United States District Court, S.D. Florida
Alexidor, pro se.
ORDER ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA
PAUPERIS AND DISMISSING CASE
BLOOM, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
CAUSE is before the Court upon the pro se
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma
Pauperis, ECF No.  (the “Motion”), filed
in conjunction with Plaintiff's Complaint, ECF No. 
(the “Complaint”). Plaintiff Betty Alexidor
(“Plaintiff” or “Alexidor”) has not
paid the required filing fee and, thus, the screening
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) are applicable. The
Court has carefully reviewed the Complaint, the Motion, and
the record in this case, and is otherwise fully advised in
the premises. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's
Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and
the Motion is DENIED AS MOOT.
to our conception and system of justice is that the
courthouse doors will not be closed to persons based on their
inability to pay a filing fee. Congress has provided that a
court “may authorize the commencement . . . or
prosecution of any suit, action or proceeding . . . or appeal
therein, without the prepayment of fees . . . therefore, by a
person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of
all assets such [person] possesses that the person is unable
to pay such fees . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1);
see Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d
1305, 1306 n.1 (11th Cir. 2004) (interpreting statute to
apply to all persons seeking to proceed in forma
pauperis (“IFP”)). Permission to proceed
in forma pauperis is committed to the sound
discretion of the court. Camp v. Oliver, 798 F.2d
434, 437 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Thomas v.
Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit, 574 Fed.Appx. 916, 916
(11th Cir. 2014) (“A district court has wide discretion
in ruling on an application for leave to proceed
IFP.”). However, “proceeding in forma
pauperis is a privilege, not a right.”
Camp, 798 F.2d at 437.
addition to the required showing that the litigant, because
of poverty, is unable to pay for the court fees and costs,
Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307, upon a motion to proceed
in forma pauperis the Court is required to examine
whether “the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or
malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2). If the Court determines that the complaint
satisfies any of the three enumerated circumstances under
Section 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must dismiss the complaint.
pleading in a civil action must contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Although a
complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,
” it must provide “more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that Rule
8(a)(2)'s pleading standard “demands more than an
accusation”). Nor can a complaint rest on
“‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of
‘further factual enhancement.'”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 557 (alteration in original)). “[A]
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.'” Id. (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). Importantly, “[p]ro se
pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than
pleadings drafted by attorneys and [are] liberally
construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148
F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). “But the leniency
accorded pro se litigants does not give a court
license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or
to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading to sustain an
action.” Matthews, Wilson & Matthews,
Inc. v. Capital City Bank, 614 Fed.Appx. 969, 969 n.1
(11th Cir. 2015) (citing GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cty. of
Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998),
overruled in part on other grounds by Randall v.
Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709 (11th Cir. 2010)).
Complaint in this case must be dismissed because it fails to
state a claim. In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, a plaintiff must plead that she was (1) deprived
of a right; (2) secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States; and (3) that the alleged deprivation was
committed under color of state law. See Am. Mfrs. Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999);
Rayburn v. Hogue, 241 F.3d 1341, 1348 (11th Cir.
2001). In the Complaint, Alexidor alleges that she has been
receiving a Special One Time Assistance (“SOTA”),
pursuant to which Defendants offered her a housing deal that
would pay her security deposit and rent for a full year. She
alleges further that when she called the SOTA program number,
she was told that she no longer qualified for certain
benefits because she lives out of state (presumably meaning
outside of New York). As a result, Plaintiff contends that
the SOTA program is misleading and requests declaratory and
injunctive relief, including that the Court continue her
grant from the SOTA program.
the Court liberally construes pro se pleadings, the
Court is not free to construct causes of action for which
adequate facts are not pleaded. Indeed, although Alexidor
states conclusively that Defendants violated her Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process, property, life,
and liberty, the Complaint does not set forth sufficient
facts to state plausible claims based on these theories. As
the Court is unable to ascertain any plausible claim for
relief from Plaintiffs allegations, the instant action must
it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
Complaint, ECF No. , is DISMISSED
Plaintiffs Motion, ECF No. , is
DENIED AS MOOT.
Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this