United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Jacksonville Division
MORALES HOWARD UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Casey Mattingly, an inmate of the Florida penal system,
initiated this action by filing, pursuant to the mailbox
rule, a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 (Petition; Doc. 1) on February 24, 2017. In the
Petition, Mattingly challenges a 2016 state court (Duval
County, Florida) judgment of conviction for armed robbery and
aggravated assault. Mattingly raises one ground for relief.
See Petition at 5-14. Respondents have submitted a
memorandum in opposition to the Petition. See
Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Response;
Doc. 15) with exhibits (Resp. Ex.). Mattingly filed a brief
in reply. See Plaintiff's Response to
Respondent's Answer Brief (Reply; Doc. 16). This case is
ripe for review.
Relevant Procedural History
12, 2012, the State of Florida (State) charged Mattingly with
armed robbery (count one), aggravated assault (count two),
and shooting or throwing deadly missiles (count three). Resp.
Ex. B1 at 10. On October 16, 2014, while awaiting trial,
Mattingly filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus
with Florida's First District Court of Appeal (First
DCA), arguing the circuit court violated his speedy trial
rights. Resp. Ex. E1. The First DCA dismissed the petition
for failure to comply with a previous order. Resp. Ex. E6. On
April 17, 2015, Mattingly filed another pro se petition for
writ of habeas corpus with the First DCA, in which he
appealed the circuit court's denial of his notice of
expiration of speedy trial. Resp. Ex. C1. The First DCA
converted the petition to a petition for writ of prohibition,
Resp. Ex. C2, and later dismissed it for lack of prosecution.
Resp. Ex. C5. On July 1, 2015, Mattingly moved to reopen the
case, Resp. Ex. C6, the First DCA granted the request on July
27, 2015, Resp. Ex. C7, and denied the petition on the merits
on August 11, 2015. Resp. Ex. C8. Mattingly moved for
rehearing, Resp. Ex. C9, and the First DCA denied the motion
for rehearing on September 21, 2015. Resp. Ex. C11. On
November 12, 2015, Mattingly filed another petition for writ
of habeas corpus with the Florida Supreme Court that raised
the same issue concerning his speedy trial rights. Resp. Ex.
D1. The Florida Supreme Court denied the petition as
successive based on the First DCA's disposition of the
claim. Resp. Ex. D6.
a jury found Mattingly guilty as charged as to counts one and
two. Resp. Ex. B1 at 249-51. As to count one, the jury found
that Mattingly carried and discharged a firearm during the
commission of the offense. Id. at 249-50. Likewise,
as to count two, the jury found that Mattingly discharged a
firearm during the commission of the offense. Id. at
251. On February 10, 2016, the circuit court sentenced
Mattingly as to counts one and two to a term of incarceration
of twenty years in prison, with a twenty-year minimum
mandatory sentence as to each count. Id. at 304-06.
The circuit court ordered the sentence imposed on count two
to run consecutively to the sentence imposed on count one.
Id. at 305-06.
filed a notice of appeal with the First DCA. Id. at
325. On August 4, 2016, Mattingly, through counsel, filed a
motion to correct sentencing error pursuant to Florida Rule
of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) with the circuit court, in
which he challenged the consecutive nature of his sentences.
Resp. Ex. B3 at 1-8. On September 15, 2015, the circuit court
granted the motion and resentenced Mattingly so that his
sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Resp. Exs. B3 at
9; B4 at 18-24. In his initial brief before the First DCA,
Mattingly argued that the circuit court fundamentally erred
when it referred Mattingly for a competency determination but
failed to enter an order finding him competent before
proceeding to trial. Resp. Ex. B5. The State filed an answer
brief, Resp. Ex. B6, and Mattingly filed a brief in reply.
Resp. Ex. B7. On September 27, 2017, the First DCA issued a
per curiam written opinion affirming Mattingly's judgment
and sentence but remanded the case solely for entry of an
order of competency nunc pro tunc to the date of a hearing
where the circuit court orally adjudicated Mattingly
competent. Resp. Ex. B8. Mattingly filed a motion for
clarification and rehearing en banc, Resp. Ex. B9, which the
First DCA denied on October 17, 2017. Resp. Ex. B10. The
First DCA issued the Mandate on November 7, 2017. Resp. Ex.
February 22, 2016, Mattingly filed a pro se petition for writ
of habeas corpus with the circuit court, in which he alleged
the charging document was invalid. Resp. Ex. G1. The circuit
court denied the petition on November 9, 2017. Resp. Ex. G2.
Mattingly did not appeal. Resp. Ex. A.
One-Year Limitations Period
proceeding was timely filed within the one-year limitations
period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to
establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See
Chavez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d
1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). “In deciding whether to
grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider
whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the
petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would
entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.”
Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007);
Jones v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 834
F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2016), cert.
denied, 137 S.Ct. 2245 (2017). “It follows
that if the record refutes the applicant's factual
allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district
court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.”
Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474. The pertinent facts of
this case are fully developed in the record before the Court.
Because the Court can “adequately assess
[Mattingly's] claim[s] without further factual
development, ” Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d
1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not
Governing Legal Principles