United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Fort Myers Division
JAMAAL ALI BILAL, and all other FCCC residents similarly situated, Plaintiff,
REBECCA KAUPASTA, DONALD SAWYER, PH. D., EMILY SELEMA, KRISTEN KANNER and CORRECT CARE, Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
P. BARBER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Jamaal Bilal initiated this purported class action by filing
a "42 U.S.C. § 1983 Complaint" (Doc. 1,
Complaint) while involuntarily civilly confined to the
Florida Civil Commitment Center
("FCCC"). Bilal seeks to proceed in forma
pauperis on his Complaint (Doc. 2). The Court takes
judicial notice that this Court recently entered a filing
injunction against Plaintiff due to his abusive filing
practices. See Bilal v. Fennick, Case No:
2:16-cv799-FtM-29MRM (M.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2019). Nonetheless,
because Bilal initiated this action before the effective date
of the filing injunction, the Court will review the Complaint
sua sponte to determine whether it is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
Bilal is considered a non-prisoner due to his civil
commitment status,  he is still subject to § 1915(e)(2).
See Troville v. Vera, 303 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir.
2002) (finding "no error in the district court's
dismissal of [a non-prisoner's] complaint" under
§ 1915(e)(2)). Further, while pro se complaints
are held to "less stringent standards" than those
drafted and filed by attorneys, Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted), the standard
pleading requirements under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8, Fed.R.Civ.P. 10
still apply to pro se complaints. Giles v.
Wal-Mart Distribution Ctr., 359 Fed.Appx. 91, 92 (11th
Cir. 2009). In particular, the complaint must contain "a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief," and "each
allegation must be simple, concise, and direct."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), (d)(1). Overall, "a lengthy ...
personal narrative suggesting, but not clearly and simply
stating, a myriad of potential claims" does not meet the
pleading requirements of Rules 8 and 10. Giles, 359
Fed.Appx. at 93.
this Court uses the standard for Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)
dismissals for dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
See Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir.
2008). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint is subject to
dismissal if the claim alleged is not plausible on its face.
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
All pleaded facts are deemed true for the purposes of Rule
12(b)(6), but a complaint is still insufficient without
adequate facts. Id. The plaintiff must assert enough
facts to allow "the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). The asserted facts must "raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence" in
favor of the plaintiffs claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556. Overall, "labels ... conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action" are not
enough to meet the plausibility standard. Id. at
review, the Court finds this action subject to dismissal
under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The gravamen of the Complaint
is that Bilal contends that he and the other individuals who
are civilly confined at the FCCC, are entitled to the minimum
wage provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"). See generally Doc. 1.
Specifically, Bilal avers that "residents at the FCCC
are entitled to minimum wages simply because Wellpath-Correct
Care save millions of dollars in workforce payment by paying
residents at FCCC less than minimum wages." Doc. 1 at 1.
At the outset, the Court finds Bilal lacks standing in this
matter. Significantly, a party seeking to invoke the
jurisdiction of the federal court has the burden of
establishing that it has standing to pursue its claim.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561
(1992). To meet Article Ill's standing requirement, a
plaintiff must allege and be able to demonstrate that he
personally suffered injury. Griffin v. Dugger, 823
F.2d 1476, 1482-83 (11th Cir. 1987). This requirement is not
met by alleging that an injury has been suffered by other
individuals of the class to which the plaintiff contends he
belongs and which he purports to represent. Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 50 (1975). Here, Plaintiffs admits
he has never worked in any capacity while confined at the
FCCC. See Doc. 1, ¶ 14 (stating he "has
never been given or offered a pay job in the 19 years he has
been in this program").
Bilal could show he worked in any capacity while at the FCCC,
his claim is foreclosed by binding caselaw. The Eleventh
Circuit has held that the FLSA does not apply to individuals
civilly confined under Florida's SVP Act because no
employee-employer relationship exists. Troville v.
Calabrese, 54 Fed.Appx. 689 (11th Cir. 2002) (extending
Villarreal v. Woodham, 113 F.3d 202, 204 (11th Cir.
1997) which held that the FSLA does not apply to criminal
detainees under the "economic reality'" test to
civilly detained individuals under Florida SVP Act); see
also Shaw v. Briody, 2005 WL 2291711. No.
2:02-cv-500-FtM-33SPC (M.D. Fla. September 20, 2005).
it is hereby
1. The Complaint (Doc. 1) is
DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (ii).
2. The Clerk of Court shall
terminate any pending motions, enter judgment, and close this
 Plaintiff is civilly committed to the
Florida Civil Commitment Center ("FCCC") pursuant
to the Sexual Violent Predators Act, Fla. Stat. §§
394.910-.913 ("SVP Act"), by which a person
determined to be a sexually violent predator is required to
be housed in a secure facility "for control, care, and
treatment until such time as the person's mental
abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that it ...