United States District Court, S.D. Florida
BLOOM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
CAUSE is before the Court upon Petitioner Jacques
Ricardo Hyacinthe's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, ECF No.  (the
“Petition”). Through this action, Petitioner
challenges his detention by U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) as well as the execution of
an expedited removal order against Petitioner. Id.
¶¶ 1, 4. The Court has carefully reviewed the
Petition, all supporting and opposing filings, the record,
and the applicable law. For the foregoing reasons, the
Petition is dismissed without prejudice.
alleges that he is a Haitian national who entered the United
States in August of 2014. Id. ¶ 24. Upon entry
to the United States, Petitioner did not possess any
documents that would have permitted him to validly enter the
United States. Id. ¶ 24. According to the
Petition, he was interviewed by a border patrol agent who
ordered that Petitioner be removed pursuant to §
235(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”). Id. ¶ 25. Subsequent to
the order of expedited removal being issued and served upon
Petitioner, he was paroled into the United States on August
12, 2014, for a period of two years pursuant to INA §
five years later, Petitioner was detained by ICE officials.
Id. ¶ 2. The detainment was premised upon the
existence of the expedited removal order entered in 2014.
Id. ¶ 3. As of the date the Petition was filed,
April 30, 2019, the Petitioner was in the physical custody of
ICE at the Krome Service Processing Center at 18201 SW 12th
Street, Miami, Florida 33194. Id. ¶ 6.
According to the Petitioner, the Government intended to
remove Petitioner from the United States on May 2, 2019.
Id. at 2.
Petitioner filed an Emergency Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction on May 1, 2019.
ECF No.  (“Emergency Motion”). The Petition
and the Emergency Motion allege that Respondents'
attempts to execute the five-year-old expedited removal order
violates the INA and the Administrative Procedure Act and
that Petitioner's detention violates his due process
rights under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. The
Court thereafter ordered Respondents to file their response
to the Petition and Emergency. ECF No. . Respondents filed
a response stating that a further review of the matter was
required, and no action would be taken to effect
Petitioner's removal before May 20, 2019. ECF No. .
The Court issued an order to show cause why the Court should
not grant the Petition and required Respondents to respond to
the Emergency Motion. ECF No. . Respondents then filed a
supplemental response informing the Court that on May 3,
2019, Petitioner was released from ICE custody under an order
of supervision. ECF No.  at 1; see ECF No.
[16-1] (the Order of Supervision”).
now argue that Petitioner's claims are moot because the
Court can no longer grant Petitioner the relief he seeks on
account of his release from ICE custody. Petitioner responds
that the Petition is not moot for three reasons. First,
Petitioner contends he remains “in custody” for
purposes of the habeas corpus statute because he is subject
to a final order of removal. Second, Petition argues that he
continues to suffer collateral consequences sufficient to
satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III. Third,
Petitioner contends his claims are not moot because he was
placed under the Order of Supervision upon his release.
federal court to have subject matter jurisdiction over a
habeas proceeding, the petitioner must be “in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States. . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3);
accord Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989).
The “in custody” determination is made at the
time the § 2241 petition is filed. Carafas v.
LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968). Petitioner has
clearly met the “in custody” requirement in that
he was confined when he filed his Petition. However, this
Court has no continuing jurisdiction in this case.
III of the Constitution limits federal ‘Judicial
Power,' that is, federal-court jurisdiction, to
‘Controversies.'” United States Parole
Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 395 (1980);
Soliman v. United States ex rel. INS, 296 F.3d 1237,
1242 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted); see also Al
Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th Cir. 2001)
(same). “This case-or-controversy requirement subsists
through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and
appellate.” Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp.,
494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990). The parties must continue to have a
“personal stake in the outcome” of the lawsuit.
Id. at 478 (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons,
461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983)). In other words, a petitioner
“must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual
injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed
by a favorable judicial decision.” Lewis, 494
U.S. at 477.
becomes moot “when the issues presented are no longer
‘live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable
interest in the outcome.” Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969). The doctrine of mootness derives
“directly from the case or controversy limitation
because ‘an action that is moot cannot be characterized
as an active case or controversy.'”
Soliman, 296 F.3d at 1242. Thus, a case is moot when
it no longer presents a live controversy with respect to
which the court can give meaningful relief. If events that
occur subsequent to the filing of a lawsuit or an appeal
deprive the court of the ability to give the moving party
meaningful relief, then the case is moot and must be
dismissed. In fact, dismissal is required because mootness is
jurisdictional. Since a habeas petition under § 2241
challenges immigration officials' authority to keep an
individual “in custody, ” the petitioner's
release moots a habeas petition. See generally Lane v.
Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 632 (1982).
where an alien is released from ICE custody pending removal
from the United States, his petition for habeas relief is
moot. See generally He v. Gonzales, No. 05-1912,
2006 WL 1687796, *1 (W.D. La. May 1, 2006); Revan v.
Mukasey, No. 08-20289-CIV, 2008 WL 3992291, *2 (S.D.
Fla. Aug. 17, 2008); Ismaila v. Dep't of Homeland
Sec., No. No. CA 09-0184-KD-C, 2009 WL 1635781, *1 (S.D.
Ala. June 9, 2009); Abdalla v. Ashcroft, No. No.
03-CV-0602E(F), 2004 WL 2315089, *2 (W.D. N.Y. Oct. 14, 2004)
(“As, however, Petitioner does not dispute he was
released from administrative custody on January 30, 2004, the
instant Petition no longer presents a case or controversy
pursuant to Article III, § 2 of the United States
Petitioner does not dispute that he was released from ICE
custody. Nevertheless, Petitioner argues that he is “in
custody” for the purposes of § 2241 because he is
subject to a final order of removal. Petitioner relies on
cases from other circuits for the proposition that an
individual subject to a final order of removal is considered
to be “in custody” for purposed of the habeas
corpus statute. See ECF No.  at 3 (citing
Simmonds v. INS, 326 F.3d 351, 354 (2nd Cir. 2003);
Aguilera v. Kirkpatrick, 241 F.3d 1286, 1291 (10th
Cir. 2001); Rosales v. ICE, 426 F.3d 733, 734-36
(5th Cir. 2005). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
not resolved this issue but has suggested “that the
mere possibility of future deportation is insufficient to
establish custody, even when the petitioner is subject to a
deportation order.” Arnold v. U.S. Atty. Gen.,
422 Fed.Appx. 793, 795 (11th Cir. 2011); see also
Hernandez v. Immigration & Customs Enf't, No.
2:13-CV-807-FTM-38, 2014 WL 4145530, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug.
20, 2014) (“The Eleventh Circuit has not expressly