United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Jacksonville Division
DOMINIQUE L. BEEKS, Plaintiff,
v.
HMC ASSETS, LLC, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [1]
MONTE
C. RICHARDSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
THIS
CAUSE is before the Court on pro se
Plaintiff's Application to Proceed in District Court
Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (“Application”)
(Doc. 2). For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned
recommends that the Application be DENIED
and the case be DISMISSED without prejudice.
A court
receiving an application to proceed in forma
pauperis must dismiss the case sua sponte if
the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails
to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii)
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from
such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). An action
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted if it
fails to include “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Harper v. Lawrence Cnty., Ala., 592 F.3d 1227 (11th
Cir. 2010) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), 12(b)(6)). To show
entitlement to relief, Plaintiff must include a short and
plain statement of facts in support of his claims.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). This statement of facts must show the
plausibility of Plaintiff's claims. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). “[L]abels and
conclusions” are not enough to satisfy the
“plausibility” standard. Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
In
addition, the court must dismiss the action sua
sponte if it “determines at any time that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3);
see also Blankenship v. Gulf Power Co., 551
Fed.Appx. 468, 470 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (same);
Walker v. Sun Trust Bank of Thomasville, GA, 363
Fed.Appx. 11, 15 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“[A]
district court may sua sponte consider whether it
has subject matter jurisdiction over a plaintiff's
claims.”).
Subject matter jurisdiction in a federal court may be based
upon federal question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. Diversity jurisdiction
exists where the plaintiffs and defendants are citizens of
different states, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,
000. . . . Absent diversity of citizenship, a plaintiff must
present a substantial federal question in order to invoke the
district court's jurisdiction.
Walker, 363 Fed.Appx. at 15 (internal quotation
marks omitted). “[E]ven a claim that arises under
federal law may be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction if (1) the claim clearly appears to be
immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining
jurisdiction, or (2) the claim is wholly insubstantial and
frivolous.” Blankenship, 551 Fed.Appx. at 470
(internal quotation marks omitted). A claim is wholly
insubstantial and frivolous if it “has no plausible
foundation, or if the court concludes that a prior Supreme
Court decision clearly forecloses the claim.”
Id. at 470-71 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Pro
se Plaintiff, Dominique L. Beeks, initiated this action
on June 26, 2019 by filing a Complaint for the Conversion of
Property with this Court (“Complaint”) (Doc. 1),
along with the Application (Doc. 2). On July 16, 2019,
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint for the Conversion of
Property (“Amended Complaint”). (Doc. 4.) In the
Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that beginning on May 8,
2017, she initiated attempts to perfect title to real
property located in Jacksonville, Florida, which she claims
was abandoned, through adverse possession. (See Id.
at 6.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants wrongfully obtained
a certificate of title to said property after foreclosure
proceedings in State court and wrongfully evicted Plaintiff
after obtaining a writ of possession purportedly in violation
of, inter alia, Fla. Stat. § 95.18(8) and the
Fourteenth Amendment.[2] (Id. at 6-8, 10.)
Through
this federal action, Plaintiff contests the validity of the
foreclosure sale and requests, inter alia, that the
foreclosure sale and judgment be set aside, and that this
Court “make null and void” a trial court order in
the underlying foreclosure proceedings titled “Order
Granting Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate the Foreclosure
Sale Held on July 14, 2016, Vacate the Certificate of Title,
Vacate the Final Judgment of Mortgage Foreclosure and Motion
for Leave to File Amended Complaint.” (Id. at
7, 27.) Plaintiff also seeks restitution, punitive damages,
and sanctions against Defendants. (Id. at 10.)
Construing
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint liberally, it appears that
Plaintiff seeks to appeal a final judgment entered in favor
of Defendant in State court. However, this Court does not
have jurisdiction to hear appeals of state court decisions.
The only federal court that can hear an appeal of a state
court final judgment is the United States Supreme Court.
Seltz v. Medina, No. 2:13-cv-394-FtM-38DNF, 2013 WL
2920415, *2 (M.D. Fla. June 13, 2013) (citing Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923) and
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462, 482-83 (1983)). Under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal district court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction to directly or indirectly
review an unfavorable state judgment. Feldman, 460
U.S. at 476; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416. “The
doctrine applies both to federal claims raised in the state
court and to those inextricably intertwined with the state
court's judgment.” Casale v. Tillman, 558
F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotations and citation
omitted). “A claim is inextricably intertwined if it
would effectively nullify the state court judgment, or it
succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly
decided the issues.” Id. (quotations and
citations omitted). “The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine makes clear that federal district courts cannot
review state court final judgments because that task is
reserved for state appellate courts or, as a last resort, the
United States Supreme Court.” Casale, 558 F.3d
at 1260 (citation omitted); see also Pompey v. Broward
Cnty., 95 F.3d 1543, 1550 (11th Cir. 1996)
(“Neither federal district courts nor federal courts of
appeals may usurp the authority and function of the Supreme
Court and state appellate courts to review state court
proceedings.”).
Here,
as Plaintiff alleges injuries caused by an adverse State
court judgment, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is
implicated. Exxon Mobil. Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Moreover,
Plaintiff's claims are inextricably intertwined with the
state court action as the relief sought would effectively
nullify the state court judgment. See Kohler v.
Garlets, 578 Fed.Appx. 862, 864 (11th Cir. 2014)
(“To the extent Mr. Kohler claims that he was injured
by the state court's foreclosure order and seeks ‘a
determination as to the title and rights and interests'
of the foreclosed-upon property . . . the district court
properly ruled that his claims were barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as these claims
are inextricably intertwined with the state court's
foreclosure judgment.”); Springer v. Perryman,
401 Fed.Appx. 457, 458 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded review of
the plaintiff's Section 1983 claims alleging
constitutional violations during state court proceedings,
including violations of the Seventh Amendment, and finding
the claims were inextricably intertwined with the state
court's judgment). Therefore, to the extent
Plaintiff's State court actions were completed at the
time Plaintiff initiated this case, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes this
Court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over
Plaintiff's claims.[3] For these reasons, the Court can,
sua sponte, dismiss this action. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
Thus,
Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed without
prejudice under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Although a pro se plaintiff is usually given at
least one opportunity to amend her complaint, it would be
futile to do so here in light of the relief requested in this
case.
Accordingly,
it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that:
1. The
Application (Doc. 2) be
DENIED.
2. The
case be DISMISSED ...