Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Port Royal Property, LLC v. Woodson Electric Solutions, Inc.

Florida Court of Appeals, Third District

October 30, 2019

Port Royal Property, LLC, a Florida limited liability company, Appellant,
v.
Woodson Electric Solutions, Inc., a Florida corporation; Robert J. Smallwood, an individual; and Richard L. Hanson, an individual, Appellees.

         Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

          An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Lower Tribunal No. 18-29307 Jose M. Rodriguez, Judge.

          Coffey Burlington, P.L., and Kevin C. Kaplan and Jeffrey B. Crockett, for appellant.

          Holmes Fraser, PA, and Ian T. Holmes, David P. Fraser, and Daniel P. Fraser (Naples), for appellees.

          Before SALTER, LINDSEY, and HENDON, JJ.

          HENDON, J.

         Port Royal Property, LLC ("Plaintiff"), appeals from a non-final order granting the defendants', Woodson Electric Solutions, Inc., et al. (collectively, "Defendants"), amended motion to transfer venue from Miami-Dade County to Collier County pursuant to section 47.122, Florida Statutes (2019) ("amended motion to transfer venue"). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the order under review and remand for further proceedings.

         I. Facts and Procedural History

         This is the Plaintiff's and the Defendants' second time before this Court. See Woodson Elec. Sols., Inc. v. Port Royal Prop., LLC, 271 So.3d 111 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) ("Woodson Electric I"). As stated in Woodson Electric I, the Plaintiff filed suit against the Defendants in Miami-Dade County, stemming from the design, installation, and implementation of audiovisual and internet systems in a house owned by the Plaintiff in Naples, Collier County, Florida. Id. at 113. The Defendants moved to dismiss for improper venue and/or to transfer the action from Miami-Dade County to Collier County under section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2018)[1] ("motion to dismiss"). Id. In response to the motion to dismiss, the Plaintiff filed an affidavit, which provides that the Defendants made misrepresentations that induced the Plaintiff to enter into a contract executed by the Plaintiff in Miami. Id. Following a hearing, the trial court entered a non-final order denying the Defendants' motion to dismiss, and the Defendants filed the non-final appeal in Woodson Electric I. Id. Based on this Court's determination that the causes of action based on the Defendants' alleged misrepresentations accrued in Miami, we affirmed the trial court's non-final order denying the Defendants' motion to dismiss. Id. at 114-15.

         Following this Court's affirmance, the Defendants filed the amended motion to transfer venue from Miami-Dade County to Collier County pursuant to section 47.122, which provides: "For the convenience of the parties or witnesses or in the interest of justice, any court of record may transfer any civil action to any other court of record in which it might have been brought." In their amended motion to transfer venue, the Defendants argued that transferring the action from Miami-Dade County to Collier County was warranted pursuant "to the required analysis under Kinney System, Inc. v. Continental Insurance Co., 674 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1996)." In making this argument, the Defendants relied on this Court's opinion in Westchester Fire Insurance Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 673 So.2d 958 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), which was issued a few months after the Florida Supreme Court issued Kinney.

         At the hearing on the amended motion to transfer venue, the Defendants argued that the trial court was required to conduct the following four-part analysis set forth in Kinney:

[1] As a prerequisite, the court must establish whether an adequate alternative forum exists which possesses jurisdiction over the whole case. [2] Next, the trial judge must consider all relevant factors of private interest, weighing in the balance a strong presumption against disturbing plaintiffs' initial forum choice. [3] If the trial judge finds this balance of private interests in equipoise or near equipoise, he must then determine whether or not factors of public interest tip the balance in favor of a trial in [another] forum. [4] If he decides that the balance favors such a . . . forum, the trial judge must finally ensure that plaintiffs can reinstate their suit in the alternative forum without undue inconvenience or prejudice.

Id. at 90 (quoting Pain v. United Techs. Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 784-85 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.061(a) (codifying the four-step analysis set forth in Kinney). In response, the Plaintiff argued that the Kinney factors are not applicable because Kinney relates to the transfer of a case filed in Florida to a jurisdiction outside of Florida based on forum non conveniens, not a transfer from one Florida county to another Florida county pursuant to section 47.122.

         The trial court entered a non-final order granting the Defendants' amended motion to transfer venue. In doing so, the trial court ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.