United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Fort Myers Division
MARION REED, Individually and as Administrator of Estate of Barbara C. Reed, JENNIFER EDSON and RANDY REED, Plaintiffs,
CHARLES W. DENNY, IV and SANDRA DENNY, as personal representatives of the Estate of Charles W. Denny, III, Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER 
POLSTER CHAPPELL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter comes before the Court on sua sponte review.
Because this Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, the case is
remanded back to state court.
August 2018, Plaintiffs initiated this wrongful death and
survival action in Iowa state court against Defendants
Schneider Electric USA, Inc., as successor-in-interest to
Square D Company (“Square D”), Charles W. Denny,
(“Charles Denny”), and Does 1-10. (Doc. 1-2).
Plaintiffs allege because of Defendants' negligence,
Barbara Reed was exposed to asbestos, which led to her death.
(Id.). Defendants removed the case to the Northern
District of Iowa, relying on 28 U.S.C. Â§Â§ 1331 (federal
question), 1343(3) (civil rights/constitutional claims), and
1332 (diversity) to confer jurisdiction. (Doc. 1).
Northern District of Iowa determined that it lacked personal
jurisdiction over Charles Denny III, and because his Estate
had been filed in Collier County, Florida, transferred the
case to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). (Docs. 73;
75). But before doing so the Northern District of Iowa
dismissed the only federal claim (Doc. 74).
the only federal claim (declaratory relief as to whether
certain Iowa statutes are unconstitutional) has been
dismissed. (Doc. 74). Indeed, Plaintiffs' Third Amended
Complaint (Doc. 145) only alleges state law claims and
asserts: “There is no longer a federal question in this
case. This Court may have supplemental jurisdiction over the
Florida state law claims, notwithstanding the lack of
diversity among the parties.” (Doc. 145 at ¶ 9)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367).
district courts are given supplemental jurisdiction over
state claims that “form part of the same case or
controversy” as federal claims over which they have
original jurisdiction. See28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
This jurisdictional extension has limits, however, and a
district court “may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over [such] claim[s] ... if ... [it] has
dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The
decision of whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
where a district court has dismissed all federal claims is
left to the court's discretion, as “pendent
jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiffs
right.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (footnote omitted); see
also Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086,
1088-89 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). When deciding
whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, district
courts should consider “judicial economy, convenience,
fairness, and comity.” Baggett v. First Nat'l
Bank of Gainesville, 117 F.3d 1342, 1353 (11th Cir.1997)
(citations omitted). “Another important consideration
... is the running of a state statute limitation.”
Ingram v. Sch. Bd. of Miami Dade Cty., 167 Fed.Appx.
107, 109 (11th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
noted, the Court dismissed the federal claim over which it
had original jurisdiction, leaving only the state law claims.
On this posture, Plaintiffs are no longer entitled to remain
in federal court. See28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3);
Busse v. Lee Cty., Fla., 317 Fed.Appx. 968, 973-74
(11th Cir. 2009) (“Since the district court ‘had
dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction,' it therefore had the discretion not to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over [Appellant's]
state law claims.” (citation omitted)).
considered the above-discussed factors, the Court declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state
law claims. See Baggett, 117 F.3d at 1353
(“Where § 1367(c) applies, considerations of
judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity may
influence the court's discretion to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction.” (citations omitted)). This case has not
progressed past Defendants' motion to dismiss, and thus
it is still in the early stages of litigation. See
Raney, 370 F.3d at 1089 (encouraging district courts
to dismiss remaining state claims when the federal claim has
been dismissed prior to trial). In addition, resolution of
Plaintiffs' state law claims depends on determinations of
state law. Finally, there are no concerns about the
timeliness of Plaintiffs' claims because § 1367(d)
tolls the statutes of limitation for state claims during the
period in which they have been pending in federal court and
for thirty (30) days after an order of dismissal.
See28 U.S.C. § 1367(d); Jinks v. Richland
Cty., 538 U.S. 456, 465 (2003) (upholding 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(d) as constitutional); Beck v. Prupis,
162 F.3d 1090, 1099-1100 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[A]
dismissal under section 1367 tolls the statute of limitations
on the dismissed claims for 30 days”); see
generally Dunavant v. Sirote & Permutt,
P.C., No. CIV. A. 13-0268-WS-M, 2014 WL 2885483, at *13
n.7 (S.D. Ala. June 25, 2014). For these reasons, the Court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs' state claims and will remand this case to the
Iowa state state court.
it is now ORDERED:
(1) The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over this case and therefore the case is
REMANDED to the Iowa District Court in and
for Linn County.
(2) The Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit a
certified copy of this Opinion and Order to the Clerk of that
(3) The Clerk is further DIRECTED to
terminate any pending motion or deadlines and ...