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Robinson v. Secretary, Department of Corrections

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division

August 1, 2019

LEE P. ROBINSON, Petitioner,



         Lee P. Robinson, a Florida inmate, timely filed a pro se second amended petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his Hillsborough County convictions. (Doc. 11). Respondent filed a response (Doc. 21) and Robinson filed a reply (Doc. 30). Upon consideration, the petition will be DENIED.

         Procedural History

         Robinson was convicted after a jury trial of first degree felony murder with a firearm, attempted robbery with a firearm, and burglary with a firearm. (Doc. 23, Ex. 1a, pp. 230-32). The state trial court sentenced him to an overall term of life in prison. (Id., pp. 247-54). The state appellate court per curiam affirmed the convictions and sentences. (Doc. 23, Ex. 5). Robinson's motions for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 were denied. (Doc. 23, Exs. 9-9c). The state appellate court per curiam affirmed. (Doc. 23, Ex. 13).

         Facts; Robinson's Theory Of Defense [1]

         On the night of June 14, 2007, Robinson and his friend Wesley Reeves picked up Ishla Daniels and Veandrea Smith, two women whom Robinson knew. In the early morning hours of June 15, 2007, the four traveled in Smith's car to Mirage, a club in Tampa, and Daniels noticed a “bulge” near Robinson's right hip. Robinson pointed to a man in the club's parking lot and asked Smith to talk to him. Smith and Daniels ended up talking to two men, Granville Ritchie and Dwayne Simms.

         Smith and Daniels rode with Ritchie in his car to the Village Motel in Tampa; Simms drove to the motel in his own car. After Ritchie rented a two-bedroom motel room, Smith and Daniels went into the bathroom and talked about leaving. When the men came in, Smith and Simms sat down on the bed in the front bedroom. When Simms took his shirt off, Smith began rubbing his back. She did not notice any weapon on Simms.

         Saying they needed to use the phone, Smith and Daniels left the room and went outside. Daniels called Robinson on her cell phone. She told him that she was scared and wanted to leave. Robinson responded that he could see her, but she could not see him. Smith and Daniels began walking away. Robinson rushed past them towards the room, with Reeves following behind him. As they passed, Daniels noticed Robinson reach towards his right side. When Smith and Daniels heard gunshots, they ran until they got to Smith's car, which Robinson had parked nearby.

         Meanwhile, in the back bedroom, Ritchie “heard a little sound like [Simms] want [sic] to say something, but it didn't come out, ” followed by a gunshot. (Doc. 23, Ex. 1d, p. 346). Ritchie stood by the bathroom door but was able to look in a mirror and see the front bedroom. Ritchie observed Simms “sliding” and trying to get away as Robinson continued to shoot. (Id., p. 347). After Simms “dropped, ” Robinson ran from the room. (Id., pp. 347-48, 350). Ritchie denied that Simms had any type of weapon. Ritchie did not see Simms and Robinson wrestling or struggling.

         Robinson, Reeves, Smith, and Daniels left together in Smith's car. As they drove away, Robinson said that “that wasn't supposed to happen” and that they “need[ed] to pray that [Simms] doesn't pass away.” (Doc. 23, Ex. 1e, pp. 415-16).

         Simms died as a result of a gunshot wound. During the day of June 15, Robinson and his wife, Felicia, picked up Smith and Daniels. Robinson, who wanted to leave Tampa because of local news coverage of the murder, drove them to Gainesville. During this time, Daniels recalled Robinson talking on the phone to an unidentified person using the word “lick, ” meaning robbery, in referring to the victim. (Id., p. 499).

         Subsequently, Deputy United States Marshals arrested the four at a residence in Gainesville. When officers from the Tampa Police Department arrived, Robinson was handcuffed in the back of a police car. Prior to receiving Miranda[2] warnings, Robinson talked to Detective Charles Massucci at the arrest scene and again at the Gainesville Police Department. Later, Robinson received Miranda warnings, waived his rights, and gave a recorded interview to Detective Massucci. During the interview, Robinson stated that he wanted money to pay his electric bill and he thought he could “rough the guys up a little” and that he was “going to grab . . . what I can and get and go.” (Doc. 23, Ex. 1g, pp. 758, 775). Robinson said that Simms attacked him with a gun and that as they “wrestled over the gun”, Robinson “pulled the trigger . . . to try to get [Simms] off me, to keep him from killing me.” (Id., p. 758).

         Robinson met Scott McCombs in jail. McCombs testified at trial that Robinson said he went to the club to look for “some guys that . . . owed him some money” and that he used Daniels and Smith to lure Simms away from the club. (Doc. 23, Ex. 1f, p. 585). According to McCombs, Robinson said that when he walked into the motel room, he pulled the gun from his right hip area and demanded money. Robinson was startled when Simms approached him, and shot once. When Simms continued approaching, Robinson shot at Simms several more times before fleeing. Robinson later met with the others to “get their stories straight.” (Id., p. 587).

         Robinson testified at trial that Daniels and Smith planned to go into Mirage and have some drinks, and that he agreed to pick them up later that night. He denied telling them to talk to any men. Robinson testified that he received a call from Daniels asking him to pick her up from the motel and that when he arrived, he saw Daniels and Smith standing outside of the room. He explained, “I just really want to know who [was] in the room. I want to know who they left with, you know, and I want to know, you know, if they are playing a game with me or what. . . . So I'm just curious of who [was] in the room. So I went into the room.” (Doc. 23, Ex. 1h, pp. 912-13). When he went in, he stated, Simms jumped up and reached for something. Robinson testified that he did not take a gun into the room. He stated that he ran into Simms to stop him, and that they ended up “tussling and wrestling” with the gun. (Id., p. 914). Robinson testified that the gun went off as he struggled to get it away from Simms. Robinson denied that he intended to commit a robbery, saying that his statement about robbery was just a story he told police to “take the rap” so that his wife would be released from custody. (Id., p. 924). Robinson also denied telling McCombs that he robbed anyone. Wesley Reeves testified that he did not see Robinson with a firearm and that they did not talk about committing a robbery. He stated that they came up with the robbery scenario because Robinson “felt guilty because [sic] the way things happened” and was willing to take the blame. (Doc. 23, Ex. 1g, pp. 849-50).[3]

         Standard Of Review

         The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) governs this proceeding. Carroll v. Sec'y, DOC, 574 F.3d 1354, 1364 (11th Cir. 2009). Habeas relief can only be granted if a petitioner is in custody “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Section 2254(d) provides that federal habeas relief cannot be granted on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

         A decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). A decision is an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Id. at 413.

         The AEDPA was meant “to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002). Accordingly, “[t]he focus . . . is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable, and . . . an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one.” Id. at 694. See also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011) (“As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”).

         The state appellate court affirmed the judgment and sentence and the denial of postconviction relief without discussion. These decisions warrant deference under § 2254(d)(1) because “the summary nature of a state court's decision does not lessen the deference that it is due.” Wright v. Moore, 278 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 2002). See also Richter, 562 U.S. at 99 (“When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.”).

         Exhaustion Of State Remedies; Procedural Default

         A federal habeas petitioner must exhaust his claims for relief by raising them in state court before presenting them in his petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999) (“[T]he state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a federal court in a habeas petition.”).

         The requirement of exhausting state remedies as a prerequisite to federal review is satisfied if the petitioner “fairly presents” his claim in each appropriate state court and alerts that court to the federal nature of the claim. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1971). “If the petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies that are no longer available, that failure is a procedural default which will bar federal habeas relief, unless either the cause and prejudice or the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is established.” Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir. 2001). See also Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299, 1305 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[F]ederal courts may treat unexhausted claims as procedurally defaulted, even absent a state court determination to that effect, if it is clear from state law that any future attempts at exhaustion would be futile. . . . A habeas petitioner can escape the procedural default doctrine either through showing cause for the default and prejudice . . . or establishing a ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice.'”).


         Ground One

         Robinson argues that the state court erred in denying the motion to suppress his statements to Detective Massucci. Robinson claims that his unrecorded, pre-Miranda statements at the arrest scene and at the Gainesville Police Department were inadmissible because he made them while he was subjected to custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings. He also alleges that his recorded, post-Miranda statements at the Gainesville Police Department should have been suppressed because the Miranda warnings were insufficient. Finally, Robinson claims that “his pre-Miranda statements tainted his post-Miranda confession.” (Doc. 11, p. 8).

         The state court denied Robinson's motion to suppress:

A homicide occurred on June 15, 2007, at 4100 E. Hillsborough Avenue. The victim was identified as Dwayne Simms. The Defendant was developed as a suspect by the police and the Defendant was arrested in Gainesville by U.S. Marshal[ ]s on June 18, 2007. Detective[s] Massucci and Sandel were notified and arrived at the scene of the Defendant's arrest approximately 1 hour after being notified. It is undisputed the defendant had been arrested and was cuffed in a police unit when Detective Massucci arrived. According to Detective Massucci, he approached the Defendant who was in a police unit. The Defendant spontaneously told Detective Massucci he was the person the detective needed to speak to. It is uncontroverted the defendant was in custody and Miranda warnings had not been given to the Defendant. Detective Massucci testified he did not ask the Defendant any questions during this period other than asking him if he needed anything to drink.
The Defendant inquired about his wife's status at the time and made a statement about cooperating if his wife and [Smith and Daniels] could be released. According to Detective Massucci, he had 2 conversations with the Defendant while Defendant was in a police unit. Detective Massucci said the Defendant spoke to him after being transported to the Gainesville Police Department before a formal interview took place which was recorded. Testimony further developed that a tape recorded statement was taken from the Defendant which started at 3:45 P.M. and ended at 4:23 P.M. A transcript of that tape was admitted and the court has reviewed it as well as the tape recording itself.
The Defendant testified that he recalled being asked questions by Detective Massucci for approximately 45 minutes at the Gainesville Police Department before going on tape. The Defendant testified he responded to the questions the detectives asked. He also testified the detective never threatened him.
During the tape recorded conversation, the Detective told the Defendant the following regarding his Miranda warnings.
Detective Massucci - Okay? Uh, your rights are that you have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to an attorney, and if you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed to you at no cost. And what's most important to remember about those are if you choose to talk to us, at any point you can stop talking to us meaning you can exercise these rights at any time.
Lee P. Robinson, Yes, Sir.
Detective Massucci -if I ask you something that you are uncomfortable with, if I ask you something that you don't wanna do. You can either say, “No” you can either ask for a lawyer or you can either stop taking [sic], okay?
Lee P. Robinson, Yes, Sir.
Detective Massucci. So with that being said, that was a lot you had to say before we went on tape.
Lee P. Robinson Yes, Sir.
The State argues that the statements the defendant made at the scene of his arrest were spontaneous and not the subject of interrogation. The defense agrees with this therefore the court finds the statements the Defendant made at the scene of his arrest were not in response to custodial interrogation and are admissible.
The Defendant gave statements to Detective [sic] at the Gainesville Police Department before being given his Miranda warnings and also gave a tape recorded statements [sic] after Miranda was administered. The court will deal with each separately.
Statements made at the Gainesville Police Department pre Miranda.
Detective Massucci testified he spoke with the Defendant for approximately one hour before the taped interview. The detective testified the only questions he asked concern[ed] making the Defendant comfortable; he at no time asked any questions which would elicit an incriminating response. The Defendant, on the other hand testified the detective asked him questions throughout the interview which he responded to.
The court listened to the recorded interview in an attempt to determine the exchange between Detective Massucci and the Defendant. That interview consists of the Detective generally letting the Defendant tell Detective Massucci what occurred. While the Detective does ask questions, most of the interview consists of the Defendant relating what occurred. The court also had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of both Detective Massucci and the Defendant conclude [sic] the detective was clearly more credible.
The court finds that the Defendant's statements made at the Gainesville Police department pre Miranda were not the result of custodial interrogation. While it is clear the Defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda, the court finds he was not subjected to custodial interrogation but volunteered the information to law enforcement. Therefore the Defendant's Motion to Suppress his out of court statements at the Gainesville Police Department before being given Miranda is denied.
Defendant's taped interview post Miranda
The Defendant gave a taped interview to the detective after being administered his Miranda warnings. The court earlier quoted the transcript which dealt with Miranda. It is clear the Defendant was never told he had the right to the presence of an attorney during questioning. The issue is whether the warnings given the Defendant comply with Miranda.
The State cites the recent case of Graham v. State, 2007 WL 4404945 (Fla. App 2 Dist) where the Second District found that warnings which informed the Defendant he had the right to an attorney without mentioning before answering any questions were not a violation of Miranda. The Graham case cites the case of Powell v. State, 32 FLW D 2418 (10-10-07) where the Second District found that warnings which informed a Defendant that he had a right to speak to an attorney before answering any questions did not comply with Miranda. The Second District felt that informing a Defendant he has the right to speak to an attorney before questioning does not tell him he has a right to counsel throughout any interrogation which is what Miranda requires. Thus the Powell court reversed the Defendant's conviction. The questions raised in Powell and a predecessor case M.A.B. v. State, 957 So.2d 1219 (Fla. 2 DCA 2007) have been certified to the Florida Supreme Court.
Miranda requires that a Defendant be informed he has the right to the presence of an attorney. Detective Massucci so advised the Defendant in this case. The case is controlled by Graham; therefore the rights given the Defendant complied with Miranda. The Defendant's Motion to Suppress his recorded statement is denied.

         (Doc. 23, Ex. 1, pp. 176-80).

         1. Robinson's Statements At The Arrest Scene

         Robinson argues that his statements at the arrest scene should have been suppressed. The Court finds that this claim is unexhausted because Robinson failed to present it to the state trial court. As the state court's order discusses, Robinson conceded that his statements at the arrest scene were spontaneous (and therefore not made in response to questioning), and did not challenge their admission. Accordingly, Robinson failed to exhaust this claim, even though he alleged on appeal that the state court erred in not suppressing these statements. See, e.g., Pruitt v. Jones, 348 F.3d 1355, 1358-59 (11th Cir. 2003) (to exhaust a claim, a petitioner must undertake “one complete round” of the state's review process). Because Robinson cannot return to the trial court to present this claim, it is procedurally defaulted. See Smith, 256 F.3d at 1138. Robinson does not demonstrate that an exception applies to excuse the default. See id.

         Even assuming that Robinson exhausted this claim by addressing it on direct appeal (see Doc. 23, Ex. 2, p. 33), Robinson cannot obtain relief. Detective Massucci testified that when he arrived in Gainesville, Robinson was handcuffed in the back of a police car. (Doc. 23, Ex. 1a, p. 272). When Detective Massucci told Robinson “who [he] was and where [he] was from, ” Robinson initiated a conversation and volunteered information. (Id., p. 273). Robinson told Detective Massucci that he was the person Detective Massucci needed to talk to. (Id.). Detective Massucci told Robinson that he was conducting a homicide investigation. (Id., pp. 273-74). Robinson began “attempting to negotiate” with Detective Massucci, indicating that if his wife was released, he would “tell [Detective Massucci] what . . . [Detective Massucci] needed to know.” (Id., p. 274). Detective Massucci also testified that Robinson asked questions about how police found him and expressed concern over the custody of his wife, Daniels, and Smith. (Id.).

         Detective Massucci testified that none of Robinson's statements prior to his formal, recorded interview at the police station were made in response to any direct questioning. (Id., pp. 273-75). Detective Massucci testified that the only questions he asked Robinson prior to the recording involved Robinson's well-being, such as whether he needed water or whether his handcuffs were comfortable. (Id., pp. 275, 280). Detective Massucci also stated that he only momentarily spoke to Robinson twice at the arrest scene, as he also worked on obtaining consent to search the residence, coordinating the investigation, and arranging transportation to the police department during the roughly 30 minutes he spent there. (Id., pp. 279, 284). In contrast, Robinson testified that he never volunteered any information, and that he made all statements in response to direct questioning. (Id., p. 305).

         Because it is uncontested that Robinson was in custody when he made statements at the arrest scene, the question is whether Robinson was at that time subjected to interrogation:

[T]he Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the term “interrogation” under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.

Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980).

         Accordingly, “[v]olunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by [the Miranda decision].” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478. In denying Robinson's motion, the state court found Detective Massucci's suppression hearing testimony credible. The credibility determination is a finding of fact that carries a presumption of correctness. “The factual findings of the state court, including the credibility findings, are presumed to be correct unless [a petitioner] rebuts the presumption by clear and convincing evidence.” Rolling v. Crosby, 438 F.3d 1296, 1301 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). See also Consalvo v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 664 F.3d 842, 845 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Federal courts have no license to redetermine credibility of witnesses whose demeanor has been observed by the state trial court, but not by them. We consider questions about the credibility and demeanor of a witness to be questions of fact.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Based on the testimony that the court found credible, Robinson was not subjected to interrogation at the arrest scene and therefore was not entitled to Miranda warnings.

         Robinson attempts to rebut the presumption of correctness by identifying four statements, which, he argues, demonstrate that Detective Massucci lied when he testified that he did not question Robinson before giving him Miranda warnings. First, Robinson points to Detective Massucci's testimony that “I approached Mr. Robinson, started advising him of who I was and where I was from, ” and that, “[Robinson] initiated a conversation with me.” (Doc. 23, Ex. 1a, p. 273). Robinson claims that these statements show Detective Massucci's lack of credibility because they are inconsistent and demonstrate that he did in fact question Robinson at the arrest scene. Read in its entirety, however, this portion of Detective Massucci's testimony refutes Robinson's allegation. Detective Massucci testified:

When Detective Sandell (ph) and I arrived, I approached Mr. Robinson, started advising him of who I was and where I was from. At that point, he initiated a conversation with me, tried to volunteer a certain level of information.


         Thus, Detective Massucci's testimony provides that although he introduced himself to Robinson, it was Robinson who began conversing and volunteering information. This testimony is not inherently inconsistent. Nor does it demonstrate that Detective Massucci testified untruthfully at the suppression hearing.

         Second, Robinson notes that in describing their communications at the arrest scene, Detective Massucci testified, “And basically we started a bartering or-he was attempting to negotiate with me and ultimately he was asking questions of me.” (Id., pp. 273-74). Robinson argues that the “use of ‘we' indicates that [Detective] Massucci was negotiating a plea agreement.” (Doc. 30, p. 23). This statement was made in the following context:

Q. When Mr. Robinson - - after he made the statement [at the arrest scene] that he was the one you want to talk to, did you - - what did you do?
A. Well, I concluded my introduction that this was a homicide investigation. He acknowledged that he understood this was a homicide investigation. And basically we started a bartering or - - he was attempting to negotiate with me and ultimately he was asking questions of me.
Q. What were those questions?
A. If we released his wife, that I would go ahead - - he would go ahead and tell me what I - - what he - - what I needed to know. Then he asked me throughout the course of the next hour questions such as, you know, how did we find him up there, how the other girls were involved. He was trying to get the other girls released out of custody.
Q. Okay. And any of those statements, were any of those statements made in response to any sort of interrogation or questioning that you made to Mr. Robinson?
A. Prior to going on tape?
Q. Correct.
A. No.

(Doc. 23, Ex. 1a, pp. 273-74).

         This testimony reflects that while there was some interaction between Robinson and Detective Massucci, Robinson actively sought information about the investigation and also offered to provide information if his wife was released. Therefore, despite Detective Massucci's use of the word “we, ” it does not appear that Detective Massucci interrogated Robinson or initiated negotiations, and no part of this testimony shows that Detective Massucci lacked credibility.

         Third, Robinson notes Detective Massucci's testimony that one hour and 45 minutes elapsed between the time he arrived and the time the taped interview began. (Doc. 30, p. 23; Doc. 23, Ex. 1a, p. 274). Robinson appears to argue that it is incredible that he and Detective Massucci would have spent that much time together without Detective Massucci questioning him. But Detective Massucci testified that he was not with Robinson that entire time. As stated above, Detective Massucci explained that he was at the arrest scene for about 30 minutes, during which time he undertook numerous responsibilities. (Doc. 23, Ex. 1a, p. 284). Detective Massucci also testified that he did not drive Robinson from the arrest scene to the Gainesville Police Department and therefore had no contact with Robinson during the transport. (Id., p. 276). He also clarified that although he had mentioned being in contact with Robinson for an hour, he was referring to “momentary conversations with [Robinson]”; that he “didn't speak to [Robinson] for an hour straight”; and that he only “spoke to [Robinson] on two occasions as he was handcuffed in the backseat of the car” at the arrest scene and “at least once, possibly twice while he was being held in a secure facility within the Gainesville Police Department.” (Id., pp. 278-79). Accordingly, Robinson fails to demonstrate that Detective Massucci's testimony was not credible based upon his statements about the timing of the events.

         Fourth, Robinson asserts that Detective Massucci's testimony that he did not question Robinson prior to the recorded statement was inconsistent with Detective Massucci's comments at the start of the recording, where he said:

Okay, Patrick, [4] we . . . talked about an hour or so ago at a place where you were detained, and we've been talking since before we went on tape . . . And ah I kinda told you that we're up here about a homicide . . . And I told you to make things official, I'd like to record it, which we are doing. And ah read you your rights.

         (Doc. 23, Ex. 1, p. 137).

         That Detective Massucci referenced talking before going on tape or making “things official” does not show that his suppression hearing testimony was untrue. Detective Massucci repeatedly told the court that although he made contact with Robinson, Robinson initiated communications in which he volunteered and sought information about the case.

         Finally, Robinson contends in his reply that Detective Massucci “implied a promise to let Petitioner's wife go if Petitioner would submit to interrogations.” (Doc. 30, p. 6). To the extent Robinson raises this allegation to support his challenge to the state court's credibility finding, in the sense that the statements Detective Massucci claimed were voluntary were actually the result of police coercion, Robinson cannot obtain relief.[5] Robinson first cites Detective Massucci's testimony on direct examination, quoted above, that Robinson said if police released his wife, he would tell them what they needed to know. Robinson also cites Detective Massucci's testimony on cross-examination:

Q. Okay. And you introduce yourself as Detective Massucci, ...

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