United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division
VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ COVINGTON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter comes before the Court in consideration of pro se
Plaintiff Rachel Nicole Hoffler Pinkston’s Verified
Motion for Reconsideration of Order (Doc. # 163), filed on
September 15, 2019. Defendant University of South Florida
Board of Trustees (USFBOT) responded on September 16, 2019.
(Doc. # 166). For the reasons that follow, the Motion is
Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60 govern motions for
reconsideration.” Beach Terrace Condo. Ass’n,
Inc. v. Goldring Invs., No. 8:15-cv-1117-T-33TBM, 2015 WL
4548721, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 28, 2015). “The time
when the party files the motion determines whether the motion
will be evaluated under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60.”
Id. “A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed within
28 days after the entry of the judgment.” Id.
“Motions filed after the 28–day period will be
decided under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).”
the Motion was filed within 28 days of the Court’s
Order, so Rule 59 applies. “The only grounds for
granting a Rule 59 motion are newly discovered evidence or
manifest errors of law or fact.” Anderson v. Fla.
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 567 Fed.Appx. 679, 680 (11th
Cir. 2014)(quoting Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th
relief under Rule 59(e) is “an extraordinary remedy to
be employed sparingly in the interests of finality and
conservation of scarce judicial resources.” United
States v. DeRochemont, No. 8:10-cr-287-T-24MAP, 2012 WL
13510, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 4, 2012)(citation omitted).
Furthermore, “a Rule 59(e) motion [cannot be used] to
relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence
that could have been raised prior to the entry of
judgment.” Michael Linet, Inc. v. Vill. of
Wellington, 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005).
raises multiple arguments for reconsideration of this
Court’s September 9th Order (Doc. # 152), which granted
USFBOT’s motion for extension of time to complete
discovery and for extensions of the other remaining
deadlines. As explained below, Pinkston’s arguments
Pinkston insists that USFBOT’s motion for an extension
of the discovery deadline and related deadlines should have
been denied because the motion and attached exhibits exceeded
twenty-five pages. (Doc. # 163 at 2). Pinkston misunderstands
Local Rule 3.01(a). It states:
In a motion or other application for an order, the movant
shall include a concise statement of the precise relief
requested, a statement of the basis for the request, and a
memorandum of legal authority in support of the request, all
of which the movant shall include in a single document not
more than twenty-five (25) pages.
Rule 3.01(a). In accordance with that Local Rule, the Case
Management and Scheduling Order provides that “No party
shall file a motion and supporting memorandum in excess of
twenty-five pages.” (Doc. # 97 at 6).
Local Rule 3.01(a) nor the Case Management and Scheduling
Order imply that exhibits are included in the page limit.
Rather, the page limit applies only to the motion and
incorporated memorandum of law. Exhibits are not included in
the page limit. See Williams v. Bank of Am. Corp.,
No. 3:15-cv-1449-J-39MCR, 2019 WL 4016474, at *1 (M.D. Fla.
July 30, 2019)(“The 25-page limit that applies to any
motion and supporting legal memorandum as set forth in Local
Rule 3.01(a), does not include any exhibits attached to the
motion.”), report and recommendation adopted as
modified, No. 3:15-cv-1449-J-39MCR, 2019 WL 4016477 (M.D.
Fla. Aug. 16, 2019). Here, USFBOT’s motion and
incorporated memorandum of law took up only twelve pages.
(Doc. # 145). Thus, USFBOT did not violate the page limit.
Pinkston argues that the undersigned “went against her
word, [and] changed the case management order in a
significant manner” by extending the deadlines in this
case. (Doc. # 163 at 2-3). The Court does warn parties that
extensions of the discovery and dispositive motions deadlines
are disfavored. (Doc. # 97 at 5; Doc. # 98). Nothing about
these warnings to the parties prevents the Court from
extending the discovery deadline - or any other deadline -
when the Court sees fit. See Wilson v. Farley, 203
Fed.Appx. 239, 250 (11th Cir. 2006)(explaining that a
“district court retains the inherent authority to
manage its own docket”). The Court saw fit here because
USFBOT established good cause for its requested extension.
also challenges the Court’s use of the phrase
“unique circumstances” in its Order granting
USFBOT’s motion for extension of the discovery deadline
and other related deadlines. (Doc. # 163 at 4-5). Pinkston
argues that this Court “obviously misapprehended the
facts of this case” because - in Pinkston’s eyes
- the Court could not possibly have granted USFBOT’s
requested relief if the Court understood the case.
(Id. at 5). She further argues that the ...