final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
Appeals from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County Lower
Tribunal Nos. 18-23904, 18-23897, Michaelle Gonzalez-Paulson,
Stone, in proper person.
Appearance for appellees.
EMAS, C.J., and LOGUE and GORDO, JJ.
Jack Stone, appeals the trial court's decision granting a
Final Judgment of Injunction for Protection Against Domestic
Violence to Appellees, Elizabeth Helen Germann and Peter
Edward Germann, as well as the trial court's denial of
Appellant's Motion to Vacate the Final Injunctions.
Appellant contends that he was not properly noticed of the
proceeding for the final injunctions, which took place on
November 15, 2018, and that the trial court therefore
violated his constitutional due process rights.
October 9, 2018, Appellees filed petitions for domestic
violence injunctions against Appellant. The same day, the
trial court granted temporary injunctions against Appellant.
Appellant was properly served, via personal service by law
enforcement, with the petitions and temporary injunctions,
also on October 9, 2018. On October 23, 2018, following a
motion by Appellant requesting a continuance of the final
injunction hearing date, the trial court extended the
temporary injunctions and re-set the final injunction hearing
for November 15, 2018. In the interim between the filing of
the petitions and the granting of Appellant's Motion for
Continuance, Appellant moved from the jurisdiction to
Japan. It is the November 15, 2018 hearing of
which Appellant states he received no notice.
to Florida Statutes section 741.30(8)(a)3, which governs
domestic violence injunctions, "[a]ll orders issued,
changed, continued, extended, or vacated subsequent to the
original service of documents" shall be mailed by the
clerk via certified mail to the last known address of the
parties, where service at the hearing is not possible.
"Service by mail is complete upon mailing." §
741.30(8)(a)3, Fla. Stat. (2019). The relevant orders include
notices of hearing and temporary injunctions. §
741.30(8)(a)1, Fla. Stat. Section 741.30(8)(a)3 goes on to
If the respondent has been served previously with the
temporary injunction and has failed to appear at the initial
hearing on the temporary injunction, any subsequent petition
for injunction seeking an extension of time may be served on
the respondent by the clerk of the court by certified mail in
lieu of personal service by a law enforcement officer.
to entry of the permanent injunctions, Appellant was
personally served with the temporary injunctions. This is
undisputed. As a result, subsequent changes or extensions to
those injunctions need only have been mailed by the clerk of
courts to Appellant's last known address in order to
properly effectuate service. See §
741.30(8)(a)1, 3, Fla. Stat. The clerk of courts did, in
fact, mail copies of the relevant documents to Appellant-a
fact which Appellant concedes. Therefore, service of the
notice of final injunction hearing was properly effectuated
upon the mailing by the clerk of courts. See §
741.30(8)(a)3, Fla. Stat. Appellant then failed to appear at
the final hearing on the injunctions despite having had
notice and knowledge of the proceedings.
arguendo that service of notice of the November 15, 2018
hearing was deficient, the trial court still did not violate
Appellant's constitutional due process rights because
Appellant had actual knowledge of the date of the final
injunction hearing. See Bevilacqua v. U.S. Bank,
N.A., 194 So.3d 461, 465 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (finding
that appellant, who was living in Italy, could not
demonstrate a due process violation where the record
affirmatively established that he had knowledge and was aware
of the proceedings); Puigbo v. Medex Trading, LLC,
209 So.3d 598, 602 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (holding that actual
knowledge of the proceedings by a defendant in Venezuela was
sufficient to "apprise [the defendant] of the pendency
of the action" and satisfy constitutional due process).
In his brief to this Court, Appellant admits that he spoke
with the trial judge's chambers prior to the final
injunction hearing and states that he spoke with several
officials from the family court. Moreover, prior to the final
hearing, Appellant filed numerous motions in the trial court.
These filings demonstrate Appellant's awareness and
knowledge of the proceedings. Appellant knew that the final
hearing was set to proceed on November 15, 2018, and simply
failed to appear as required.
Appellant was properly noticed and had actual knowledge of
the hearing on the final injunctions, the trial court did not
violate his due process rights. Thus, the trial court did not
err either in granting the final injunctions ...