appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. Waddell A.
Thomas, Public Defender, and Greg Caracci, Assistant Public
Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Moody, Attorney General, and Robert Quentin Humphrey,
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
ORDER ON MOTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
of this Court requested that this cause be reheard en banc in
accordance with Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.331(d).
All judges in regular active service have voted on the
request. Less than a majority of those judges voted in favor
of rehearing en banc. Accordingly, the request for rehearing
en banc is denied.
C. J, and Wolf, Lewis, BL Thomas, Roberts, Rowe, Osterhaus,
Winokur, and Jay, JJ, concur.
Winokur, J, concurs in an opinion in which Wolf, Lewis, B.L.
Thomas, Roberts, and Rowe, JJ., join.
Bilbrey, Kelsey, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., dissent.
J., dissents in an opinion in which Kelsey, J. joins.
Winokur, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc.
that Hicks has failed to show that en banc consideration is
appropriate. While I do not wish to belabor points made in
the panel majority opinion, I find that some points raised in
the consideration for en banc rehearing merit further
explication. I agree with the panel majority that Hicks has
improperly appealed a nondispositive issue, but the concept
of dispositiveness deserves further comment. The same is true
for the proposition that the State's stipulation in this
case permits review. More fundamentally, even if this case
presented no issue with dispositiveness or reservation, Hicks
would still be entitled to no relief because he has
misinterpreted the retroactivity of section 776.032(4),
Florida Statutes (2017).
scope of the right to appeal a judgment or sentence following
a guilty or no-contest plea is clear: such an appeal is
prohibited "without expressly reserving the right to
appeal a legally dispositive issue." § 924.051(4),
Fla. Stat. The applicable procedural rule sets forth the same
requirements. Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(2)(A)(i) (adding that
a defendant who wishes to appeal following a guilty or
no-contest plea must "identify with particularity the
point of law being reserved"). The requirement that an
issue appealed following a guilty plea be dispositive is no
mere procedural hurdle placed before defendants to limit
review. Instead, it is necessary to effectuate the overriding
rule that a guilty plea ends proceedings in the trial court.
The dispositiveness requirement ensures that, regardless of
whether the defendant wins or loses on appeal, the
proceedings in the trial court ended with the plea and
dispositiveness requirement has long been imposed to prevent
"a trial even if [the defendant] prevails on
appeal." Brown v. State, 376 So.2d 382, 384
(Fla. 1979). The requirement is meant to "expedite
resolution of the controversy," by prohibiting what
would amount to an "interlocutory appeal." Id.
See also Tiller v. State, 330 So.2d 792, 793 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1976) (holding that, without a dispositiveness
requirement, "appellate courts will be placed in the
untenable position of rendering advisory opinions and the
disposition of criminal cases will be unacceptably
delayed"). Thus, the central importance of the
dispositiveness requirement is that it precludes any further
proceedings following appeal. This rule makes sense, since
the defendant has already entered a guilty or no-contest
plea. Further proceedings in the trial court would be
inconsistent with the finality inherent in such a plea.
See Milliron v. State, 44 Fla.L.Weekly D1475 (Fla.
1st DCA June 7, 2019) (finding the issue nondispositive
because, even if relief were granted on some counts,
"there will still be a 'trial of the case' or
further proceedings for the remaining counts");
Sloss v. State, 917 So.2d 941, 942 (Fla. 5th DCA
2005) ("These motions . . . are in no way dispositive as
a reversal would merely result in remand for further
proceedings, including the possibility of a trial.");
Martinez v. State, 420 So.2d 637, 638 n.2 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1982) ("The test for dispositiveness . . . is
whether our decision in favor of either party would
end the case.").
intent to prevent further trial-court proceedings is so
strong that even an issue that is not in fact
dispositive of the case may be appealed, as long as the State
stipulates that no further proceedings will follow an appeal.
See Churchill v. State, 219 So.3d 14, 18 (Fla. 2017)
(noting that "the appellate court's ruling on the
issue reserved for review, even one that is not legally
dispositive as contemplated by Brown, will bring
an end to the litigation") (emphasis added). Again,
the central value of this rule is that an appeal "will
bring an end to the litigation." Id. This is
true regardless of whether the appealed issue can be properly
characterized as "dispositive," because the State
can stipulate to the appeal of a ...