United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division
LEE P. ROBINSON, Petitioner,
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
VIRGNIA M. HERNANDEZ COVINGTON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Robinson, a Florida inmate, timely filed a pro se
second amended petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his Hillsborough County
convictions. (Doc. 11). Respondent filed a response (Doc. 21)
and Robinson filed a reply (Doc. 30). Upon consideration, the
petition will be DENIED.
was convicted after a jury trial of first degree felony
murder with a firearm, attempted robbery with a firearm, and
burglary with a firearm. (Doc. 23, Ex. 1a, pp. 230-32). The
state trial court sentenced him to an overall term of life in
prison. (Id., pp. 247-54). The state appellate court
per curiam affirmed the convictions and sentences.
(Doc. 23, Ex. 5). Robinson's motions for postconviction
relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 were
denied. (Doc. 23, Exs. 9-9c). The state appellate court
per curiam affirmed. (Doc. 23, Ex. 13).
Robinson's Theory Of Defense 
night of June 14, 2007, Robinson and his friend Wesley Reeves
picked up Ishla Daniels and Veandrea Smith, two women whom
Robinson knew. In the early morning hours of June 15, 2007,
the four traveled in Smith's car to Mirage, a club in
Tampa, and Daniels noticed a “bulge” near
Robinson's right hip. Robinson pointed to a man in the
club's parking lot and asked Smith to talk to him. Smith
and Daniels ended up talking to two men, Granville Ritchie
and Dwayne Simms.
and Daniels rode with Ritchie in his car to the Village Motel
in Tampa; Simms drove to the motel in his own car. After
Ritchie rented a two-bedroom motel room, Smith and Daniels
went into the bathroom and talked about leaving. When the men
came in, Smith and Simms sat down on the bed in the front
bedroom. When Simms took his shirt off, Smith began rubbing
his back. She did not notice any weapon on Simms.
they needed to use the phone, Smith and Daniels left the room
and went outside. Daniels called Robinson on her cell phone.
She told him that she was scared and wanted to leave.
Robinson responded that he could see her, but she could not
see him. Smith and Daniels began walking away. Robinson
rushed past them towards the room, with Reeves following
behind him. As they passed, Daniels noticed Robinson reach
towards his right side. When Smith and Daniels heard
gunshots, they ran until they got to Smith's car, which
Robinson had parked nearby.
in the back bedroom, Ritchie “heard a little sound like
[Simms] want [sic] to say something, but it didn't come
out, ” followed by a gunshot. (Doc. 23, Ex. 1d, p.
346). Ritchie stood by the bathroom door but was able to look
in a mirror and see the front bedroom. Ritchie observed Simms
“sliding” and trying to get away as Robinson
continued to shoot. (Id., p. 347). After Simms
“dropped, ” Robinson ran from the room.
(Id., pp. 347-48, 350). Ritchie denied that Simms
had any type of weapon. Ritchie did not see Simms and
Robinson wrestling or struggling.
Reeves, Smith, and Daniels left together in Smith's car.
As they drove away, Robinson said that “that wasn't
supposed to happen” and that they “need[ed] to
pray that [Simms] doesn't pass away.” (Doc. 23, Ex.
1e, pp. 415-16).
died as a result of a gunshot wound. During the day of June
15, Robinson and his wife, Felicia, picked up Smith and
Daniels. Robinson, who wanted to leave Tampa because of local
news coverage of the murder, drove them to Gainesville.
During this time, Daniels recalled Robinson talking on the
phone to an unidentified person using the word “lick,
” meaning robbery, in referring to the victim.
(Id., p. 499).
Deputy United States Marshals arrested the four at a
residence in Gainesville. When officers from the Tampa Police
Department arrived, Robinson was handcuffed in the back of a
police car. Prior to receiving Miranda warnings,
Robinson talked to Detective Charles Massucci at the arrest
scene and again at the Gainesville Police Department. Later,
Robinson received Miranda warnings, waived his
rights, and gave a recorded interview to Detective Massucci.
During the interview, Robinson stated that he wanted money to
pay his electric bill and he thought he could “rough
the guys up a little” and that he was “going to
grab . . . what I can and get and go.” (Doc. 23, Ex.
1g, pp. 758, 775). Robinson said that Simms attacked him with
a gun and that as they “wrestled over the gun”,
Robinson “pulled the trigger . . . to try to get
[Simms] off me, to keep him from killing me.”
(Id., p. 758).
met Scott McCombs in jail. McCombs testified at trial that
Robinson said he went to the club to look for “some
guys that . . . owed him some money” and that he used
Daniels and Smith to lure Simms away from the club. (Doc. 23,
Ex. 1f, p. 585). According to McCombs, Robinson said that
when he walked into the motel room, he pulled the gun from
his right hip area and demanded money. Robinson was startled
when Simms approached him, and shot once. When Simms
continued approaching, Robinson shot at Simms several more
times before fleeing. Robinson later met with the others to
“get their stories straight.” (Id., p.
testified at trial that Daniels and Smith planned to go into
Mirage and have some drinks, and that he agreed to pick them
up later that night. He denied telling them to talk to any
men. Robinson testified that he received a call from Daniels
asking him to pick her up from the motel and that when he
arrived, he saw Daniels and Smith standing outside of the
room. He explained, “I just really want to know who
[was] in the room. I want to know who they left with, you
know, and I want to know, you know, if they are playing a
game with me or what. . . . So I'm just curious of who
[was] in the room. So I went into the room.” (Doc. 23,
Ex. 1h, pp. 912-13). When he went in, he stated, Simms jumped
up and reached for something. Robinson testified that he did
not take a gun into the room. He stated that he ran into
Simms to stop him, and that they ended up “tussling and
wrestling” with the gun. (Id., p. 914).
Robinson testified that the gun went off as he struggled to
get it away from Simms. Robinson denied that he intended to
commit a robbery, saying that his statement about robbery was
just a story he told police to “take the rap” so
that his wife would be released from custody. (Id.,
p. 924). Robinson also denied telling McCombs that he robbed
anyone. Wesley Reeves testified that he did not see Robinson
with a firearm and that they did not talk about committing a
robbery. He stated that they came up with the robbery
scenario because Robinson “felt guilty because [sic]
the way things happened” and was willing to take the
blame. (Doc. 23, Ex. 1g, pp. 849-50).
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”) governs this proceeding. Carroll v.
Sec'y, DOC, 574 F.3d 1354, 1364 (11th Cir. 2009).
Habeas relief can only be granted if a petitioner is in
custody “in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §
2254(a). Section 2254(d) provides that federal habeas relief
cannot be granted on a claim adjudicated on the merits in
state court unless the state court's adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceeding.
decision is “contrary to” clearly established
federal law “if the state court arrives at a conclusion
opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question
of law or if the state court decides a case differently than
[the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). A decision is an
“unreasonable application” of clearly established
federal law “if the state court identifies the correct
governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's
decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the
facts of the prisoner's case.” Id. at 413.
AEDPA was meant “to prevent federal habeas
‘retrials' and to ensure that state-court
convictions are given effect to the extent possible under
law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002).
Accordingly, “[t]he focus . . . is on whether the state
court's application of clearly established federal law is
objectively unreasonable, and . . . an unreasonable
application is different from an incorrect one.”
Id. at 694. See also Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011) (“As a condition for obtaining
habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must
show that the state court's ruling on the claim being
presented in federal court was so lacking in justification
that there was an error well understood and comprehended in
existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
state appellate court affirmed the judgment and sentence and
the denial of postconviction relief without discussion. These
decisions warrant deference under § 2254(d)(1) because
“the summary nature of a state court's decision
does not lessen the deference that it is due.”
Wright v. Moore, 278 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir.
2002). See also Richter, 562 U.S. at 99 (“When
a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the
state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the
state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the
absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles
to the contrary.”).
Of State Remedies; Procedural Default
federal habeas petitioner must exhaust his claims for relief
by raising them in state court before presenting them in his
petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); O'Sullivan
v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999) (“[T]he
state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to
act on his claims before he presents those claims to a
federal court in a habeas petition.”).
requirement of exhausting state remedies as a prerequisite to
federal review is satisfied if the petitioner “fairly
presents” his claim in each appropriate state court and
alerts that court to the federal nature of the claim.
Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1971).
“If the petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies
that are no longer available, that failure is a procedural
default which will bar federal habeas relief, unless either
the cause and prejudice or the fundamental miscarriage of
justice exception is established.” Smith v.
Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir. 2001). See
also Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299, 1305 (11th Cir.
1999) (“[F]ederal courts may treat unexhausted claims
as procedurally defaulted, even absent a state court
determination to that effect, if it is clear from state law
that any future attempts at exhaustion would be futile. . . .
A habeas petitioner can escape the procedural default
doctrine either through showing cause for the default and
prejudice . . . or establishing a ‘fundamental
miscarriage of justice.'”).
argues that the state court erred in denying the motion to
suppress his statements to Detective Massucci. Robinson
claims that his unrecorded, pre-Miranda statements
at the arrest scene and at the Gainesville Police Department
were inadmissible because he made them while he was subjected
to custodial interrogation without the benefit of
Miranda warnings. He also alleges that his recorded,
post-Miranda statements at the Gainesville Police
Department should have been suppressed because the
Miranda warnings were insufficient. Finally,
Robinson claims that “his pre-Miranda statements
tainted his post-Miranda confession.” (Doc. 11, p. 8).
state court denied Robinson's motion to suppress:
A homicide occurred on June 15, 2007, at 4100 E. Hillsborough
Avenue. The victim was identified as Dwayne Simms. The
Defendant was developed as a suspect by the police and the
Defendant was arrested in Gainesville by U.S. Marshal[ ]s on
June 18, 2007. Detective[s] Massucci and Sandel were notified
and arrived at the scene of the Defendant's arrest
approximately 1 hour after being notified. It is undisputed
the defendant had been arrested and was cuffed in a police
unit when Detective Massucci arrived. According to Detective
Massucci, he approached the Defendant who was in a police
unit. The Defendant spontaneously told Detective Massucci he
was the person the detective needed to speak to. It is
uncontroverted the defendant was in custody and
Miranda warnings had not been given to the
Defendant. Detective Massucci testified he did not ask the
Defendant any questions during this period other than asking
him if he needed anything to drink.
The Defendant inquired about his wife's status at the
time and made a statement about cooperating if his wife and
[Smith and Daniels] could be released. According to Detective
Massucci, he had 2 conversations with the Defendant while
Defendant was in a police unit. Detective Massucci said the
Defendant spoke to him after being transported to the
Gainesville Police Department before a formal interview took
place which was recorded. Testimony further developed that a
tape recorded statement was taken from the Defendant which
started at 3:45 P.M. and ended at 4:23 P.M. A transcript of
that tape was admitted and the court has reviewed it as well
as the tape recording itself.
The Defendant testified that he recalled being asked
questions by Detective Massucci for approximately 45 minutes
at the Gainesville Police Department before going on tape.
The Defendant testified he responded to the questions the
detectives asked. He also testified the detective never
During the tape recorded conversation, the Detective told the
Defendant the following regarding his Miranda warnings.
Detective Massucci - Okay? Uh, your rights are that you have
the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be
used against you in a court of law. You have the right to an
attorney, and if you cannot afford an attorney, one will be
appointed to you at no cost. And what's most important to
remember about those are if you choose to talk to us, at any
point you can stop talking to us meaning you can exercise
these rights at any time.
Lee P. Robinson, Yes, Sir.
Detective Massucci -if I ask you something that you are
uncomfortable with, if I ask you something that you don't
wanna do. You can either say, “No” you can either
ask for a lawyer or you can either stop taking [sic], okay?
Lee P. Robinson, Yes, Sir.
Detective Massucci. So with that being said, that was a lot
you had to say before we went on tape.
Lee P. Robinson Yes, Sir.
The State argues that the statements the defendant made at
the scene of his arrest were spontaneous and not the subject
of interrogation. The defense agrees with this therefore the
court finds the statements the Defendant made at the scene of
his arrest were not in response to custodial interrogation
and are admissible.
The Defendant gave statements to Detective [sic] at the
Gainesville Police Department before being given his Miranda
warnings and also gave a tape recorded statements [sic] after
Miranda was administered. The court will deal with each
Statements made at the Gainesville Police Department pre
Detective Massucci testified he spoke with the Defendant for
approximately one hour before the taped interview. The
detective testified the only questions he asked concern[ed]
making the Defendant comfortable; he at no time asked any
questions which would elicit an incriminating response. The
Defendant, on the other hand testified the detective asked
him questions throughout the interview which he responded to.
The court listened to the recorded interview in an attempt to
determine the exchange between Detective Massucci and the
Defendant. That interview consists of the Detective generally
letting the Defendant tell Detective Massucci what occurred.
While the Detective does ask questions, most of the interview
consists of the Defendant relating what occurred. The court
also had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of both
Detective Massucci and the Defendant conclude [sic] the
detective was clearly more credible.
The court finds that the Defendant's statements made at
the Gainesville Police department pre Miranda were not the
result of custodial interrogation. While it is clear the
Defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda,
the court finds he was not subjected to custodial
interrogation but volunteered the information to law
enforcement. Therefore the Defendant's Motion to Suppress
his out of court statements at the Gainesville Police
Department before being given Miranda is
Defendant's taped interview post Miranda
The Defendant gave a taped interview to the detective after
being administered his Miranda warnings. The court
earlier quoted the transcript which dealt with
Miranda. It is clear the Defendant was never told he
had the right to the presence of an attorney during
questioning. The issue is whether the warnings given the
Defendant comply with Miranda.
The State cites the recent case of Graham v. State, 2007 WL
4404945 (Fla. App 2 Dist) where the Second District found
that warnings which informed the Defendant he had the right
to an attorney without mentioning before answering any
questions were not a violation of Miranda. The
Graham case cites the case of Powell v. State, 32
FLW D 2418 (10-10-07) where the Second District found that
warnings which informed a Defendant that he had a right to
speak to an attorney before answering any questions did not
comply with Miranda. The Second District felt that
informing a Defendant he has the right to speak to an
attorney before questioning does not tell him he has a right
to counsel throughout any interrogation which is what Miranda
requires. Thus the Powell court reversed the
Defendant's conviction. The questions raised in
Powell and a predecessor case M.A.B. v.
State, 957 So.2d 1219 (Fla. 2 DCA 2007) have been
certified to the Florida Supreme Court.
Miranda requires that a Defendant be informed he has the
right to the presence of an attorney. Detective Massucci so
advised the Defendant in this case. The case is controlled by
Graham; therefore the rights given the Defendant
complied with Miranda. The Defendant's Motion to
Suppress his recorded statement is denied.
23, Ex. 1, pp. 176-80).
Robinson's Statements At The Arrest Scene
argues that his statements at the arrest scene should have
been suppressed. The Court finds that this claim is
unexhausted because Robinson failed to present it to the
state trial court. As the state court's order discusses,
Robinson conceded that his statements at the arrest scene
were spontaneous (and therefore not made in response to
questioning), and did not challenge their admission.
Accordingly, Robinson failed to exhaust this claim, even
though he alleged on appeal that the state court erred in not
suppressing these statements. See, e.g., Pruitt v.
Jones, 348 F.3d 1355, 1358-59 (11th Cir. 2003) (to
exhaust a claim, a petitioner must undertake “one
complete round” of the state's review process).
Because Robinson cannot return to the trial court to present
this claim, it is procedurally defaulted. See Smith,
256 F.3d at 1138. Robinson does not demonstrate that an
exception applies to excuse the default. See id.
assuming that Robinson exhausted this claim by addressing it
on direct appeal (see Doc. 23, Ex. 2, p. 33),
Robinson cannot obtain relief. Detective Massucci testified
that when he arrived in Gainesville, Robinson was handcuffed
in the back of a police car. (Doc. 23, Ex. 1a, p. 272). When
Detective Massucci told Robinson “who [he] was and
where [he] was from, ” Robinson initiated a
conversation and volunteered information. (Id., p.
273). Robinson told Detective Massucci that he was the person
Detective Massucci needed to talk to. (Id.).
Detective Massucci told Robinson that he was conducting a
homicide investigation. (Id., pp. 273-74). Robinson
began “attempting to negotiate” with Detective
Massucci, indicating that if his wife was released, he would
“tell [Detective Massucci] what . . . [Detective
Massucci] needed to know.” (Id., p. 274).
Detective Massucci also testified that Robinson asked
questions about how police found him and expressed concern
over the custody of his wife, Daniels, and Smith.
Massucci testified that none of Robinson's statements
prior to his formal, recorded interview at the police station
were made in response to any direct questioning.
(Id., pp. 273-75). Detective Massucci testified that
the only questions he asked Robinson prior to the recording
involved Robinson's well-being, such as whether he needed
water or whether his handcuffs were comfortable.
(Id., pp. 275, 280). Detective Massucci also stated
that he only momentarily spoke to Robinson twice at the
arrest scene, as he also worked on obtaining consent to
search the residence, coordinating the investigation, and
arranging transportation to the police department during the
roughly 30 minutes he spent there. (Id., pp. 279,
284). In contrast, Robinson testified that he never
volunteered any information, and that he made all statements
in response to direct questioning. (Id., p. 305).
it is uncontested that Robinson was in custody when he made
statements at the arrest scene, the question is whether
Robinson was at that time subjected to interrogation:
[T]he Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a
person in custody is subjected to either express questioning
or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the term
“interrogation” under Miranda refers not
only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions
on the part of police (other than those normally attendant to
arrest and custody) that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980).
“[v]olunteered statements of any kind are not barred by
the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected
by [the Miranda decision].” Miranda,
384 U.S. at 478. In denying Robinson's motion, the state
court found Detective Massucci's suppression hearing
testimony credible. The credibility determination is a
finding of fact that carries a presumption of correctness.
“The factual findings of the state court, including the
credibility findings, are presumed to be correct unless [a
petitioner] rebuts the presumption by clear and convincing
evidence.” Rolling v. Crosby, 438 F.3d 1296,
1301 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).
See also Consalvo v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.,
664 F.3d 842, 845 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Federal courts
have no license to redetermine credibility of witnesses whose
demeanor has been observed by the state trial court, but not
by them. We consider questions about the credibility and
demeanor of a witness to be questions of fact.”)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Based on
the testimony that the court found credible, Robinson was not
subjected to interrogation at the arrest scene and therefore
was not entitled to Miranda warnings.
attempts to rebut the presumption of correctness by
identifying four statements, which, he argues, demonstrate
that Detective Massucci lied when he testified that he did
not question Robinson before giving him Miranda
warnings. First, Robinson points to Detective Massucci's
testimony that “I approached Mr. Robinson, started
advising him of who I was and where I was from, ” and
that, “[Robinson] initiated a conversation with
me.” (Doc. 23, Ex. 1a, p. 273). Robinson claims that
these statements show Detective Massucci's lack of
credibility because they are inconsistent and demonstrate
that he did in fact question Robinson at the arrest scene.
Read in its entirety, however, this portion of Detective
Massucci's testimony refutes Robinson's allegation.
Detective Massucci testified:
When Detective Sandell (ph) and I arrived, I approached Mr.
Robinson, started advising him of who I was and where I was
from. At that point, he initiated a conversation with me,
tried to volunteer a certain level of information.
Detective Massucci's testimony provides that although he
introduced himself to Robinson, it was Robinson who began
conversing and volunteering information. This testimony is
not inherently inconsistent. Nor does it demonstrate that
Detective Massucci testified untruthfully at the suppression
Robinson notes that in describing their communications at the
arrest scene, Detective Massucci testified, “And
basically we started a bartering or-he was attempting to
negotiate with me and ultimately he was asking questions of
me.” (Id., pp. 273-74). Robinson argues that
the “use of ‘we' indicates that [Detective]
Massucci was negotiating a plea agreement.” (Doc. 30,
p. 23). This statement was made in the following context:
Q. When Mr. Robinson - - after he made the statement [at the
arrest scene] that he was the one you want to talk to, did
you - - what did you do?
A. Well, I concluded my introduction that this was a homicide
investigation. He acknowledged that he understood this was a
homicide investigation. And basically we started a bartering
or - - he was attempting to negotiate with me and ultimately
he was asking questions of me.
Q. What were those questions?
A. If we released his wife, that I would go ahead - - he
would go ahead and tell me what I - - what he - - what I
needed to know. Then he asked me throughout the course of the
next hour questions such as, you know, how did we find him up
there, how the other girls were involved. He was trying to
get the other girls released out of custody.
Q. Okay. And any of those statements, were any of those
statements made in response to any sort of interrogation or
questioning that you made to Mr. Robinson?
A. Prior to going on tape?
(Doc. 23, Ex. 1a, pp. 273-74).
testimony reflects that while there was some interaction
between Robinson and Detective Massucci, Robinson actively
sought information about the investigation and also offered
to provide information if his wife was released. Therefore,
despite Detective Massucci's use of the word “we,
” it does not appear that Detective Massucci
interrogated Robinson or initiated negotiations, and no part
of this testimony shows that Detective Massucci lacked
Robinson notes Detective Massucci's testimony that one
hour and 45 minutes elapsed between the time he arrived and
the time the taped interview began. (Doc. 30, p. 23; Doc. 23,
Ex. 1a, p. 274). Robinson appears to argue that it is
incredible that he and Detective Massucci would have spent
that much time together without Detective Massucci
questioning him. But Detective Massucci testified that he was
not with Robinson that entire time. As stated above,
Detective Massucci explained that he was at the arrest scene
for about 30 minutes, during which time he undertook numerous
responsibilities. (Doc. 23, Ex. 1a, p. 284). Detective
Massucci also testified that he did not drive Robinson from
the arrest scene to the Gainesville Police Department and
therefore had no contact with Robinson during the transport.
(Id., p. 276). He also clarified that although he
had mentioned being in contact with Robinson for an hour, he
was referring to “momentary conversations with
[Robinson]”; that he “didn't speak to
[Robinson] for an hour straight”; and that he only
“spoke to [Robinson] on two occasions as he was
handcuffed in the backseat of the car” at the arrest
scene and “at least once, possibly twice while he was
being held in a secure facility within the Gainesville Police
Department.” (Id., pp. 278-79). Accordingly,
Robinson fails to demonstrate that Detective Massucci's
testimony was not credible based upon his statements about
the timing of the events.
Robinson asserts that Detective Massucci's testimony that
he did not question Robinson prior to the recorded statement
was inconsistent with Detective Massucci's comments at
the start of the recording, where he said:
Okay, Patrick,  we . . . talked about an hour or so
ago at a place where you were detained, and we've been
talking since before we went on tape . . . And ah I kinda
told you that we're up here about a homicide . . . And I
told you to make things official, I'd like to record it,
which we are doing. And ah read you your rights.
23, Ex. 1, p. 137).
Detective Massucci referenced talking before going on tape or
making “things official” does not show that his
suppression hearing testimony was untrue. Detective Massucci
repeatedly told the court that although he made contact with
Robinson, Robinson initiated communications in which he
volunteered and sought information about the case.
Robinson contends in his reply that Detective Massucci
“implied a promise to let Petitioner's wife go if
Petitioner would submit to interrogations.” (Doc. 30,
p. 6). To the extent Robinson raises this allegation to
support his challenge to the state court's credibility
finding, in the sense that the statements Detective Massucci
claimed were voluntary were actually the result of police
coercion, Robinson cannot obtain relief. Robinson first cites
Detective Massucci's testimony on direct examination,
quoted above, that Robinson said if police released his wife,
he would tell them what they needed to know. Robinson also
cites Detective Massucci's testimony on
Q. Okay. And you introduce yourself as Detective Massucci,