United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Fort Myers Division
OPINION AND ORDER 
POLSTER CHAPPELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Reinstate Case (Doc.
22). Plaintiff, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 60(b)(6), moves to
reopen this case based upon the Eleventh Circuit's
holding in Bilal v. Fennick, No. 17-12062, 11th
Cir., October 25, 2018.Specifically, Plaintiff's contends
that the Court “erroneously dismissed” the above
captioned action based upon a filing injunction entered by
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Florida and seeks reinstatement of the case. Doc. 22, ¶
1. Plaintiff argues that “the Fennick decision
applies of all cases erroneously dismissed by this court
based upon the U.S. Northern District filing
injunction.” Id., ¶ 2. Also pending is
Plaintiff's Motion for Court to Serve Defendants with
Copy of Complaint Before Ruling by U.S. Magistrate Judge
(Doc. 24) filed January 9, 2019. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court denies Plaintiffs' Motions.
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides:
On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or
its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by
an opposing party (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment
has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on
an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or
applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any
other reason that justifies relief.
Civ. P. 60(b) (2017). The purpose of Rule 60(b) is to define
the specific circumstances under which a party may obtain
relief from a final judgment or order. Motions under this
rule are directed to the sound discretion of the court.
Cano v. Baker, 435 F.3d 1337, 1342 (11th Cir. 2006);
Mahone v. Ray, 326 F.3d 1176, 1178, n.1 (11th Cir.
2003); Weiss v. Warden, 703 Fed.Appx. 789, 791 (11th
Cir. July 24, 2017). Rule 60(b) (6), known as the catch-all
provision, requires a party to “demonstrate that the
circumstances are sufficiently extraordinary to warrant
relief.” Aldana v. DelMonte Fresh Produce
N.A., Inc., 741 F.3d 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2014)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). To be entitled
to relief under this provision, Plaintiff must show that
“absent such relief, an extreme and unexpected hardship
will result.” Crapp v. City of Miami
Beach, 242 F.3d 1017, 1020, (11th Cir. 2001)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). A motion for
reconsideration “cannot be used to relitigate old
matters, raise argument [, ] or present evidence that could
have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.”
Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 740 (11th Cir.
2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Court finds Bilal's Motion to Reinstate to be without
merit. First, other than referencing the Fennick
decision, Bilal provides no reason why he is entitled to
reconsideration in the instant case. The motion is devoid of
any reasons why the Court should grant him Rule 60(b) relief.
Nonetheless, a change of law does not reopen a case for which
no appeal or other process is pending or available. See
Ramsey v. Walker, 304 Fed.Appx. 827, 829 (11th Cir.
2008) (“[a] change of law alone does not provide
grounds for Rule 60(b)(6) relief.”); Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 239, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 2018, 138
L.Ed.2d 391 (1997) (“[i]ntervening developments in the
law by themselves rarely constitute the extraordinary
circumstances required for relief under Rule 60(b)(6)
...”); Ritter v. Smith, 811 F.2d 1398, 1401-03
(11th Cir.1987) (something more than a “mere”
change in the law is necessary to provide the grounds for
Rule 60(b)(6) relief and listing factors for consideration).
As a matter of law, and contrary to Bilal's assertion,
the Eleventh Circuit's remand in Bilal v.
Fennick, 2:16-cv-799, is not grounds to reopen every
case which considered and applied the Northern District of
Florida's injunction in denying Plaintiff in forma
the relief Plaintiff seeks under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6), is
untimely. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1) (stating that
a motion filed under Rule 60(b)(6) “must be made within
a reasonable time”). This case was dismissed, and
judgment was entered on November 18, 2016. Plaintiff waited
in excess of two years to move for reconsideration in this
on May 19, 2017, the Eleventh Circuit denied Plaintiff in
forma pauperis status “because the appeal is
frivolous.” (Doc. 19). Notably Plaintiff sought nominal
damages contending that officials at the Florida Civil
Commitment Center were not providing access to the law
library consistent with its contractual obligations. (See
generally Doc. 6). Bilal alleges no injury in fact and
instead makes general complaints about how library time is
allocated among residents. Consequently, Plaintiff lacks
standing, which is jurisdictional and not subject to waiver.
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996).
pending is Bilal's Motion for the Court to Serve
Defendants with Copy of Complaint Before Ruling by U.S.
Magistrate Judge (Doc. 24). Bilal contends this Court does
not have jurisdiction to rule on this Complaint until all
named defendants are served. (Id. at 1). Contrary to
Plaintiff's assertion, when a litigant does not pay the
filing fee but seeks to proceed in an action due to his
indigent status, this Court is vested with authority to
dismiss a case “at any time” if it determines the
allegations of poverty in an affidavit are untrue, the action
is frivolous or malicious, the complaint fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune. 28 U.S.C. §
it is hereby
Plaintiff's Motion to Reinstate Case (Doc. 22) is
Se Plaintiff's Motion for Court to Serve Defendants with
Copy of Complaint Before Ruling by U.S. Magistrate Judge
(Doc. 24) is DENIED.