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Klieforth v. Saul

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division

September 20, 2019

YVONNE KLIEFORTH, Plaintiff,
v.
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, [1]Defendant.

          ORDER

          SEAN P. FLYNN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

         Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the denial of her claim for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). As the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision was based on substantial evidence and employed proper legal standards, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.

         I. Procedural Background

         Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and DIB (T r. 66, 178-79, 180-83). The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s claims both initially and upon reconsideration (Tr. 12). Plaintiff then requested an administrative hearing (Tr. 95-98). Per Plaintiff’s request, the ALJ held a hearing at which Plaintiff appeared and testified (Tr. 31-55). Following the hearing, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision finding Plaintiff not disabled and accordingly denied Plaintiff’s claims for benefits (Tr. 12-24). Subsequently, Plaintiff requested review from the Appeals Council, which the Appeals Council denied (Tr. 1-6). Plaintiff then timely filed a complaint with this Court (Doc. 1). The case is now ripe for review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).

         II. Factual Background and the ALJ’s Decision

         Plaintiff, who was born in 1959, claimed disability beginning November 21, 2014 (Tr. 178). Plaintiff has som e college but had not graduated as of the hearing[2] (Tr. 35, 200). Plaintiff’s past relevant work experience included work as a customer service representative, order clerk, and accounting clerk (Tr. 23). Plaintiff alleged disability due to diabetes, arthritis, back/neck injury, and depression/anxiety (Tr. 199).

         In rendering the administrative decision, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements through December 20, 2019, and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 21, 2014, the alleged onset date (Tr. 14). After conducting a hearing and reviewing the evidence of record, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: hypertension, disorders of spine, right hip osteoarthritis, fibromyalgia, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), obesity, and diabetes mellitus (Tr. 14). Notwithstanding the noted impairments, the ALJ determined Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (Tr. 18). The ALJ then concluded that Plaintiff retained a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work with the following limitations: occasionally overhead reach with her left non-dominant upper extremity; frequently handle and finger bilaterally; occasionally climb ramps and stairs; never climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; frequently stoop, balance, kneel, crouch, and crawl; frequent exposure to fumes, odors, dusts, gases, and poor ventilation; and occasional exposure to hazards such as moving mechanical parts of equipment, tools or machinery (Tr. 18-19). In formulating Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined that, although the evidence established the presence of underlying impairments that reasonably could be expected to produce the symptoms alleged, Plaintiff’s statements as to the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence (Tr. 19).

         Considering Plaintiff’s noted impairments and the assessment of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work (Tr. 23). Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled (Tr. 24).

         III. Legal Standard

         To be entitled to benefits, a claimant must be disabled, meaning he or she must be unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). A “physical or mental impairment” is an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities, which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382c(a)(3)(D).

         The Social Security Administration, in order to regularize the adjudicative process, promulgated the detailed regulations currently in effect. These regulations establish a “sequential evaluation process” to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. If an individual is found disabled at any point in the sequential review, further inquiry is unnecessary. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). Under this process, the ALJ must determine, in sequence, the following: whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; whether the claimant has a severe impairment, i.e., one that significantly limits the ability to perform work-related functions; whether the severe impairment meets or equals the medical criteria of 20 C.F.R. Part 404 Subpart P, Appendix 1; and whether the claimant can perform his or her past relevant work. If the claimant cannot perform the tasks required of his or her prior work, step five of the evaluation requires the ALJ to decide if the claimant can do other work in the national economy in view of his or her age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). A claimant is entitled to benefits only if unable to perform other work. Bowen v. Y uckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g).

         A determination by the Commissioner that a claimant is not disabled must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence and comports with applicable legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996). While the court reviews the Commissioner’s decision with deference to the factual findings, no such deference is given to the legal conclusions. Keeton v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).

         In reviewing the Commissioner’s decision, the court may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ even if it finds that the evidence preponderates against the ALJ’s decision. Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). The Commissioner’s failure to apply the correct law, or to give the reviewing court sufficient reasoning for determining that he or she has conducted the proper legal analysis, mandates reversal. Keeton, 21 F.3d at 1066. The scope of review is thus limited to determining whether the findings of the Commissioner are ...


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