final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion
under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.
appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. Linda F.
Flowers, pro se, Appellant.
Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Flowers appeals an order dismissing with prejudice his motion
for postconviction relief filed under Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.850, and a later order imposing
sanctions. We affirm.
2014, Flowers was convicted of second-degree murder and
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He was
sentenced as a habitual felony offender ("HFO") to
fifty years in prison with a mandatory minimum of twenty
years for the murder, and a consecutive thirty years with a
mandatory minimum of three years for the firearm possession.
This court upheld his conviction and sentence on direct
appeal without opinion and mandate issued almost four years
ago in 2015. Flowers v. State, 171 So.3d 704 (Fla.
1st DCA 2015).
following month, Flowers filed a motion to correct illegal
sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a)
arguing that his consecutive mandatory minimum sentences were
illegal. The denial of that motion was affirmed on appeal.
Flowers v. State, 226 So.3d 816 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017).
Flowers then filed his first motion for postconviction relief
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 raising four
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. After denying
his request to amend or supplement that motion, the
postconviction court denied his motion, and we affirmed that
decision on appeal. Flowers v. State, 236 So.3d 1011
(Fla. 1st DCA 2017). Flowers next filed another 3.800(a)
motion arguing that his consecutive HFO sentences were
illegal. The postconviction court denied his motion because
the same claim had been rejected in his first 3.800(a) motion
but also explained why his claim lacked merit. We again
affirmed the decision on appeal. Flowers v. State,
237 So.3d 482 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018).
month after he filed his second 3.800(a) motion, Flowers
filed a successive 3.850 motion raising the same claims he
unsuccessfully tried to add to his first 3.850 motion. The
postconviction court denied his motion as successive and
issued a warning that if he continued to file frivolous,
successive pro se motions, he would be referred to the
Department of Corrections ("DOC") for the
imposition of disciplinary proceedings under section
944.279(1), Florida Statutes, and he could also be prohibited
from submitting pro se filings in the future. We affirmed
that decision on appeal. Flowers v. State 253 So.3d
1068 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018).
in 2018, Flowers filed yet another successive 3.850 motion
raising four new claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
and a fifth claim related to his habitual traffic violations
that had been raised and rejected twice before. The
postconviction court dismissed his motion as untimely and
successive, found that he had committed an abuse of judicial
procedure by filing repetitive and frivolous postconviction
motions, and ordered him to show cause why he should not be
barred from further pro se filings in the instant case. In
response, Flowers reargued his habitual traffic violations
claim, and suggested the court issue a "strong
warning" rather than impose sanctions on him because he
is not trained in the law and relies on prison law clerks to
help prepare his court filings. The court disagreed. It found
that Flowers had abused the judicial process by filing
frivolous claims, wasted the court's limited and valuable
time, deprived other indigent petitioners of the opportunity
to have their motions addressed in a timely manner, and
proved that he had no intention of abiding by the court's
decisions or heeding its warnings. The court then barred him
from filing any further pro se pleadings in the instant case
and referred him to prison officials for the imposition of
Dismissing Postconviction Claims
improper for a defendant to raise claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel piecemeal by filing successive motions.
Pope v. State, 702 So.2d 221, 223 (Fla. 1997). A
second or successive rule 3.850 motion is an extraordinary
pleading. As such, a court may dismiss the motion if it fails
to allege new grounds and the prior decision was on the
merits or, if new grounds are alleged, the court finds that
the defendant's failure to raise those grounds in a prior
motion was an abuse of process or there was no good cause for
the failure to raise them previously. Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.850(h)(2). Additionally, ineffective assistance claims
filed more than two years after the judgment and sentence
become final are procedurally barred as untimely unless they
fall within an exception to the two-year deadline.
Martinez v. State, 265 So.3d 690, 692 (Fla. 1st DCA
Flowers's four new claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel are untimely because they were raised more than two
years after his conviction became final, and he has failed to
show justification for not raising them in his initial 3.850
motion. Thus, they are procedurally barred. See Fla.
R. Crim. P. 3.850(b). His remaining ineffective assistance
claim about his habitual traffic violations has already been
raised twice and rejected by the courts, the first time on
the merits. See Carroll v. State, 192 So.3d 525,
526-27 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (observing that prisoners waste
valuable and limited court resources by filing successive
postconviction claims that have already been addressed). For
these reasons, we affirm the order dismissing his
postconviction claims with prejudice.