final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion
under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.
appeal from the Circuit Court for Suwannee County. William F.
Natalia P. Kalishman of Steven Kalishman, P.A., Gainesville,
D. Hatton of Hatton Law, P.A., Mayo, for Appellee.
challenges the two-year domestic violence injunction entered
against her at the behest of her daughter, Appellee, on
behalf of Appellee's minor daughter/Appellant's
granddaughter. Appellee alleged that she herself was
physically abused at Appellant's hands as a child, that
Appellant had attempted to interfere with paternity
proceedings involving Appellee's daughter and had
involved the Department of Children and Families in unfounded
attempts to take the child away, and that Appellant tries to
control Appellee. These allegations are legally insufficient
to support entry of a domestic violence injunction, and
therefore we reverse the injunction.
domestic violence injunction may issue to protect a member of
the movant's family or household "who is either the
victim of domestic violence as defined in s. 741.28 or has
reasonable cause to believe he or she is in imminent danger
of becoming the victim of any act of domestic violence."
§ 741.30(1)(a), Fla. Stat. "Domestic violence"
is defined as "any assault, aggravated assault, battery,
aggravated battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, stalking,
aggravated stalking, kidnapping, false imprisonment, or any
criminal offense resulting in physical injury or death of one
family or household member by another family or household
member." § 741.28(2), Fla. Stat. This injunction
was improper because there was no evidence that the minor
child was the victim of domestic violence or in imminent
danger of becoming such a victim.
allegations of previous physical abuse related to
Appellant's alleged treatment of Appellee when Appellee
was a child. Although Appellee alleged it continued into
Appellee's early adulthood, it was nevertheless
undisputed that the abuse ended when Appellee moved out of
the household two or three years before seeking the
injunction. There was no evidence of any more recent acts of
domestic violence against Appellee; no evidence that
Appellant ever committed any act of domestic violence against
the minor child-and to the contrary, Appellee admitted that
Appellant had not threatened or committed any acts of
domestic violence against the minor child; and no evidence of
any imminent threat of any such acts.
allegations about Appellant's anger issues and physical
abuse when Appellee was a child do not support entry of an
injunction, both because they do not establish actual
victimization or an imminent threat to the minor child, and
because they were too long ago to constitute current evidence
of an actionable threat. The statute expressly requires a
showing either that the alleged victim is currently a victim
of domestic violence, or that there is reasonable cause to
believe the victim is in imminent danger of such violence.
§ 741.30(1)(a). No evidence supports either of the
alternative statutory requirements.
remoteness of Appellant's alleged prior abuse of Appellee
also renders the injunction improper. Incidents remote in
time by as little as a year are insufficient to support entry
of a new injunction, absent allegations of current violence
or imminent danger that satisfy the statute. See, e.g.,
Leaphart v. James, 185 So.3d 683, 686 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)
(reversing injunction because predicate act of domestic
violence occurred twenty months before the petition was filed
and no imminent threat was shown); Arnold v.
Santana, 122 So.3d 512, 513 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (finding
act of domestic violence three to four years before filing of
petition was insufficient to support injunction); Gill v.
Gill, 50 So.3d 772, 773 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (holding act
of domestic violence fourteen months earlier too remote to
support injunction); see also Giallanza v.
Giallanza, 787 So.2d 162, 163 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)
(affirming temporary injunction based on evidence of domestic
violence from ten years earlier coupled with recent evidence
of respondent's anger and verbal abuse, but reversing
permanent injunction). The allegations of physical violence
between these parties, which it is undisputed ended two or
three years ago, do not satisfy the statutory requirement of
a current or imminent threat. See Randolph v. Rich,
58 So.3d 290, 292 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (emphasizing statutory
requirement of "sufficient evidence to establish the
objective reasonableness of his or her fear that the danger
of violence is 'imminent'").
allegation that Appellant has made unfounded calls to DCF
likewise does not satisfy the statute. We have held that
"[u]nfounded reports to authorities or requests for
judicial relief, even if repeated or for malicious purposes,
do not support the entry of an injunction against domestic or
other violence." Olin v. Roberts, 42 So.3d 841,
842 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); accord Wills v. Jones, 213
So.3d 982, 985 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). Appellee's vague
complaint that Appellant is too controlling is equally
insufficient to support the injunction.
of providing evidence sufficient to satisfy the statute,
Appellee's allegations were speculative and did not
establish current domestic violence or reasonable cause to
believe the minor child was in imminent danger of such
violence. Appellee alleged that if future circumstances
resulted in the State's removing the minor child from
Appellee, the child might be placed with Appellant, who might
then commit an act of violence against the child. There was
no evidence that any of these potentialities was real or
imminent. The injunction was improperly granted, and we