final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Teresa
Mary Pooler, Judge.
J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Maria E. Lauredo, Chief
Assistant Public Defender, and Allen Kathir, Assistant Public
Defender, for appellant.
Moody, Attorney General, and David Llanes, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
SALTER, MILLER, and GORDO, JJ.
O.P-G., challenges his finding of guilt for disruption of a
school function, in violation of section 877.13, Florida
Statutes (2019). Appellant contends that the erroneous
determination by the lower tribunal that off-campus conduct
evidenced a statutory violation, along with the State's
failure to assiduously heed its discovery obligations,
necessitate reversal. For the reasons set forth below, we
discern no error and affirm.
days after a deadly mass shooting claimed the lives of
multiple students and staff members at Marjory Stoneman
Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida, law enforcement
officers were alerted to a threatening comment posted online
in response to a YouTube video featuring the aftermath of the
incident. The post, rendered under the username "Ninja
Roos," reflected "I[']m going to shoot my
school in [F]lorida[.] [I']m only 13[.] I got bull[ied]
and [I']m getting my revenge with my guns[.] [T]he school
is [M]iami [L]akes [M]iddle [S]chool." In response,
Sergeant Jose Canaves propounded an "exigent
circumstances" request upon Google, and obtained
subscriber information, in the form of an internet protocol
address ("IP address"), for Ninja Roos. Thereafter,
Comcast furnished the address of the subscriber at the time
of the posting. A search of a student database revealed that
O.P-G., a resident at the address, was enrolled as a student
at Miami Lakes Middle School.
Hector Martinez responded to Miami Lakes Middle School and
interacted with various administrators. After he was informed
of the threat, the school principal directed that students be
funneled through a single entrance, and further ordered a
"pat down" of all backpacks. Supervisory staff was
added, security monitors were positioned throughout the
school, and classes did not commence in a timely manner.
was removed from class and escorted to the main office of the
school. Upon arrival, he volunteered he was aware that law
enforcement was at the school "because of some postings
[he] placed on the internet." O.P-G. provided a written
confession, which was later suppressed by the lower tribunal.
He was charged with disruption of a school function and the
case proceeded to trial.
trial, Detective Martinez testified that O.P-G., when asked
by the assistant principal whether he made a posting under
the pseudonym "Ninja Roos," responded
affirmatively. The defense lodged a
Richardson objection, contending the admission had
not been properly disclosed in discovery. The defense then
withdrew the objection, as the prosecutor represented that
the contents of the statement had indeed been furnished prior
to trial. Questioning resumed and thereafter, the defense
unsuccessfully argued the admission constituted an
involuntary confession, in violation of
Miranda. The defense then re-raised a
Richardson objection, contending the State failed to
disclose the assistant principal as a witness. Further inquiry
ensued, and the trial court found no discovery violation and
resumed the trial. Following the presentation of the
evidence, the defense sought involuntary dismissal. The court
denied the motion and found O.P-G. delinquent, as charged in
the amended petition, withheld adjudication, and imposed a
defined term of supervision.
to trial, O.P-G. submitted a public records request to the
Miami-Dade Schools Police Department which yielded a
five-page supplement to a truncated offense incident report
previously disclosed to the defense in discovery. Although
the report did not reflect O.P-G.'s statement to the
assistant principal, it contained other inculpatory evidence,
including additional online threats purportedly penned by
O.P-G. On the basis of the incomplete report, O.P-G. again
sought involuntary dismissal. The lower court conducted a
hearing and denied relief. The instant appeal followed.
standard of review that applies to a motion for judgment of
dismissal in a juvenile case is the same standard that
applies to a motion for judgment of acquittal in a criminal
case." A.P.R. v. State, 894 So.2d 282, 284
(Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (citing J.P. v. State, 855 So.2d
1262, 1264 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) ("Though referred to
as a judgment of acquittal, under the Rules of Juvenile
Procedure, the proper title of the motion should have been a
Motion for Judgment of Dismissal. Notwithstanding, this court
uses the same standard on review as for a judgment of
acquittal.") (citations omitted); E.A.B. v.
State, 851 So.2d 308 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); W.E.P. v.
State, 790 So.2d 1166 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)); see also
J.L.F. v. State, 887 So.2d 432 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004);
M.N. v. State, 821 So.2d 1205 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)
(applying standard of review for motions for judgment of
acquittal in a juvenile case). Accordingly, "[o]ur
review . . . is de novo." J.W.J. v. State, 994
So.2d 1223, 1224 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (citing E.A.B.,
851 So.2d at 310). "A motion for judgment of dismissal
should not be granted unless there is no legally sufficient
evidence on which to base a guilty verdict."
Id. (citing G.D. v. State, 497 So.2d 1318,
1319 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)). "We view the evidence and all
reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the
State." Id. (citing D.E. v. State, 904
So.2d 558, 561 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)). Finally, "[u]nder
Richardson, when a discovery violation is alleged,
the standard of appellate review is whether the trial court
abused its discretion in determining if a violation occurred
and if so, whether it was inadvertent, and not prejudicial to
the preparation of the defense." Mascolo v.
State, 774 So.2d 827, 829 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).
Section 877.13, Florida Statutes
first asserts that the fact that the threat was dispatched
into cyberspace from an off-campus location is fatal to the
integrity of the court's finding of guilt, contending
section 877.13, Florida Statutes, solely proscribes on-campus
actions. Alternatively, he argues state regulation of his
off-campus speech renders the applicable statutory scheme
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
seminal student speech case, Tinker v. Des Moines
IndependentCommunity School District, 393 U.S.
503, 506, 89 S.Ct. 733, 736, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 ...