United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division
JACOB D. FRANTZ, JAN M. MAURICIO, and JOHN MAURICIO, Plaintiffs,
CENTURY-NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.
VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ COVINGTON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT
matter comes before the Court upon consideration of Defendant
Century-National Insurance Company's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint (Doc. # 31), filed on
August 16, 2019. Plaintiffs Jacob D. Frantz, Jan M. Mauricio,
and John Mauricio responded on August 30, 2019 (Doc. # 32).
For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted.
Court has already set forth the facts underlying this case
and the pertinent procedural history in its July 3, 2019,
order granting Defendant's motion to dismiss the original
Complaint and its July 26, 2019, order granting Plaintiffs an
extension of time in which to file an Amended Complaint.
Therefore, the Court will set forth only the facts pertinent
to its disposition of the instant Motion.
case began in February 2015, when Frantz and the Mauricios
were involved in an automobile accident. (Doc. # 29 at
¶¶ 5-6). Frantz alleges that he was insured for the
automobile accident by Century-National. (Id. at
¶ 7). On May 4, 2017, Century-National filed a complaint
for declaratory judgment in Sarasota County, Florida, in No.
2017-CA-002209, against Frantz, alleging that the policy
issued to Frantz provided no bodily injury liability
coverage. (Id. at ¶ 15). A copy of the summons
and complaint in that case were served on Frantz's
father, and Frantz has alleged that he had no actual notice
of the declaratory judgment proceedings against him.
(Id. at ¶¶ 16-17).
13, 2017, after securing a default from the Clerk of the
Court, Century-National obtained an order granting its motion
for final default judgment against Frantz in the declaratory
judgment action. (Id. at ¶ 18; Doc. # 1 at
78-79). The June 13, 2017, order stated that Frantz's
insurance policy with Century-National “does not
provide any bodily injury liability insurance coverage”
and that Century-National “owes no duty to defend
and/or indemnify” Frantz for any bodily injury claim
brought by Jan Mauricio or any loss of consortium claim
brought by John Mauricio in connection with the 2015
automobile accident. (Doc. # 1 at 78-79). In its previous
order, this Court determined that the June 13, 2017, order
did not contain sufficient words demonstrating finality and
was not a final judgment for res judicata purposes. (Doc. #
23 at 10-12).
approximately one week after this Court entered its order on
Century-National's motion to dismiss, Century-National
moved in state court for an entry of final default judgment
in the underlying declaratory action. (Doc. # 24-1). Frantz,
in turn, filed a response to that motion, a motion to set
aside the default, and requested a hearing before the state
court judge. (Doc. # 24-3). To this Court's knowledge,
Century-National's motion for entry of final default
judgment remains pending before the state court.
Amended Complaint, like the original Complaint, contains two
counts. Count 1 seeks relief from the June 13, 2017, state
court order under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b).
(Doc. # 29 at 6-7). Count 2 alleges bad faith on the part of
Century-National. (Id. at 7-10).
August 16, 2019, Century-National moved to dismiss the
Amended Complaint. (Doc. # 31). Plaintiffs have responded
(Doc. # 32), and the Motion is ripe for review.
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), this Court
accepts as true all the allegations in the complaint and
construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262
(11th Cir. 2004). Further, the Court favors the plaintiff
with all reasonable inferences from the allegations in the
complaint. Stephens v. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 901 F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir. 1990). But,
[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a
plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his
entitlement to relief requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)(internal citations omitted). Courts are not
“bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as
a factual allegation.” Papasan v.
Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).