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Hyacinthe v. McAleenan

United States District Court, S.D. Florida

August 20, 2019

JACQUES RICARDO HYACINTHE, Plaintiff,
v.
KEVIN MCALEENAN, in his capacity as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, et al. Defendants.

          ORDER

          BETH BLOOM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Petitioner Jacques Ricardo Hyacinthe's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, ECF No. [1] (the “Petition”). Through this action, Petitioner challenges his detention by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) as well as the execution of an expedited removal order against Petitioner. Id. ¶¶ 1, 4. The Court has carefully reviewed the Petition, all supporting and opposing filings, the record, and the applicable law. For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is dismissed without prejudice.

         I. BACKGROUND

         Petitioner alleges that he is a Haitian national who entered the United States in August of 2014. Id. ¶ 24. Upon entry to the United States, Petitioner did not possess any documents that would have permitted him to validly enter the United States. Id. ¶ 24. According to the Petition, he was interviewed by a border patrol agent who ordered that Petitioner be removed pursuant to § 235(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). Id. ¶ 25. Subsequent to the order of expedited removal being issued and served upon Petitioner, he was paroled into the United States on August 12, 2014, for a period of two years pursuant to INA § 212(d)(5).

         Approximately five years later, Petitioner was detained by ICE officials. Id. ¶ 2. The detainment was premised upon the existence of the expedited removal order entered in 2014. Id. ¶ 3. As of the date the Petition was filed, April 30, 2019, the Petitioner was in the physical custody of ICE at the Krome Service Processing Center at 18201 SW 12th Street, Miami, Florida 33194. Id. ¶ 6. According to the Petitioner, the Government intended to remove Petitioner from the United States on May 2, 2019. Id. at 2.

         The Petitioner filed an Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction on May 1, 2019. ECF No. [7] (“Emergency Motion”). The Petition and the Emergency Motion allege that Respondents' attempts to execute the five-year-old expedited removal order violates the INA and the Administrative Procedure Act and that Petitioner's detention violates his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. The Court thereafter ordered Respondents to file their response to the Petition and Emergency. ECF No. [8]. Respondents filed a response stating that a further review of the matter was required, and no action would be taken to effect Petitioner's removal before May 20, 2019. ECF No. [14]. The Court issued an order to show cause why the Court should not grant the Petition and required Respondents to respond to the Emergency Motion. ECF No. [15]. Respondents then filed a supplemental response informing the Court that on May 3, 2019, Petitioner was released from ICE custody under an order of supervision. ECF No. [16] at 1; see ECF No. [16-1] (the Order of Supervision”).

         Respondents now argue that Petitioner's claims are moot because the Court can no longer grant Petitioner the relief he seeks on account of his release from ICE custody. Petitioner responds that the Petition is not moot for three reasons. First, Petitioner contends he remains “in custody” for purposes of the habeas corpus statute because he is subject to a final order of removal. Second, Petition argues that he continues to suffer collateral consequences sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III. Third, Petitioner contends his claims are not moot because he was placed under the Order of Supervision upon his release.

         II. DISCUSSION

         For a federal court to have subject matter jurisdiction over a habeas proceeding, the petitioner must be “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); accord Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989). The “in custody” determination is made at the time the § 2241 petition is filed. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968). Petitioner has clearly met the “in custody” requirement in that he was confined when he filed his Petition. However, this Court has no continuing jurisdiction in this case.

         “Article III of the Constitution limits federal ‘Judicial Power,' that is, federal-court jurisdiction, to “‘Cases' and ‘Controversies.'” United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 395 (1980); Soliman v. United States ex rel. INS, 296 F.3d 1237, 1242 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted); see also Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th Cir. 2001) (same). “This case-or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate.” Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990). The parties must continue to have a “personal stake in the outcome” of the lawsuit. Id. at 478 (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983)). In other words, a petitioner “must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477.

         A case becomes moot “when the issues presented are no longer ‘live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969). The doctrine of mootness derives “directly from the case or controversy limitation because ‘an action that is moot cannot be characterized as an active case or controversy.'” Soliman, 296 F.3d at 1242. Thus, a case is moot when it no longer presents a live controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful relief. If events that occur subsequent to the filing of a lawsuit or an appeal deprive the court of the ability to give the moving party meaningful relief, then the case is moot and must be dismissed. In fact, dismissal is required because mootness is jurisdictional. Since a habeas petition under § 2241 challenges immigration officials' authority to keep an individual “in custody, ” the petitioner's release moots a habeas petition. See generally Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 632 (1982).

         a.In custody”

         Generally, where an alien is released from ICE custody pending removal from the United States, his petition for habeas relief is moot. See generally He v. Gonzales, No. 05-1912, 2006 WL 1687796, *1 (W.D. La. May 1, 2006); Revan v. Mukasey, No. 08-20289-CIV, 2008 WL 3992291, *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2008); Ismaila v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. No. CA 09-0184-KD-C, 2009 WL 1635781, *1 (S.D. Ala. June 9, 2009); Abdalla v. Ashcroft, No. No. 03-CV-0602E(F), 2004 WL 2315089, *2 (W.D. N.Y. Oct. 14, 2004) (“As, however, Petitioner does not dispute he was released from administrative custody on January 30, 2004, the instant Petition no longer presents a case or controversy pursuant to Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution.”).

         Here, Petitioner does not dispute that he was released from ICE custody. Nevertheless, Petitioner argues that he is “in custody” for the purposes of § 2241 because he is subject to a final order of removal. Petitioner relies on cases from other circuits for the proposition that an individual subject to a final order of removal is considered to be “in custody” for purposed of the habeas corpus statute. See ECF No. [19] at 3 (citing Simmonds v. INS, 326 F.3d 351, 354 (2nd Cir. 2003); Aguilera v. Kirkpatrick, 241 F.3d 1286, 1291 (10th Cir. 2001); Rosales v. ICE, 426 F.3d 733, 734-36 (5th Cir. 2005). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has not resolved this issue but has suggested “that the mere possibility of future deportation is insufficient to establish custody, even when the petitioner is subject to a deportation order.” Arnold v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 422 Fed.Appx. 793, 795 (11th Cir. 2011); see also Hernandez v. Immigration & Customs Enf't, No. 2:13-CV-807-FTM-38, 2014 WL 4145530, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2014) (“The Eleventh Circuit has not expressly ...


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