United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division
P. FLYNN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
the Court is Plaintiff’s Verified Motion to Reconsider
Court Order (Doc.#) (“Motion”) (Doc. 162)
and Defendant’s response in opposition thereto (Doc.
171). Upon consideration, Plaintiff’s Motion is denied.
generally recognize three grounds justifying reconsideration:
(1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the
availability of new evidence; and (3) the need to correct
clear error or manifest injustice. Succullo v. U.S.,
No. 8:16-CV-410-T-36TBM, 2017 WL 6383984, at *2 (M.D. Fla.
Oct. 3, 2017). The decision to grant a motion for
reconsideration is within the sound discretion of the trial
court. See Region 8 Forest Serv. Timber Purchasers
Council v. Alcock, 993 F.2d 800, 806 (11th Cir. 1993).
When presented with a motion to reconsider, however, a court
should proceed cautiously, realizing that “in the
interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial
resources, reconsideration of a previous order is an
extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly.”
United States v. Bailey, 288 F.Supp.2d 1261, 1267
(M.D. Fla. 2003), aff'd, 419 F.3d 1208 (11th
Cir. 2005); Burger King Corp. v. Ashland Equities,
Inc., 181 F.Supp.2d 1366, 1369 (S.D. Fla. 2002)
(explaining that “[f]or reasons of policy, courts and
litigants cannot be repeatedly called upon to backtrack
through the paths of litigation which are often laced with
seeks reconsideration of the Court’s Order dated
September 9, 2019, granting Defendant’s motions to
compel Plaintiff to provide proper responses to
Defendant’s first set of interrogatories and requests
for production, granting reasonable attorney’s fees to
the Defendant, directing Plaintiff to serve the requested
discovery within ten days from the date of the order, and
ordering Plaintiff to appear for a video deposition on
September 24, 2019, in Tampa, Florida (“September Court
Order”) (Doc. 153).
first argues that it is a clear error for the Court to have
granted Defendant’s motions to compel because the
motions violate the Local Rules and the Case Management and
Scheduling Order (Doc. 162 at 2). Particularly, Plaintiff
argues that Defendant’s motions to compel exceeded the
page limits set in the Local Rules. Plaintiff’s
argument is unavailing. Defendant’s motions to compel
properly comply with the requirements of Local Rule 3.04.
Further, the motions did not exceed twenty-five pages as
required by Local Rule 3.01(a) because, contrary to
Plaintiff’s argument, exhibits do not count toward the
page limits. Williams v. Bank of Am. Corp., No.
3:15-CV-1449-J-39MCR, 2019 WL 4016474, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July
30, 2019), report and recommendation adopted as
modified, 3:15-CV-1449-J-39MCR, 2019 WL 4016477 (M.D.
Fla. Aug. 16, 2019) (“[t]he 25-page limit that applies
to any motion and supporting legal memorandum as set forth in
Local Rule 3.01(a), does not include any exhibits attached to
the motion”). Further, even if Defendant failed to
comply with the Local Rules, the Court may exercise its
“discretion to waive or excuse noncompliance with its
local rules.” Fluor Intercontinental, Inc. v. IAP
Worldwide Servs., Inc., 533 F. App’x. 912, 922
n.35 (11th Cir. 2013).; Arval Serv. Lease S.A. v.
Clifton, No. 3:14-CV-1047-J-39MCR, 2014 WL 12615698, at
*2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2014).
next argues that the Court failed to consider
Plaintiff’s argument that “Defendant did not
properly seek the Court to determine the sufficiency of
Plaintiff’s answers to interrogatories” (Doc. 162
at 2). To the extent Plaintiff is referring to her argument
that “Defendant failed to include a concise statement
as to why it believes Plaintiff’s responses to be
insufficient” (Doc. 140 at 1), Defendant provided such
a statement after listing each objection in its motions to
compel (Doc. 135 & 136). Further, the Court addressed why
Plaintiff’s objections to Defendant’s
interrogatories Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
16, and 17, were improper in light of Defendant’s
statements. Therefore, the Court finds no clear error or
also argues that an award of attorney’s fees is
unjustified because Plaintiff had a genuine dispute as to the
reasonableness of the interrogatories served by Defendant,
and Defendant did not attempt in good faith to actively
resolve the dispute prior to filing its motions to compel as
required by Rule 37(a)(5)(A)(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Court clearly explained the reasons why
Plaintiff’s objections were not justified. Plaintiff
does nothing more than rehash arguments already considered by
the Court. Because a motion for reconsideration should not be
used to reargue an issue the Court has already rejected,
Plaintiff’s argument is unavailing. See Arthur v.
King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343–44 (11th Cir. 2007);
O’Neal v. Kennamer, 958 F.2d 1044, 1047 (11th
Cir. 1992) (stating that a motion for reconsideration should
not be used to reargue an issue the Court has already
dismissed, or to offer an argument or evidence that could
have been presented prior to the entry of judgment).
Moreover, and contrary to Plaintiff’s contention, the
Court is satisfied that Defendant tried to resolve the matter
with Plaintiff before filing its motion to compel as required
by Rule 37(a)(5)(A)(i).
further requests that the Court reconsider its order
directing Plaintiff to appear at a deposition in Tampa, on
what she argues is a “a ten-day notice, ” and to
file responses to Defendant’s interrogatories and
requests for production within a ten-day deadline. Local Rule
3.02 states that “a party desiring to take the
deposition of any person upon oral examination shall give at
least 14 days’ notice in writing . . . to the
deponent.” M.D. Fla. L. R. 3.02 (emphasis added). The
Court is not a party. Nevertheless, the September Court Order
was entered on September 9, 2019, which is fifteen days
before the deposition.
addition, as stated in the Court’s Order, dated
September 18, 2019 (Doc. 170), Plaintiff must make herself
available for deposition in the judicial district in which
she filed suit. Curry v. HSBC N.A. Holdings, Inc.,
No. 8:14-CV-2420-T-30JSS, 2015 WL 4911447, at *2 (M.D. Fla.
Aug. 17, 2015); see also DeepGulf, Inc. v.
Moszkowski, 330 F.R.D. 600, 608 (N.D. Fla. 2019)
(stating that there is a presumption that a plaintiff may be
deposed in the district in which he has initiated his
action); Culhane v. MSC Cruises (USA), Inc., 290
F.R.D. 565, 566 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (stating that the
“Plaintiff in an action should expect to be deposed in
the forum where the action is pending”). Given that the
Court had already addressed Plaintiffs request to postpone or
prevent her deposition, the Court ...