final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2)
from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Martin Zilber,
Judge Lower Tribunal Nos. 89-12383C, 89-21846.
J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Jonathan Greenberg,
Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Moody, Attorney General, and Linda Katz, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
EMAS, C.J., and LOGUE and HENDON, JJ.
Ingraham was charged with committing first-degree murder
(Count I) and attempted first-degree murder (Counts II and
III) on March 20, 1989. Ingraham was a juvenile on the date of
the offenses. Following trial, he was convicted of
first-degree murder (as charged) and two counts of attempted
second-degree murder with a firearm (as lesser-included
offenses of attempted first-degree murder).
first-degree murder count (Count I), Ingraham was sentenced
to life with parole eligibility after twenty-five years. On
each of the two attempted second-degree murder counts (Counts
II and III), Ingraham was sentenced to thirty years in prison
without parole, each sentence to be served consecutively to
each other and consecutively to the life-with-parole sentence
on the murder count.
convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal.
Ingraham v. State, 626 So.2d 1117 (Fla. 3d DCA
2017, Ingraham filed a motion to vacate his judgments and
sentences pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.850, raising two claims: 1) his life- with-parole sentence
for first-degree murder violated
Miller and Graham; and 2) his
aggregate sentence of sixty years in prison for the
non-homicide offenses (two consecutive thirty-year sentences
on Counts II and III), to be served at the conclusion of his
life-with-parole sentence on Count I, is unconstitutional and
contrary to the Florida Supreme Court's decisions in
Henry and Kelsey.
trial court denied Ingraham's first claim, and we affirm.
See Franklin v. State, 258 So.3d 1239 (Fla. 2018);
State v. Michel, 257 So.3d 3 (Fla. 2018).
the trial court issued no ruling on Ingraham's claim that
the aggregate sixty-year sentence, to be served at the
conclusion of his life-with-parole sentence on Count I, is
unconstitutional and contrary to Henry and
Kelsey. Although we have the discretion to address
this matter in the first instance, we decline to do so, and
instead remand this cause for the trial court to conduct any
further proceedings as may be appropriate, to make a
determination on Ingraham's second claim, and to render
an order accordingly.
in part, ...