final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit,
St. Lucie County; Gary L. Sweet, Judge; L.T. Case No.
Haughwout, Public Defender, and Stacey Kime, Assistant Public
Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jessenia J.
Concepcion, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for
appeal, the defendant primarily argues that the circuit
court, in sentencing him for the instant crimes, violated
Norvil v. State, 191 So.3d 406 (Fla. 2016), by
considering a collateral crime which the defendant committed
before the instant crimes, but for which the defendant was
not convicted until after he committed the instant
state argues that Norvil is inapplicable. According
to the state, although the defendant was not convicted of the
collateral crime until after he committed the instant crimes,
he nevertheless committed his collateral crime
before committing the instant crimes, and was
convicted of his collateral crime before he was
sentenced for the instant crimes.
agree with the state's argument. We hold that if a
defendant commits, but is not convicted of, a collateral
crime before committing the instant crimes, the sentencing
court still may consider the collateral crime in rendering
sentence for the instant crimes, if the defendant has been
convicted of the collateral crime before sentencing for the
instant crimes. Therefore, we affirm the defendant's
sentence for the instant crimes.
present this opinion in three parts:
1. an examination of Norvil;
2. the parties' arguments in this case; and
3. our review, based on the Criminal Punishment Code and
An Examination of Norvil
Norvil, the defendant entered an open plea to the
charge of armed burglary of a dwelling. Id. at 407.
Before sentencing, the state recommended that the court
consider a new charge against the defendant for burglary of a
vehicle, which the defendant allegedly committed while he was
on pre-trial release for the burglary of a dwelling charge.
Id. Defense counsel objected to the state's
trial court, in pronouncing sentence on the armed burglary of
a dwelling charge, referred to the new burglary of a vehicle
charge, noting that the arrest for the new charge occurred
while the defendant was on pre-trial release. Id. at
the defendant's ultimate appeal to our supreme court, the
issue was framed as "whether the trial court violated
the defendant's due process rights by considering a
subsequent arrest without conviction during