final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County Lower
Tribunal No. 15-22546, Mark Blumstein, Judge.
Office of Roderick D. Vereen, Esq., P.A., and Roderick D.
Vereen, for appellant.
Moody, Attorney General, and Joanne Diez, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
EMAS, C.J., and FERNANDEZ and MILLER, JJ.
Tavius Lubin appeals from a conviction and sentence for
attempted second-degree murder. He raises two issues, neither
of which is meritorious.
first contends that the trial court erred in denying
Lubin's motion for judgment of acquittal. Upon our de
novo review, Pagan v. State, 830 So.2d 792, 803
(Fla. 2002); Giralt v. State, 935 So.2d 599, 601
(Fla. 3d DCA 2006), and viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the State, we hold that the State presented
sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction and that a
rational trier of fact could find, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that Lubin committed the crime of attempted second-degree
murder with a firearm. See Pagan, 830 So.2d at 803.
also contends that the trial court erred in admitting
Williams rule evidence of Lubin's prior crimes,
wrongs or acts upon the victim. See §
90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2018) (providing: "Similar
fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible
when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including,
but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is
relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity").
State timely filed its notice of intent to offer this
evidence (see section 90.404(d)1.) The trial court
held a hearing on the State's notice, but did not issue a
definitive ruling, thus requiring Lubin to make a
contemporaneous objection when the State presented such
evidence during trial. See § 90.104(1), Fla.
Stat. (2018) (providing: "If the court has made a
definitive ruling on the record admitting or excluding
evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not renew
an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error
for appeal.") Lubin failed to make a contemporaneous
objection to this evidence at trial, and thus failed to
preserve the issue for appeal. See Johnson v. State,
969 So.2d 938 (Fla. 2007) (noting that a claim of error in
the admission of evidence is not preserved where the grounds
for reversal argued on appeal are not the same as those
raised in the objection below); Steinhorst v. State,
412 So.2d 332, 338 (Fla. 1982) (holding that "in order
for an argument to be cognizable on appeal, it must be the
specific contention asserted as legal ground for the
objection, exception, or motion below").
even if the issue had been preserved, we conclude that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this
evidence. See Brookins v. State, 228 So.3d 31, 37
n.6 (Fla. 2017) (noting that a trial court's ruling on
the admission of collateral crimes evidence is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion); Durousseau v. State, 55
So.3d 543 (Fla. 2010) (noting that the test for admissibility
of Williams rule evidence is relevancy; holding that
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting, in the
guilt phase of a capital murder trial, collateral crimes
evidence that defendant had previously committed two other
murders, where court determined the evidence was relevant,
weighed the probative value against the danger of unfair
prejudice, and ensured that such evidence did not become an
impermissible feature of the trial). See also Dennis v.
State, 817 So.2d 741 (Fla. 2002) (holding, in a murder
prosecution, that collateral evidence of prior incidents in
which the defendant had stalked, threatened, and assaulted
the victim was properly admitted as relevant to establish the
defendant's motive or intent); Simmons v. State,
790 So.2d 1177 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (holding that evidence of
the defendant's prior violent acts upon his girlfriend
were relevant and admissible to establish his intent to
commit the charged crimes of aggravated battery, aggravated
assault and armed kidnapping upon his girlfriend); Burgal
v. State, 740 So.2d 82 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (holding that
prior incidents of domestic violence by the defendant against
the victim were properly admitted to prove motive, intent,
and premeditation in prosecution for attempted first-degree
murder); Brown v. State, 611 So.2d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA
1992) (holding that evidence the defendant had a rocky
relationship with the victim and had threatened to kill her
if he caught her with another man was relevant to establish
motive in a prosecution for battery and attempted