United States District Court, S.D. Florida
ORDER DISMISSING CASE
N. Scola, Jr., United States District Judge
Consulate General Antonio El has applied to proceed in the
district court without prepaying any fees or costs.
(Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 3.) It appears Antonio El seeks to
proceed on behalf of Plaintiffs Amirah El, and Ali Bey as
well. Because El has not paid the required filing fee, the
screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) are
applicable. Under the statute, courts are permitted to
dismiss a suit “any time . . . the court determines
that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted;
or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Upon initial screening, the Court finds El’s complaint
(ECF No. 1) fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted, is frivolous, and must be dismissed.
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading
contain a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Thereunder “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
Consequently, “to state a plausible claim for relief,
the plaintiff must plead ‘factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”
Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1268
(11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
El purports to petition the Court for habeas corpus relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He submits he is being held on
orders by a “501(c)3 non profit
organization/corporation” and that he was sentenced by
the Superior Court of California. (Compl. at ¶¶
3–4.) In the section of the form petition he filled out
that asks him to describe the decision or action he is
challenging, El says he “Demands Proof of Valid Claim
of Alleged Charges and to show valid proof of probable
cause” and demands that the Defendants “Provide
Valid Proof of Claim on behalf of both children
damages.” (Id. at ¶¶ 5–6.) He
lists four grounds in support of his claim: (1)
“Violation of Unalienable Secured 4th
Amendment Constitutional Rights of 1791 (Republic) Consulate
General El’s consort and children was violated without
voluntary consent Given”; (2) “Violation of
Treaty of Peace and Friendship”; (3) “Conspiracy
and Fraudulent Transactions”; and (4) “Violation
of Sworn Oath and Duty To Uphold The United States of America
Constitution 1791 (Republic).” (Id. at ¶
13.) The only facts El relays are that California
“agents have given a false statement/report accusing
Consulate General El of a[n] alleged crime of assault under
color of law. Video evidence obtained by defendants proves
and shows the complaining agents fraudulent report to be
false due to the agent never falling or ever being struck
with a car door.” (Id.) The relief El seeks is
“A Common Law Remedy and to Remove All Claims Under
Color Of Law. Also Immediate Release Of Consulate General
El’s Children[ and] to set aside and suppress all
information.” (Id. at ¶15.)
El’s presentation is unintelligible. And certainly his
claims as alleged do not in any way arise under § 2241.
See, e.g., Bryant v. Warden, FCC
Coleman-Medium, 738 F.3d 1253, 1288 (11th Cir. 2013),
overruled on other grounds by McCarthan v. Dir. of
Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076 (11th Cir.
2017) (“[Section] 2241 habeas petitions . . . are
generally reserved for challenges to execution of a sentence
or the nature of confinement, not the validity of the
sentence itself or the fact of confinement.”)
And even if his claims did have anything to do with §
2241, such a petition “must be filed in the
incarceration district.” Id. Further, not only
has El failed to set forth the basis for the Court’s
jurisdiction, he affirmatively maintains that, in fact, the
“U.S. District [C]ourt does not have
jurisdiction.” (Compl. at ¶ 9 (emphasis added).)
El has also not explained what Defendants Department of
Children and Family Service, Superior Court of California,
and Julie Fox Blackshaw have to do with his grievances.
short, El’s complaint fails to meet the standard for
plausibility articulated in Iqbal and
Twombly. It does not include sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, that would allow the Court to
reasonably infer what his claims for relief against the
Defendants may be. See Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d
553, 556–57 (11th Cir. 1984) (“[A] complaint will
be dismissed as insufficient where the allegations it
contains are vague and conclusory.”). Even under the
relaxed pleading standard afforded to pro se litigants,
El’s pro se complaint fails to state a claim for which
relief may be granted. See Abele v. Tolbert, 130 F.
App’x 342, 343 (11th Cir. 2005).
screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 also authorize
courts to dismiss claims “at any time if the court
determines [the action] is frivolous or malicious.” 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(1). “A claim is frivolous
if it is without arguable merit either in law or fact.”
Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir.
2001) (citing Battle v. Central State Hosp., 898
F.2d 126, 129 (11th Cir. 1990)). “Section 1915
represents a balance between facilitating an indigent
person’s access to the courts and curbing the
potentially vast number of suits by such persons, who, unlike
those who must pay in order to litigate their claims, have no
economic disincentives to filing frivolous or malicious suits
once in forma pauperis status is granted.”
Herrick v. Collins, 914 F.2d 228, 229 (11th Cir.
1990) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
327-28 (1989)). “To this end, the statute accords
judges . . . the unusual power to pierce the veil of the
complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those
claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. “The frivolousness
determination is a discretionary one.” Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). The mishmash of
claims, vague assertions, and unrelated allegations set forth
here amount to a frivolous complaint.
the Court denies El’s motion to
proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No.
3), and, under § 1915,
dismisses his complaint without prejudice
(ECF No. 1). The Clerk is directed to close
this case, and any pending motions are
denied as moot.
Court directs the Clerk to mail a copy of
this order to the Plaintiff at the address indicated below.