United States District Court, N.D. Florida, Tallahassee Division
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
CHARLES A. STAMPELOS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
February 1, 2019, the pro se Plaintiff filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction, ECF No. 12, requesting that
Defendants be prohibited from denying him adequate medical
care, treatment, and/or medications. Id. at 1.
Plaintiff contends that his complaint and amended complaint
presents claims of the denial of “needed medical care
for: skin cancer, abnormally enlarged breasts, neuropathy,
urinary tract disfunction, medications, and related or
unrelated medical conditions.” Id. at 1-2. He
broadly claims that “Defendants have refused [him]
needed medical care in reprisal for his complaints and
remained deliberately indifferent to serious risk of
harm” to Plaintiff. Id. at 3. Plaintiff also
contends that he has been denied examinations and treatments
from a dermatologist, an endocronologist, a urologist, and an
orthopedic physician. Id. at 4. He further asserts
that he has been diagnosed with macular degeneration but has
been denied “medical care and or vitamins to slow
progression of this disease.” Id. He alleges
he has been given only cursory examinations and Defendants
are “indifferent to risk of irreparable harm and even
death of” the Plaintiff. Id. at 5.
making conclusory assertions and quoting case law, Plaintiff
has not identified a specific symptom or problem he has
experienced, he has not stated when he experienced these
problems, nor has he specifically alleged what treatment or
diagnosis was made. Indeed, Plaintiff has not identified a
specific Defendant to which his motion is directed. For those
reasons alone, the motion is insufficient on its face.
granting or denying a preliminary injunction is a decision
within the discretion of the district court. Carillon
Importers, Ltd. v. Frank Pesce Intern. Group Ltd., 112
F.3d 1125, 1126 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v.
Lambert, 695 F.2d 536, 539 (11th Cir. 1983)).
Preliminary injunctive relief may be granted only if the
moving party establishes:
(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits;
(2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury unless the
(3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever
harm the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party;
(4) granting the injunction would not be adverse to the
Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 868 (11th
Cir. 2011); Carillon Importers, Ltd., 112 F.3d at
1126; United States v. Jefferson Cnty., 720 F.2d
1511, 1519 (11th Cir. 1983). To be entitled to a preliminary
injunction, a plaintiff must demonstrate all four
prerequisites. Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176
(11th Cir. 2000); Jefferson Cnty., 720 F.2d at 1519
(citing Canal Auth. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567 (5th
Plaintiff's motion, ECF No. 12, was filed after entry of
an Order directing Plaintiff to file a second amended
complaint. ECF No. 10. That Order explained numerous
deficiencies with Plaintiff's first amended complaint and
provided him with time to comply. Plaintiff filed the motion
for preliminary injunction, ECF No. 12, prior to filing his
second amended complaint, ECF No. 16. Thus, Plaintiff's
motion is insufficient to demonstrate a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits because his amended
complaint, ECF No. 6, was insufficient as filed.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 65(d) requires all
orders granting an injunction to: “state the reasons
why it issued; state its terms specifically; and describe in
reasonable detail . . . the act or acts sought to be
restrained or required.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d). Providing
such specificity will “prevent uncertainty and
confusion on the part of those faced with injunctive orders,
and” avoid future contempt proceedings based “on
a decree too vague to be understood.” Schmidt v.
Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 476, 94 S.Ct. 713, 715, 38
L.Ed.2d 661 (1974). As the Supreme Court has pointed out,
“basic fairness requires that those enjoined receive
explicit notice of precisely what conduct is outlawed.”
Schmidt, 414 U.S. at 476, 94 S.Ct. at 715. Thus, an
injunction may not simply order a defendant to “obey
the law.” Am. Red Cross v. Palm Beach Blood Bank,
Inc., 143 F.3d 1407, 1412 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Hughey v. JMS Dev., 78 F.3d 1523, 1531 (11th Cir.
1996)). Such an injunction is incapable of enforcement as an
operative command. Hughey, 78 F.3d at 1531 (citing
Longshoremen's Ass'n. v. Marine Trade
Ass'n., 389 U.S. 64, 73-74, 88 S.Ct. 201, 206-07, 19
L.Ed.2d 236, 244 (1967)).
case, Plaintiff's motion requests nothing more than an
order requiring unspecified prison officials and medical
staff to provide him with general medical care. See
ECF No. 12. Such an order cannot be granted as it would
merely require compliance with the commands of the Eighth
Amendment. It would also be so vague that no Defendant could
reasonably know what conduct would risk contempt, and no
court could enforce. The motion should be denied.
respectfully RECOMMENDED that
Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, ECF No.
12, be DENIED and this case be
REMANDED for further proceedings.