United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Fort Myers Division
OPINION AND ORDER 
POLSTER CHAPPELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court is pro se Defendant Thurnal Glover,
Jr.'s Motion to Correct the Denial of Order to Transfer
the Defendant into Federal Custody filed on August 1, 2019.
(Doc. 123). The Government has not responded, and the time to
respond has lapsed.
federal grand jury indicted Glover for conspiracy to commit
armed bank robbery and armed bank robbery. Because Glover was
in state custody when indicted, the Court issued a Writ of
Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum for him. (Doc. 8). Almost five
months later, the Court accepted Glover's guilty plea. On
May 9, 2017, the Court sentenced him to “60 Months as
to Count 1 and 90 Months as Count 2, to run
concurrently.” (Doc. 100 at 2). He was then returned to
state custody. And a month later, the state court revoked his
probation and sentenced him to sixty months imprisonment
“concurrent with federal sentence.” (Doc. 118-2).
Because the state obtained custody of Glover first, he
started the state sentence with a federal detainer. (Doc.
year after his state sentence, Glover moved to be transferred
to the Bureau of Prisons from state custody to serve his
federal sentence. (Doc. 118). The Court denied the motion
because it lacked authority to direct Glover to be
transferred to a federal facility until he completed his
state-imposed imprisonment. (Doc. 120).
year has passed. And Glover wants the Court to reconsider its
decision. He says the Court's prior order was incorrect
in stating he was serving a 60-month state sentence when he
was federally indicted. (Doc. 123). Glover asserts the Court
must have received bad information because the state court
did not sentence him until after the undersigned did.
is correct that the Court's prior order mistakenly states
the state court sentenced him before the Indictment here. But
the misstatement does not change the analysis. Glover was
first in state custody on the charge for which he is now
serving his state sentence, and there was no break in his
state custody before the Writ. Because Glover was brought
into federal custody on the Writ, the state retained priority
over Glover's custody status. In other words, the Writ
did not disrupt Florida's primary custody over him.
See Butler v. Warden, 451 Fed.Appx. 811,
812 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[W]hen the federal government
takes possession of a state prisoner pursuant to a writ of
habeas corpus ad prosequendum, the state's custody is not
interrupted, and thus the prisoner's federal sentence
does not begin to run until he is turned over to federal
authorities after having served his state sentence.”);
Causey v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 691, 693 (5th Cir.
1980)(“A writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum is only a ‘loan' of the prisoner to
another jurisdiction for criminal proceedings in the
receiving jurisdiction.”). Glover has provided no
persuasive basis for the Court to reconsider its prior order.
Nor has he shown any new law in which the Court has authority
to direct Glover to be transferred to a federal facility.
Glover's request is better directed to the Bureau of
Prisons, which has “exclusive authority to determine
when a federal sentence shall begin and where the federal
sentence shall be served.” United States v.
Hunter, No. 2:06-cr-81-FtM-29DNF, 2012 WL 4051954, at *2
(M.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 2012).
it is now
Thurnal Glover, Jr.'s Renewed Motion for Transfer (Doc.
123) is DENIED.
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