United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Fort Myers Division
OPINION AND ORDER
P. BARBER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Jamaal Bilal initiated this action by filing a "42
U.S.C. § 1983 Complaint" (Doc. 1, Complaint) while
involuntarily civilly confined to the Florida Civil
Commitment Center ("FCCC"). Bilal seeks to proceed
in forma pauperis on his Complaint (Doc. 2). The
Court takes judicial notice that this Court recently entered
a filing injunction against Plaintiff due to his abusive
filing practices. See Bilal v. Fennick, Case No:
2:16-cv799-FtM-29MRM (Ft. Myers, FL. Aug. 21, 2019).
Nonetheless, because Bilal initiated this action before the
effective date of the filing injunction, the Court will
review the Complaint sua sponte to determine whether
it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §
Bilal is considered a non-prisoner due to his civil
commitment status,  he is still subject to § 1915(e)(2).
See Troville v. Venz, 303 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir.
2002) (finding "no error in the district court's
dismissal of [a non-prisoner's] complaint" under
§ 1915(e)(2)). Further, while pro se complaints
are held to "less stringent standards" than those
drafted and filed by attorneys, Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted), the standard
pleading requirements under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8, Fed.R.Civ.P. 10
still apply to pro se complaints. Giles v.
Wal-Mart Distribution Or., 359 Fed.Appx. 91, 92 (11th
Cir. 2009). In particular, the complaint must contain "a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief," and "each
allegation must be simple, concise, and direct."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), (d)(1). Overall, "a lengthy ...
personal narrative suggesting, but not clearly and simply
stating, a myriad of potential claims" does not meet the
pleading requirements of Rules 8 and 10. Giles, 359
Fed.Appx. at 93.
this Court uses the standard for Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)
dismissals for dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
See Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir.
2008). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint is subject to
dismissal if the claim alleged is not plausible on its face.
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
All pleaded facts are deemed true for the purposes of Rule
12(b)(6), but a complaint is still insufficient without
adequate facts. Id. The plaintiff must assert enough
facts to allow "the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). The asserted facts must "raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence" in
favor of the plaintiffs claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556. Overall, "labels ... conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action" are not
enough to meet the plausibility standard. Id. at
review, the Court finds this action subject to dismissal
under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983
prohibits the deprivation of constitutional rights under
color of state law. "[C]omplaints in § 1983 cases
must... contain either direct or inferential allegations
respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a
recovery under some viable legal theory." Randall v.
Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 707 n. 2 (11th Cir. 2010)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). BilaPs
complaint contains no allegations from which it could be
inferred that Defendants deprived Bilal of any of his
Complaint identifies "Dr. Emily Selema, Psy. D."
and "Melinda Masters, M.S." as defendants. Doc. 1
at 1. Bilal contends that Defendant Masters' position as
a DeSoto County Commissioner violates an internal FCCC rule
and the "DCF-Wellpath contract." Doc. 1 at
¶¶ 14-15. Bilal appears to suggest that Defendant
Masters' position as a county commissioner creates a
conflict of interest as evidenced by the fact that she did
not testify on his behalf in connection with her witnessing a
fight between him and Captain Kilgo, for which Bilal
eventually plead guilty to battery and was sentenced to
one-year in prison. Id., ¶¶ 13-14.
Regarding Defendant Selema, the Complaint alleges only the
she "sits on the board of the BMT and in that capacity
she authorizes all of the disciplinary reports (D.R.'s)
that are sent to all judges in this state at civil commitment
trials" and "she is not qualified to make such
decisions without the required Ph.D. that is called for by
the contract." Id., ¶¶ 16-17. As
relief, Plaintiff seeks, inter alia, $100, 000 in
compensatory damages against each Defendant and $100, 000 in
punitive damages against each Defendant. Doc. 1 at 6.
Presumably in support of his claims, Plaintiff refers this
Court to the Seventh Circuit's decision affirming the
grant of summary judgment to defendants in Smego v.
Jumper, 707 F App'x 411 (7th Cir. 2017).
Smego, the plaintiff alleged that because some of
the defendants had participated in his treatment before they
obtained licenses required under the Illinois Sex Offender
Evaluation and Treatment Act, 225 ILCS 109/1-99 (the
"Illinois Act"), his sex-offender treatment was
unconstitutional. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment and found the district
court properly found that the record belied any concern about
the defendants' qualifications to provide sex-offender
treatment. Smego, 707 Fed.Appx. at 412-13. At the
outset, Bilal fails to identify where Florida's SVP Act
contains a similar provision to that under review in the
Illinois Act. Irrespective of whether Florida's SVP Act
requires specific licenses, Plaintiff fails to allege that he
was even participating in sex-offender treatment or that
either of the Defendants were his treatment providers.
Moreover, Bilal predicates liability not on Florida's SVP
Act but on his contention that Ms. Masters and Mrs. Selema
are in breach of internal "FCCC rules" and/or the
terms of the "DC-Wellpath" contract. The assertions
of unlawful contractual matters are "legal
conclusions" and as such, should not be entitled to the
assumption of truth. Iqbal, at 680. Moreover, even
if Plaintiff had standing to challenge the
"DCF-Wellpath" contract, (not conceded) a breach of
contact claim under state law does not give rise to federal
jurisdiction absent complete diversity. 28 U.S.C. §
it is hereby
1. The Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED with
prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(c)(2)(B)
2. The Clerk of Court shall terminate any pending motions,
enter judgment, and close this file.