied. (Doc. 19). The
undersigned concludes that no evidentiary hearing is required
for the disposition of this matter, and that Woodard is not
entitled to habeas relief.
Background and Procedural History 
October 27, 2004, Petitioner Woodard called Marvin Cannon
mid-evening and asked Cannon if he wanted to “pull a
lick with him”-a colloquialism for robbing someone.
Cannon agreed. Woodard did not give Cannon any details about
the robbery, but merely instructed Cannon that his role was
to provide transportation. Cannon obliged, borrowed his
sister's car, and drove to pick up Woodard.
in the meantime, called his robbery target Ephram Hagins and,
claiming to be Marvin Cannon, told Hagins that he was
interested in buying drugs. Hagins was acquainted with Cannon
because the two previously had attended school together.
Although Hagins did not recognize the caller's voice,
Hagins assumed it was Cannon based on Woodard's
misrepresentation of his identity. Hagins told Woodard (still
believing he was Cannon), that he would make some phone
Cannon picked up Woodard and Alfred Denson around 9:00 or
9:30 p.m. Woodard and Denson entered the car with a
black bag. Woodard spoke to Hagins on the phone (with Hagins
still believing he was speaking to Cannon), and the pair
agreed to meet at a store behind Hagins's apartment
complex in Tallahassee, Florida. This area had a BP gas
station, a Circle K, a Jamaican Way store, and a Wing Zone
and Denson took ski masks out of their black bag. Cannon
drove them to the Wing Zone. As he drove, he noticed that
Woodard, who was sitting in the front passenger seat, also
removed a gun from the black bag.
Cannon parked, Woodard instructed Cannon: (1) to position
himself near the trash can in front of the Jamaican Way store
which was next to the Circle K, (2) to wait there for the
victim, (3) that the victim would approach Cannon, (4) that
the victim was a large, black, bald-headed man known as
“E”, and (5) that once Cannon and the intended
victim made contact, Cannon should show the victim money and
discuss drugs. Cannon agreed, still not knowing the intended
victim's identity or that he and the intended victim were
arrived at the shopping plaza between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m.,
parked in front of the Jamaican Way store, and went into the
Circle K. Woodard called Cannon and informed him that the
intended victim had arrived. When Hagins came out of the
store, Cannon asked Hagins if he was “E.” Hagins
responded affirmatively. Cannon then recognized Hagins from
school. Cannon asked Hagins if he had any drugs. Hagins
replied no, but got on his cell phone and returned to his car
to make phone calls. Cannon waited outside Hagins's car.
minutes, Woodard and Denson ran up behind Hagins's car.
Hagins looked up from inside his car and saw the pair.
Woodard was wearing all black clothing including a black ski
mask. Denson was wearing a sweater-looking shirt with a hood.
Woodard and Denson each had a firearm.
tried to get out of his car, but Woodard hit Hagins in the
face with his gun. Woodard, Denson and Cannon then pushed
Hagins back inside his car. Woodard ordered Hagins into the
passenger seat and demanded Hagins's car key. Hagins
complied, and Woodard got in the driver's seat. Denson
got in the back seat. Cannon remained outside.
drove Hagins's car out of the shopping plaza and onto a
highway. Five to six miles later, Woodard stopped and ordered
Hagins from the car at gunpoint. Woodard and Denson tied
Hagins with speaker wire from the car and left him on the
side of the road. Hagins eventually freed himself and flagged
down a passerby. Hagins informed the police that Cannon was
one of the attackers. Hagins was taken to the hospital and
treated for head injuries.
in the meantime, drove to his sister's house and waited
to hear from Woodard. Between 30 to 60 minutes after Cannon
left the shopping plaza, Woodard called Cannon. Woodard
initially had tried to reach Cannon by calling Cannon's
mother's home. Woodard made both calls from Hagins's
testified at trial that the last time he used his cell phone
was at the shopping plaza during his encounter with Cannon
outside the Jamaican Way. During the carjacking, Hagins
dropped his cell phone in the car, and he saw Woodard use it.
Hagins also recalled that his cell phone remained in the car
after Woodard forced him out. Hagins's cell phone records
confirmed that Woodard called not only Cannon from
Hagins's cell phone, but also Woodard's
then-girlfriend Shontecia Murray.
was charged in Leon County Circuit Court No. 2004-CF-3842,
with three crimes: Armed Carjacking; Kidnapping to Facilitate
Felony with a Firearm; and Aggravated Battery with a Firearm.
(Doc. 17, Attach. 1, Ex. B1, p. 2 (third amended
information), pp. 3-8 (complaint/probable cause
affidavit)).Woodard and co-defendant Denson's first
trial ended in a mistrial due to a hung jury. (See
Doc. 17, Attach. 9, Ex. F1, p. 47).
and Denson were re-tried on June 12-14, 2006. The State
presented testimony from Hagins, Cannon, law enforcement
officers, the custodian of Hagins's cell phone records,
and Shontecia Murray. The State also introduced records from
Mr. Hagins's cell phone confirming Woodard's various
calls. The State introduced inculpatory letters Woodard wrote
to his sister and to a co-inmate at the Leon County Jail
(Derrick Holmes) after the first trial. The letters directed
them to memorize a particular story to support Woodard's
defense and discredit Cannon's anticipated trial
testimony. Woodard's defense theory was that the two
masked carjackers were Cannon's cousins whom Cannon was
trying to protect by implicating Woodard and Denson. The jury
found Woodard guilty of all three crimes as charged. (Doc.
17, Attach. 2, Ex. B3, pp. 446-50 (verdict)).
trial court adjudicated Woodard guilty and sentenced him as a
Prison Releasee Reoffender to life in prison. (Doc. 17,
Attach. 2, Ex. B3, pp. 458-67 (judgment and sentence); Ex. B6
(transcript of sentencing). The Florida First District Court
of Appeal (“First DCA”) affirmed on August 5,
2008, per curiam and without written opinion.
Woodard v. State, 995 So.2d 500 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)
(Table) (copy at Doc. 17, Attach. 5, Ex. B9). Woodard's
motion for rehearing was denied on November 10, 2008. (Doc.
17, Attach. 5, Ex. B11).
November 9, 2009, Woodard filed a pro se motion for
postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.850, which he twice amended. (Doc. 17, Attach. 6,
Ex. E1, pp, 1-48 (original motion); Ex. E1, pp. 49-59
(amended motion); Ex. E1, pp. 77-118 (second amended
motion)). The state circuit court ordered an evidentiary
hearing and appointed counsel to assist Woodard. (Doc. 17,
Attach. 6, Ex. E1, pp. 139, 140-47).
postconviction evidentiary hearing was held on January 11,
2013. (Doc. 17, Attach. 7, Ex. E2). At the close of the
hearing, the state circuit court denied relief, explaining
its reasons on the record. (Doc. 17, Attach. 7, Ex. E2, pp.
266-71 (evidentiary hearing transcript)). The circuit court
entered a written final order that day which stated, in
relevant part: “Based on the reasons as announced on
the record, the court finds that defendant has failed to show
that he received ineffective assistance of counsel or that he
was prejudiced by any alleged deficiency.” (Doc. 17,
Attach. 6, Ex. E1, p. 180). The First DCA affirmed per
curiam without written opinion on July 29, 2014.
Woodard v. State, 147 So.3d 991 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)
(Table) (copy at Doc. 17, Attach. 9, Ex. E6). The mandate
issued August 26, 2014. (Doc. 17, Attach. 9, Ex. E7).
his first postconviction appeal was pending, Woodard filed a
second Rule 3.850 motion on October 24, 2013, alleging that
he had “newly discovered evidence” of his
innocence. Woodard explained that Marvin Cannon recanted his
trial testimony. (Doc. 17, Attach. 9, Ex. F, pp. 1-19). The
state circuit court ordered an evidentiary hearing and
appointed counsel to assist Woodard. (Doc. 17, Attach. 9, Ex.
F1, pp. 24-35). The evidentiary hearing was held on April 9,
2015. (Doc. 17, Attach. 9, Ex. F1, pp. 52-149 (evidentiary
hearing transcript)). On August 12, 2015, the state circuit
court denied relief by written order. (Doc. 17, Attach. 9,
Ex. F1, pp. 47-50). The First DCA affirmed per
curiam without written opinion on March 23, 2017.
Woodard v. State, 224 So.3d 218 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)
(Table) (copy at Doc. 17, Attach. 12, Ex. F6). The mandate
issued April 18, 2017. (Doc. 17, Attach. 12, Ex. F7).
filed his pro se federal habeas petition on May 26,
2017, (Doc. 1). Woodard's petition raises five claims of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and one claim of
actual innocence. (Doc. 1, pp. 4-6 in ECF; Doc. 2). The State
asserts that Woodard is not entitled to habeas relief on any
claim because each claim is either procedurally defaulted,
devoid of merit, or both. (Doc. 17, pp. 7-55).
Governing Legal Principles
Section 2254 Standard of Review
federal court “shall not” grant a habeas corpus
petition on any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in
state court unless the state court's decision “was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The United States
Supreme Court explained the framework for § 2254 review
in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362
(2000). In Williams, Justice O'Connor
described the appropriate test:
Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas
court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a
conclusion opposite to that reached by this court on a
question of law or if the state court decides a case
differently than this Court has on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable
application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant
the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing
legal principle from this Court's decisions but
unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the
Id., 529 U.S. at 412-13 (O'Connor, J.,
the Williams framework, the federal court must first
determine the “clearly established Federal law, ”
namely, “the governing legal principle or principles
set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court
render[ed] its decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade,
538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). After identifying the governing
legal principle, the federal court determines whether the
state court's adjudication is contrary to the clearly
established Supreme Court case law. The adjudication is
“contrary to” federal law only if either the
reasoning or the result contradicts the relevant Supreme
Court cases. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8
(2002) (“Avoiding th[e] pitfalls [of § 2254(d)(1)]
does not require citation to our cases-indeed, it does not
even require awareness of our cases, so long as neither the
reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision
“contrary to” clause is not satisfied, the
federal court determines whether the state court
“unreasonably applied” the governing legal
principle set forth in the Supreme Court's cases. The
federal court defers to the state court's reasoning
unless the state court's application of the legal
principle was “objectively unreasonable” in light
of the record before the state court. See Williams,
529 U.S. at 409; Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649,
652 (2004). “[E]ven a strong case for relief does not
mean the state court's contrary conclusion was
unreasonable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.
86, 102 (2011).
2254(d) also allows habeas relief for a claim adjudicated on
the merits in state court where that adjudication
“resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The “unreasonable
determination of the facts” standard is implicated only
to the extent the validity of the state court's ultimate
conclusion is premised on unreasonable fact finding. See
Gill v. Mecusker, 633 F.3d 1272, 1292 (11th Cir. 2011).
As with the “unreasonable application” clause,
the federal court applies an objective test. See
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (holding
that a state court decision based on a factual determination
“will not be overturned on factual grounds unless
objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented
in the state court proceeding.”). Federal courts
“may not characterize . . . state-court factual
determinations as unreasonable merely because we would have
reached a different conclusion in the first instance.”
Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. __, __, 135 S.Ct. 2269,
2277 (2015) (quotation marks omitted).
Supreme Court has often emphasized that a state
prisoner's burden under § 2254(d) is
“difficult to meet, . . . because it was meant to
be.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. The Court
As amended by AEDPA, § 2254(d) stops short of imposing a
complete bar on federal-court relitigation of claims already
rejected in state proceedings. Cf. Felker v. Turpin,
518 U.S. 651, 664, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996)
(discussing AEDPA's “modified res judicata
rule” under § 2244). It preserves authority to
issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility
fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's
decision conflicts with this Court's precedents. It goes
no further. Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas
corpus is a “guard against extreme malfunctions in the
state criminal justice systems, ” not a substitute for
ordinary error correction through appeal. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332, n. 5, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61
L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). As
a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court,
a state prisoner must show that the state court's
ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so
lacking in justification that there was an error well
understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any
possibility for fairminded disagreement.
Richter, 562 U.S. at 102-03 (emphasis added).
federal court may conduct an independent review of the merits
of the petitioner's claim only if it first finds that the
petitioner satisfied § 2254(d). See Panetti
v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 954 (2007). Even then, the
writ will not issue unless the petitioner shows that he is in
custody “in violation of the Constitution or laws and
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §
Clearly Established Federal Law Governing Claims of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Supreme Court follows a two-pronged test for evaluating
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The
petitioner must show (1) his counsel's performance was
constitutionally deficient, and (2) the deficient performance
prejudiced him. See Id. at 687. “First,
petitioner must show that ‘counsel's representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.'
Second, petitioner must show that ‘there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.'” Darden v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 184 (1986) (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly
deferential, ” and courts should make every effort to
“eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to
reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged
conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's
perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 689. Trial counsel is “strongly presumed to have
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant
decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional
judgment.” Id. at 690. The burden to overcome
that presumption and show that counsel's performance was
deficient “rests squarely on the defendant.”
Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 22-23 (2013);
Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 189 (2011)
(“To overcome that presumption, a defendant must show
that counsel failed to act reasonably considering all the
circumstances.” (quotation marks and alterations
omitted)). Strickland's prejudice prong requires
a defendant to establish a “reasonable
probability” of a different result. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is
one that sufficiently undermines confidence in the outcome.
Id. “The likelihood of a different result must
be substantial, not just conceivable.”
Richter, 562 U.S. at 112.
district court considers a habeas petition, the state
court's findings of historical facts in the course of
evaluating an ineffectiveness claim are subject to the
presumption of correctness, while the performance and
prejudice components are mixed questions of law and fact.
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698. “Surmounting
Strickland's high bar is never an easy
task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371
(2010). “Establishing that a state court's
application of Strickland was unreasonable under
§ 2254(d) is all the more difficult.”
Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (citations omitted). The
Supreme Court explained:
The standards created by Strickland and §
2254(d) are both “highly deferential, ” and when
the two apply in tandem, review is “doubly” so.
The Strickland standard is a general one, so the
range of reasonable applications is substantial. Federal
habeas courts must guard against the danger of equating
unreasonableness under Strickland with
unreasonableness under § 2254(d). When § 2254(d)
applies, the question is not whether counsel's actions
were reasonable. The question is whether there is any
reasonable argument that counsel satisfied
Strickland's deferential standard.
Id. (citations omitted).
Ground One “Denial of Effective Assistance of
Counsel, in Violation of Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment Right
of the United States and Florida Constitution, by
Counsel's Failure to Conduct an Adequate Pre-Trial
Investigation, Interview and Depose Terrell Powell, Derick
Holmes, and Canary Denson, and for Failure to Move to
Suppress Unlawfully Seized Evidence.” (Doc. 1, p.
claims that his trial counsel, Attorney John Kenny, was
ineffective for failing to interview three witnesses: Terrell
Powell, Derrick Holmes, and Canary Denson. (Doc. 1, p. 4 in
ECF). Woodard also claims that Attorney Kenny was ineffective
for failing to move to suppress “unlawfully seized
evidence, ” namely, the letters he wrote to his sister
and Derrick Holmes. (Id.).
State asserts that Woodard's claim is partially
procedurally defaulted, because although Woodard raised all
of these issues in his second amended Rule 3.850 motion, he
abandoned two issues (counsel's failure to investigate
Canary Denson and failure to file a motion to suppress) by
failing to raise them in his counseled postconviction appeal.
Accordingly, these aspects of Woodard's claim are
procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 17, pp. 9-11). The State argues
in the alternative that even assuming to Woodard's
benefit that he properly exhausted all aspects of this claim,
he is not entitled to habeas relief because he fails to meet
§ 2254(d)'s demanding standard. (Doc. 17, pp.
replies that he did not abandon any aspect of this claim in
his postconviction appeal; that his appellate brief
“was filed pro se with sufficient facts to state a
claim”, and that nothing in the First DCA's summary
decision indicates that it deemed any part of the claim
waived. (Doc. 19, pp. 3-4).
Woodard Procedurally Defaulted His Sub-Claims Involving
Canary Denson and Motion to Suppress
bringing a § 2254 habeas action, the petitioner must
exhaust all available state court remedies for challenging
his conviction, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving
the State the “‘opportunity to pass upon and
correct' alleged violations of its prisoners' federal
rights.” Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365
(1995) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275
(1971) (citation omitted)). The petitioner “must give
the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any
constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the
State's established appellate review process.”
O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845
(1999); Picard, 404 U.S. at 277-78.
that was not properly exhausted in state court and can no
longer be litigated under state procedural rules is
considered procedurally defaulted, i.e.,
procedurally barred from federal review. Boerckel,
526 U.S. at 839-40, 848; Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991) (“[I]f the petitioner failed
to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the
petitioner would be required to present his claims in order
to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims
procedurally barred . . . there is a procedural default for
purposes of federal habeas . . . .” (citations
omitted)). A petitioner seeking to overcome a procedural
default must “demonstrate cause for the default and
actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of
federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the
claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of
justice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.
established postconviction process includes an appeal from an
order denying postconviction relief. See Fla. R.
App. P 9.141(b)(3); see also Leonard v. Wainwright,
601 F.2d 807, 808 (5th Cir. 1979); Rodwell v.
Singletary, 114 F.Supp.2d 1308, 1312 (M.D. Fla. 2000).
Where, as here, a defendant appeals from an order denying
postconviction relief after an evidentiary hearing, he is
required to file an initial brief. Fla. R. App. Proc.
9.141(b)(3)(C). Issues not raised and argued in the initial
brief are abandoned. See Atwater v. Crosby, 451 F.3d
799, 809-10 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Shere v. State,
742 So.2d 215, 217 n.6 (Fla. 1999) (recognizing Florida's
rule that an issue raised in an appellate brief which
contains no argument is abandoned)); see also Duest v.
Dugger, 555 So.2d 849, 851 (Fla. 1990) (holding that
issues raised on appeal from an order denying postconviction
relief were procedurally barred when petitioner received an
evidentiary hearing and failed to fully brief and argue the
points on appeal).
state court record establishes that Woodard's second
amended Rule 3.850 motion raised counsel's
ineffectiveness concerning Terrell Powell as Ground 1-B;
counsel's ineffectiveness concerning Canary Denson as
Ground 1-C; counsel's ineffectiveness concerning Derrick
Holmes as Ground 1-D; and counsel's ineffectiveness
concerning the motion to suppress as Ground 1-E. (Doc. 17,
Ex. E1, pp. 80-91). The state circuit court denied relief on
all grounds after an evidentiary hearing. Woodard appealed,
and his postconviction counsel filed an initial brief. (Doc.
17, Ex. E4). The initial brief, however, raised only one
argument concerning Ground 1, namely, that the circuit court
erred by failing to resolve Ground 1-B (concerning Powell)
and Ground 1-D (concerning Holmes). (Doc. 17, Ex. E4, pp.
i-iii (Table of Contents), 2-6 (Statement of the Facts),
11-13 (Points of Argument on Appeal and Summary of Argument),
and 37-38 (Argument)). Woodard excluded from his brief the
ineffective assistance claims concerning Canary Denson
(Ground 1-C) and the motion to suppress (Ground 1-E). The
First DCA summarily affirmed.
failure to invoke one complete round of Florida's
established appellate review process-by abandoning Grounds
1-C and 1-E on appeal-renders them unexhausted. Because any
further attempt by Woodard to exhaust those issues in state
court would be futile, Grounds 1-C (concerning Denson) and
1-E (concerning the motion to suppress) are procedurally
defaulted. See Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 848 (holding
that Alabama's established appellate review process
provided for discretionary review in the state supreme court,
and that petitioner's filing of a discretionary review
petition but leaving out three issues he later included in
his federal habeas petition rendered the issues unexhausted
and procedurally defaulted); Coleman, 501 U.S. at
735 n.1; Sims v. Singletary, 155 F.3d 1297, 1311
(11th Cir. 1998) (“Sims abandoned the photograph
component of this claim on appeal of the denial of his motion
for post-conviction relief. Therefore, this portion of the
argument is procedurally barred for federal habeas
purposes.” (citing Lindsey v. Smith, 820 F.2d
1137, 1143 (11th Cir.1987))); see also, e.g.,
Baker v. Dep't of Corr., Sec'y, 634
Fed.Appx. 689, 693 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that the habeas
petitioner's substantive double jeopardy claim-which was
rejected on the merits by the postconviction trial court-was
procedurally defaulted on habeas review because the
petitioner abandoned the claim in his postconviction appeal
by failing to argue it in his counseled initial brief or in
his pro se brief).
makes none of the requisite showings to excuse his procedural
default. Woodard's procedural default bars habeas review
of his claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to
investigate Canary Denson and failing to file a motion to
Woodard Is Not Entitled To Habeas Relief On His Sub-Claims
Involving Terrell Powell and Derrick Holmes
alleges that Marvin Cannon “told him that Terrell
Powell was one of the perpetrators involved in the alleged
crime” and that Powell was being held in the Gadsden
County Jail. (Doc. 2, p. 14). Woodard claims he gave trial
counsel this information and asked him to interview Powell,
but counsel failed to investigate the matter. (Id.,
pp. 14-15). Woodard contends that “[t]he failure to
investigate matters and learn the facts effectively deprived
the Petitioner of the right to place evidence before the jury
that could have made the difference in the verdict of guilty
to not guilty.” (Id., p.p. ...