final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Michael G. Kaplan, Judge; L.T. Case No.
S. Edinger of Benjamin, Aaronson, Edinger & Patanzo,
P.A., Gainesville and James S. Benjamin of Benjamin,
Aaronson, Edinger & Patanzo, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for
David Bogenschutz and Jaclyn E. Broudy of J. David
Bogenschutz & Associates, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for
appellant appeals a final injunction for protection against
stalking. He argues, among other things, that the trial court
erred in entering the injunction because the appellee failed
to prove the statutory requirements for an injunction and
because the injunction is a prior restraint on his free
speech. We agree in part and reverse.
appellee is a public advocate for child abuse victims and
promotes strict policies related to sex offenders. The
appellant is an outspoken opponent of sex offender
laws. The appellee filed for an injunction
alleging the appellant was harassing and cyberstalking her.
The trial court held a hearing and took testimony from the
parties and witnesses, after which the court entered the
injunction. The injunction is now appealed.
trial court has broad discretion to grant an injunction, and
we review an order imposing a permanent injunction for a
clear abuse of that discretion." Pickett v.
Copeland, 236 So.3d 1142, 1143-44 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018).
support of her request for an injunction, the appellee
alleged three instances of offending conduct: (1) the
appellant's protest at the end of a children's march
in Tallahassee; (2) his appearance and conduct at a New York
film festival; and (3) his social media postings on his
website, blog, and other social media platforms.
injunction hearing, the appellee testified about these three
instances. She expressed her fear of the appellant and
testified to her contact with law enforcement to ensure her
safety and that of her young children.
First Instance - The Tallahassee Protest
revealed the appellant protested, and encouraged others to
join his protest, against the children's march in
Tallahassee. He stood at the side of the road, across the
street from the State Capitol, holding a three-by-three-foot
handwritten sign protesting the appellee's advocacy of
sex offender registration laws. His protest included a
diorama of a homeless camp and a commode chair bearing the
title, "King Ron's Throne." Law enforcement
had been notified of the protest in advance, and there were
no untoward incidents reported regarding appellant's
Second Instance - The Film Festival
appellee was scheduled to attend a film festival in New York
for the screening of a documentary about sex offenders in
which both she and the appellant appeared. She knew the
appellant would attend the film festival and arranged for
security to be in place. The appellant sat three rows behind
her during the documentary.
the documentary concluded, the appellee walked to the front
of the theater to take questions. When the appellant took the
microphone, he asked the appellee: "how can you sit
there and talk about how people on the registry don't
deserve a second chance when your father . . . is a convicted
criminal and he got a second chance?" A law enforcement
officer in attendance testified that the appellant asked the
question in a loud, aggressive manner and pointed his finger
at the appellee as he asked it. However, other witnesses also
said the appellant never left his seat in the theatre before
he asked this question, nor did he attempt to approach the
appellee at any time.
appellee responded. She was then immediately escorted away
from the stage by security, and the microphone was taken from
Third Instance - The Website and Social Media
and evidence established the appellant maintained a website
and other profiles on social media platforms professing his
opposition to sex offender legislation. The appellant posted
the appellee's home address and pictures of her home on
his website. On his other social media platforms, the
appellant also posted a video of a song containing an obscene
title and lyrics, as well as a cartoon depicting a tombstone
with an obscene reference to the appellee. He
"tweeted" that the song perfectly depicted the
appellee. However, the appellant neither directly
communicated with the appellee about these posts, nor sent
them to her or any of her associates by email, text, or