final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion
under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.
appeal from the Circuit Court for Santa Rosa County. John F.
Elizabeth Caudle, pro se, Appellant.
Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
and MK Thomas, JJ, concur;
Thomas, J., concurring.
Holly Elizabeth Caudle, appeals the denial of her
postconviction motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 3.850. Because each of the grounds
asserted for relief is either meritless or refuted by
portions of the record that were attached to the order, I
concur with the affirmance.
was charged as a Principal to Home Invasion Robbery with a
Deadly Weapon in violation of sections 777.011 and 812.135,
Florida Statutes, and Child Abuse by Intentional Act that
Could Reasonably be Expected to Result in Physical or Mental
Injury in violation of section 827.03, Florida Statutes.
Appellant signed a Sentence Recommendation in which she
pleaded no contest to these charges without an agreement as
to the sentence. The trial court adjudicated her guilty based
on her plea and sentenced her to concurrent terms of 20
years' imprisonment for the robbery charge and five
years' imprisonment for the child abuse charge.
timely postconviction motion, Appellant raised seven grounds
for relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. She
also claimed that the cumulative effect of counsel's
errors resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial.
alleged that counsel told her that he was going to have her
sentenced as a youthful offender with a 364-day jail sentence
and 5 years' probation or community control. This advice,
according to Appellant, fell below the standard of effective
assistance of counsel because she was not eligible for
sentencing as a youthful offender and she did not receive the
promised sentence. Appellant asserted that she would not have
pleaded no contest and would have insisted on going to trial
had she been properly advised.
postconviction court denied relief on this ground because
Appellant was not misadvised regarding her eligibility to be
sentenced as a youthful offender and the plea colloquy
refuted her claim that she was coerced into entering the plea
with a promise that she would be given a specific sentence.
trial court properly denied relief on this claim. While
youthful offender sentencing does not apply to any person
found to be guilty of a capital or life felony, see
§ 958.04(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2014), Appellant was not
convicted of a capital or life felony. See Stewart v.
State, 201 So.3d 1258, 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016);
Williams v. State, 405 So.2d 436, 438 (Fla. 1st DCA
1981) (explaining that a life felony is limited to that class
of felonies for which one may be punished "by a term of
imprisonment for life or for a term of years not less than
30" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Rather, Appellant was convicted of child abuse, a
third-degree felony, and home invasion robbery with a deadly
weapon, a first-degree felony punishable by a term of
imprisonment not exceeding life. Further, the sentencing
court considered imposing a youthful offender sentence in
this case but rejected such sentencing in light of
Appellant's co-defendants' sentences, the nature of
the charges, and the surrounding circumstances of this case.
Accordingly, counsel did not misadvise Appellant that she
could receive a youthful ...