United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Fort Myers Division
L. YVONNE BROWN, Plaintiff,
FLORIDA GULF COAST UNIVERSITY BOARD OF TRUSTEES, KEN KAVANAGH, KARL SMESKO, RODERICK ROLLE, KELLY BROCK and JESSICA HOMER, Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER 
Polster Chappell, Judge
matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff pro se L.
Yvonne Brown's request for a preliminary injunction (Doc.
29) filed on August 15, 2019. The Court had denied
Plaintiff's request for an ex parte temporary
restraining order in Doc. 29 but took Plaintiff's request
for a preliminary injunction under advisement pending formal
service of the Complaint and a response from Defendants.
Defendants have been served and have responded to the request
for injunctive relief. (Doc. 42). Based on Defendants'
Response, the Court finds there is no longer a need for the
injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks and therefore the
request is denied as moot.
October 26, 2018, Plaintiff L. Yvonne Brown filed a
nine-count Complaint (Doc. 1) alleging that Defendants
violated Title IX by dismissing her from Florida Gulf Coast
University's (FGCU) women's basketball team based on
academic ineligibility without due process. The remaining
eight claims are all state law claims.
seeks a preliminary injunction to prevent the continued
enforcement of an April 29, 2019 disciplinary sanction
imposed upon her by FGCU precluding her from registering for
Fall 2019 semester classes that began on August 19, 2019. The
disciplinary sanction stems from a citation Brown received
for running a stop sign and driving her moped without a
driver's license on FGCU's campus. So FGCU found her
in violation of its Student Code of Conduct and placed a hold
on her student account, preventing her from registering for
classes. Brown believes that the disciplinary sanction
imposed by FGCU (without a hearing) constitutes ongoing
retaliation for Brown's complaints of Title IX violations
and requests a preliminary injunction to stop the enforcement
of the disciplinary sanction until her Title IX case has been
heard by this Court.
district court may issue a preliminary injunction when the
movant demonstrates: (1) a substantial likelihood of success
on the merits; (2) that irreparable injury will be suffered
unless the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to
the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction
may cause the opposing party; and (4) if issued, the
injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.
See Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts, B.V. v.
Consorcio Barr, S.A., 320 F.3d 1205, 1210 (11th Cir.
2003); “[A] preliminary injunction in advance of trial
is an extraordinary remedy” whose purpose “is to
preserve the positions of the parties as best [the court can]
until a trial on the merits may be held.” Bloedorn
v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1229 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing
United States v. Jefferson Cnty., 720 F.2d 1511,
1519 (11th Cir. 1983)).
the sworn declaration submitted by FGCU, Chad Trisler,
Assistant Dean of Students and Director of Student Conduct,
states that Plaintiff is currently enrolled as a student at
FGCU and is registered for classes. (Doc. 42-1). Mr. Trisler
states that after Plaintiff submitted a reflection paper on
August 16, 2019-one day after she filed her request for a
temporary restraining order-she was allowed to register for
classes. (Id. at ¶ 6). Because the only
injunctive relief requested by Plaintiff (that the Court
issue a preliminary injunction compelling FGCU to remove the
hold on her student account, allowing her to register for
classes for the Fall 2019 semester) has occurred, there is no
longer a need to maintain the status quo prior to
trial and the request will be denied as moot.
it is now ORDERED:
request for preliminary injunction (Doc. 29) is
DENIED as moot.
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